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There is evidence in the psychological literature for representations of objects 
(Pylyshyn’s visual indexes) that refer to and track, not properties, but what in our sort 
of world typically turn out to be individual physical objects. I am concerned with how 
such representations acquire their content. 
 
Two strategies for accounting for the content of representations are a) 
representations of particulars refer to the entity that caused them; and b) 
representations of particulars refer to the entity whose properties are represented by 
the visual system. The first strategy faces the “which link” problem: since any one of 
the links in the causal chain leading to the token representation counts as a cause of 
the token representation, no particular link is individuated as the referent. I examine a 
recent proposed solution to this problem (Fodor’s counterfactual triangulation) and 
conclude that it fails to determine whether the referent of a visual index is an object, 
as opposed to a state of affairs, or an event. 
  
 
The problems with the first strategy are a reason to explore the second 
strategy: representations of objects refer to the entity whose properties are represented 
by the visual system. I adopt Fodor’s asymmetric dependency account (ADA) of 
intentionality to account for how representations of properties get their content. 
Fodor’s account is chosen not because it is free of problems, but because it has the 
structure of a theory that promises to deal with many of the classic problems that 
befall informational semantics (e.g. the disjunction problem).  
 
Since ADA is designed to work for causal relations between properties and 
not for causal relations between particulars, it cannot, by itself, account for how 
representations of particulars get their content. So I suggest that ADA be 
supplemented with conceptual role semantics to account for the logico-syntactic roles 
of representations of particulars. In particular, I suggest that to represent objects the 
visual system requires the capacity to form and store in memory definite descriptions 
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This dissertation examines whether and how Fodor’s asymmetric dependency 
account of intentionality (ADA) can be used to ground the contents of representations 
in the “early visual system”. Before continuing, it is important to define exactly what 
“early visual system” means here in order to specify the type of representations that 
are going to be the focus in this dissertation: 
 
I have adopted Pylyshyn’s usage of “early visual system” in this dissertation 
which, with few exceptions1, corresponds to the general use of the term. Before 
expounding on the main traits of the definition, it is important to note that Pylyshyn 
defines “early visual system” functionally, as opposed to neuroanatomically. One of 
the results of defining it this way is that the computations of the early visual system 
are not confined to those of the primary visual cortex, as is sometimes thought2. The 
definition that Pylyshyn (1999) provides goes as follows3:   
                                                 
1 For example, according to Pylyshyn’s usage, focal attention is outside (and prior) to the early visual 
system, which departs from the way the term is used in neuropsychology (cf. Pylyshyn (1999, p. 3, ff. 
2)).   
2 Cf. Julesz (1991, p. 740, italics mine): “Conceptually defined, “early vision” should be identical to 
pure bottom-up visual processes depicted without being influenced by the top-down stream of 
semantic information. Neurophysiologically defined, “early vision” should correspond to the first 
neural processing stages in the retina and the visual cortex. Psychologically defined, “early vision” 
should encompass a range of perceptual phenomena that can be experienced by humans in the absence 
of higher cognitive and semantic cues.” 





1. A proper part of the process of visual perception involves a uniquely visual system 
called “early vision”.  
2. The early vision system involves the computation of most specifically-visual 
properties, including 3D shape descriptions. 
3. The early vision system carries out complex computations, many of which involve 
top-down processing4. That is to say that the interpretation of parts of a stimulus may 
depend upon the interpretation of other parts of the stimulus, resulting in global-to-
local influences.  
4. The early vision system is encapsulated from cognition: it is cognitively 
impenetrable. That is to say that it cannot access relevant expectations, knowledge, 
and utilities in determining the function it computes. 
5. Cognition intervenes in visual perception either by allocating attention to locations 
or properties prior to the operation of early vision, or by recognizing and identifying 
patterns after the operation of early vision. It does not interfere in the operations of 
early vision.  
                                                 
4 What “top-down” means for Pylyshyn is different from the meaning of the term in other authors’ 
writing (cf. ff. 2 and Julesz (1991, p. 740)). For Pylyshyn (1999, p. 6) top-down influences within early 
vision are influences of visual interpretations computed by early vision on other visual interpretations, 
separated either by space or time. What authors like Julesz (1991) mean by top-down process is closer 
to what Pylyshyn (1999, p. 6) calls “cognitive penetration”: Cognitive penetration originates outside 
the visual system and affects the content of visual perception in a meaning-dependent way. When a 






Based upon this definition, the focus of this dissertation is going to be on 
representations produced by an autonomous visual system whose processes are not 
affected by background beliefs. The structure of these processes is innate—not 
influenced by the environment. Thus, how the representations in question get their 
content is not dependent on background knowledge, but on innate contstraints (what 
are called “natural constraints”5) that are built in the visual system. Thus, the goal of 
this dissertation is to figure out what some of the necessary constraints need to be in 
order for a representation to refer to a particular object.  
 
I have chosen to examine how Fodor’s account can help determine what some 
of the necessary constraints need to be in order for a representation to refer to a 
particular object. Fodor’s account is chosen not because it is free of problems, but 
because it has the structure of a theory that promises to deal with many of the classic 
problems that befall informational semantics.  
 
                                                 
5 Cf. Pylyshyn (1999, p. 28): “Embodying a natural constraint is different from drawing an inference 
from knowledge of the world (including knowledge of the particular constraint in question) in a 
number of ways. (a) A natural constraints that is embodied in early vision does not apply and is not 
available to any processes outside of the visual system (e.g., it does not in any way inform the 
cognitive system)…(b) Early vision does not respond to any other kind of knowledge or new 
information related to these constraints (e.g., the constraints show up even if the observer knows that 




Applying Fodor’s account and modifications of it to the representations in the 
early visual system allows me to take a position with regards to the question in 
psychology as to what is required for representation of particulars in the early visual 
system. In particular, I am concerned with Zenon Pylyshyn’s claim that visual indices 
(FINSTs) refer unmediated by conceptual representations of location to objects in the 
external world.6 In contrast, I argue that representations of particulars are mediated by 
conceptual representations of spatial relations. Furthermore, I argue that the capacity 
to express definite description is necessary to represent particular objects. 
 
Pylyshyn’s view presupposes a strategy for accounting for reference where 
tokens of symbols represent the particulars that caused them. As I explain in Chapter 
1, such strategies have trouble specifying the link, in a causal chain connecting a 
particular with a token symbol, that is the symbol’s referent7. Furthermore, such 
strategies, by themselves, have difficulty accounting for how properties are 
represented: allowing that they account for representations of particulars, these 
strategies need to provide a principled manner of generalizing from representations of 
particulars to representations of properties. It is not clear what this principled manner 
would be in a strategy that is built around only causal relations between particulars. 
This suggests that such strategies be modified—e.g. by adding teleosemantic features 
or by also appealing to causal relations between properties. I argue in Chapter 1 that 
the end result is likely to be at least as complicated account as the one that I will 
                                                 
6 Cf. Pylyshyn (1988, 2001, 2007). 




pursue in this dissertation: a strategy for accounting for content built around nomic 
causal relations between properties. This provides a reason to explore the latter 
strategy as well, which I do in this dissertation.  
 
In the chapters that follow I explore whether and how one instance of this 
strategy—Fodor’s asymmetric dependency account (ADA)—deals with one of the 
main problems raised against it (its inability to explain how particular objects are 
represented) and whether and how it can help determining what is required to 
represent particular objects in the early visual system. The overall argument in the 
dissertation can be informally summarized as follows: 
 
1. ADA is a promising account (Chapters 1-2) 
2. ADA cannot account for how representations of particular objects get their content 
(Chapters 2-3) 
3. Buttressing ADA with a conceptual role semantics is a promising strategy for 
solving the problem in (2) (Chapter 3) 
4. Conceptual role semantics is not as hopeless as some (e.g. Fodor) think it is in 
dealing with its main objections (Chapter 4) 
5. The account in (3) claims that definite descriptions are required to represent 
particular objects. 
6. If the ability to form definite descriptions presupposes conceptual representations, 
then the account in (3) is contrary to Pylyshyn’s claim that representations of objects 





In Chapter 2 I present ADA, the motivations for it, some of the main changes 
it has gone through, and the problem of representing particular objects that it faces. 
Fodor designed ADA as a type of informational semantics account because of his 
skepticism about conceptual role semantics—the account according to which the 
content of a symbol is defined in terms of its inferential relations with other symbols. 
This account Fodor takes to fatally suffer from the holism problem—the charge that 
conceptual role semantics spells doom for psychology as a science aiming to provide 
generalizations over people’s mental states. The holism charge is that a) one cannot 
identify a subset of a symbol’s inferential relations as the meaning-constitutive ones 
in a non ad hoc manner8; b) a symbol’s content would then have to be defined 
through all of a symbol’s inferential relations which would spell doom for 
psychology. This bleak scenario would follow because no two people with different 
minds would share the same symbols with the same contents. This means that 
psychology would fail to provide laws and generalizations. Since psychology does 
                                                 
8 Fodor takes this for granted because he is persuaded by Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic 
distinction in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Analytic statements are true in virtue of the meaning of 
their constituent concepts. They can be used to define the meaning of a term. Synthetic statements are 
true in virtue of how the world is. The analogue of analytic statements in conceptual role semantics is a 
proper subset of a symbol’s inferential roles—the meaning-constitutive ones. The analogue of the 
synthetic statements is all the other inferential roles. But if the analytic/synthetic distinction is 
bankrupt, then conceptual role semantics would not be able to appeal to the analogous distinction 





provide laws and generalizations, conceptual role semantics must be mistaken and so 
a different approach is needed—an informational semantics one.  
 
Informational semantics, however, suffers from the disjunction problem—the 
problem of determining which one of the many causes of a symbol is its referent. 
Fodor’s solution is ADA: according to ADA a symbol refers to the property with 
which it enters in a nomic relation on which all the other nomic relations the symbol 
enters in depend, but not vice versa.9 Fodor stresses that ADA is not a theory of 
mentality.10 It is an account of how representations of properties get to have the 
intentional content they do. Importantly, it is not an account of how representations of 
particular objects get their content. The reason is that nomic relations exist only 
between properties and not between particular objects. Fodor offers a different and 
unrelated account—his triangulation account—to explain how representations of 
particulars refer. One could try to simply clump the two accounts together, but one 
would need to provide an explanation that does not presume what the content of a 
given symbol is, as to why the content of that symbol should be accounted for by one 
and not the other of the accounts. Examining whether this approach could work I 
leave for another time. In this dissertation I will explore what seems to be a simpler 
                                                 
9 Cf. Fodor (1987, 1990). 
10 Cf. Fodor (1990, p. 130): “Even if it's true that intentionality equals information plus robustness 
[(ADA)], it wouldn't have to follow that information plus robustness is sufficient for mentality. 
Sufficient conditions for being in a state with intentional content needn’t also be sufficient conditions 




approach: whether and how ADA can be used to ground the contents of 
representations not only of properties but of particulars as well. 
 
In Chapter 3 I argue that ADA, when supplemented with conceptual role 
semantics, can account for how representations of particular objects refer. The idea is 
to use conceptual role semantics to account for the logical and non-logical roles of 
representations of particular objects in the visual system. The relations of particular 
interest are those between the representations of particular objects and representations 
of spatio-temporal relations. The representations of super-determinate spatio-temporal 
relations that I appeal to—C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)—co-vary, in the 
way Fodor suggests, with the property of being a spatio-temporal relation at time t 
such that: a) it involves the objects x, l, n, and r forming a pyramid with sides of 
length drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, and dnx; and b) r, l, and n form the base of the pyramid and r 
and l are my eyes, while n is my nose: 
 
 
Figure 0.1.: This is an instance of a configuration involving four objects x, l, n, and r 
forming a pyramid with sides of length drx, dlx, and dnx and a base of a triangle with 
sides drl, drn, and dln. The configuration instance is instantiated so that l, r, and n are 





From now on, for brevity, I will use “‘Cj” for the predicate “‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, 
drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’”.  
 
Importantly, the content of the predicate ‘Cj’ is not defined entirely á la ADA, 
but  is inferentially and functionally related to a first-person reflexive term (‘I’) and 
an indexical for time (‘t’). It is this characteristic that complements and helps ADA 
here: in virtue of the predicate being related to ‘I’ and ‘t’ it doesn’t pick out just any 
pyramidal super-determinate configuration of type C, instead it picks out a particular 
instance of it: the one that is set on me at t. This makes the referent of the predicate 
‘Cj’ a trope.11 ‘Cj’ is nomically related to the property of being a pyramidal super-
determinate configuration but is not nomically related to a trope. Instead, the trope is 
picked out in virtue of the ‘Cj’’s nomic relations with the property of being the super-
determinate spatial configuration Cj and in virtue of its inferential and functional 
relations with ‘I’ and ‘t’. The picking out of a trope is cashed out as the satisfaction 
relation that obtains between Fregean definite descriptions and their referents. In 
short: when ‘I’ and ‘t’ in the predicate ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, O)’ are 
saturated, then the referent of this predicate is a trope.  
 
                                                 
11 Tropes, also known as property instances, concrete properties, and abstract particulars can be 
schematized as follows (cf. Funkhouser (2006, p. 14)): “[(O, t), P]. This is to be read as “O’s 
having/being P at t.” O is an object or spatial location, t a time (span), and P a property type. Such 




I suggest that we use the predicate ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, O)’ in 
the following definite description in virtue of which the symbol ‘x’ gets to refer to a 
particular object: 
 
(Ex)((y)(C(y, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, dry, dly, dny, t, O) ↔ (x = y))) 
 
Put crudely, this reads: right now x is the one and only particular that has the 
relational spatial property of being at the specified distances with respect to my nose 
and eyes.  
 
This approach makes use of conceptual role semantics for more than the 
logical apparatus needed for the definite description. Conceptual role semantics is 
also used to define the content of ‘I’ (the first-person reflexive term) and is perhaps 
needed also for the content of the temporal predicate ‘t’.  
 
Since there are serious problems against conceptual role semantics accounts, I 
devote Chapter 4 to meeting the key objections. Following up on Rey’s comparison 
of Horwich’s and Fodor’s accounts, I suggest that by taking the asymmetric 
dependencies inside the mind (i.e. by applying them to the roles between symbols), 
one can identify the meaning-constitutive roles of a symbol: the meaning-constitutive 
ones are the ones on which all the rest depend, but not vice versa. This would allow 
one to solve the analytic/synthetic distinction problem and because of this it would 





After defending conceptual role semantics, I incorporate it in an informational 
semantics account á la Horwich’s basicality strategy for accounting for the content of 
symbols. According to this strategy the content of a symbol is determined by the 
relation in which a symbol enters that is explanatorily basic: the one on which all 
other relations involving the symbol depend on, but not vice versa. The basic 
relations in question can be external, internal, or a mixture of both. For example, 
many primitive symbols in the sensory modalities will have a referent that is 
accounted for entirely through external (nomic) relations. Logical operators would be 
accounted for entirely through internal (inferential) roles. Empty names and 
predicates (e.g. ‘Zeus’, ‘miracle’, and ‘triangle’) and complex predicates might have 
their content accounted for through both external and internal relations. The content 
of representations of particulars would be accounted for through internal (inferential) 
relations with symbols whose content is in turn accounted for at least in part through 
external (nomic) relations. Thus, the content of representations of particulars is 
accounted for through both nomic and inferential relations.12 
 
                                                 
12 Note that this leaves open whether the content of representations of particulars is, in part, the 
inferential relations. That is, it is left open whether representations of particulars have narrow content. 
What is said in the main text only states that the internal relations play a role in determining the 
content of representations of particulars, but something can determine the content of ‘x’ without being 
the content of ‘x’ (e.g. Kaplan’s definite descriptions that individuate a ‘dthat’’s content). Logical 




In Chapter 5 I apply the account of how particulars get represented to the problem of 
representing particular objects in the early visual system: according to the account 
above of how particular objects get represented a representation of a particular object 
gets its content in virtue of definite descriptions. This means that the possession of 
quantifiers, predicates, argument variables, and names is required to represent 
particular objects. If the capacity to express definite descriptions is taken to imply the 
possession of conceptual representations (these being the predicates and argument 
variables in the definite descriptions), then Pylyshyn would be mistaken to hold that 
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In this chapter I explain why nomic accounts of content like ADA are chosen 
to begin with. Consider the representations in the early visual system: they are visual 
indices (demonstratives) and representations of properties. Strategies for accounting 
for content centered on causal relations between symbols and particular objects—
what I call “singular causal strategies of content”—are the most obvious approach to 
take in explaining how visual indices refer. Strategies for accounting for content 
centered on causal relations between symbols and properties—what I call “nomic 
strategies of content”—are the most obvious approach to take in explaining how 
representations of properties refer. In what follows I argue that singular causal 
strategies of content face a significant problem—the “which link” problem. This 
problem constitutes a reason to examine how promising nomic strategies of reference 
are in explaining how representations of particulars refer.  In the following chapters I 





The plan for this chapter is as follows: Section 1.B is where I draw the 
distinction between singular causal strategies of content and nomic strategies of 
content. In Section 1.C I analyze the most significant problem singular causal 
strategies of content face—the “which link” problem. The implication is that this 
problem is a reason to explore other strategies: specifically, nomic strategies of 
content. In Section 1.D I argue that even ignoring this problem, singular causal 
strategies of content end up being about as complicated as the nomic strategy that will 
be examined in this dissertation. Again, the implication is that this is a reason to 
explore the nomic strategy as well, as I do in this dissertation. 
 
 
1.B. Causal strategies for accounting for content: 
 
 
In this section I distinguish between singular causal strategies of content and 
nomic strategies of content. I ignore teleosemantic strategies of content, even though 
they also fall under the type of causal strategies of content13. The reason is that they, 
like ADA, have trouble accounting for how representations of particulars refer—it is 
extremely implausible that I have a mechanism whose function is to represent Bob, 
for example. After all, Bob wouldn’t have been around when the mechanism would 
                                                 
13 Cf. Neander (1995) where she argues that teleosemanticists should be concerned only with those 
properties that cause an underlying genotype to be selected: “According to the definition favoured in 
this paper, the function of a trait is to do whatever it did in ancestral creatures that was adaptive and 




have been selected for. Thus, teleosemantic theories, like ADA, need to be 
supplemented in order to account for representations of particulars. In fact, if ADA is 
mistaken and teleosemantic theories are right, then the solution I propose in Chapter 3 
will still work after ADA is replaced with a teleosemantic theory. As a result, I will 
not argue about how ADA and teleosemantic theories match up14. Instead, I will 
concern myself with causal theories that, prima facie at least, show promise in 
accounting on their own for how representations of particulars refer. 
 
In what follows I distinguish between strategies of content based on causal 
relations between particular objects and strategies based on causal relations between 
properties. But causal relations exist between particulars and between properties. 
Why center a causal strategy for accounting for the content of representations on 
relations involving only particular objects or on relations involving only properties? 
Why not have a strategy where if a symbol is caused by a property, then it represents 
the property, and if it is caused by a particular object, then it represents the object? 
The reason stems from the fact that the causal relations between properties are 
generally taken to be nomic relations—lawful co-variation between properties15. As 
will be pointed out in the next chapter, I will assume, following Fodor, that such 
relations “cover” causal relations between particular objects. This means that when 
we have causal relations between particular objects we also have causal relations 
                                                 
14 I believe that ADA is better, but discussion of that is left for another time. Cf. Rey (1997) for an 
excellent survey of the main problems facing teleosemantic theories. 




between properties, “covering” the causal relations between the objects. The same 
applies in the opposite direction if one assumes, as I will do in this dissertation, that 
no property can exist uninstantiated by a particular object.16 This means that 
whenever a symbol is tokened: a) the token of the symbol is caused by a particular 
object; and b) there is a law that relates properties of the token with properties of the 
particular object. It is then ad hoc to claim that with some symbols it is the particular 
object which causes their tokens, that is their content, while with other symbols it is 
the property of the particulars which cause their tokens, that is their content. Thus, 
causal strategies should be split into two types: singular causal strategies17 of content 
which focus on causal relations between particular objects and nomic strategies of 
content which focus on causal relations between properties. 
 
The prototypical example of singular causal strategies of content is Kripke’s 
(1980) account. The following illustrates Kripke’s approach: when a baby is born, 
one points at the baby and names it ‘Bob’. Whoever uses ‘Bob’ to refer to the baby is 
connected by a causal chain that runs through communications with people who use 
‘Bob’ to refer to the baby and understandings to use ‘Bob’ in the same way, all the 
way through the point when one pointed at the baby an baptized it ‘Bob’. Now, this 
                                                 
16 Cf. Armstrong (1997) for a persuasive defense of this position. 
17 I have borrowed the term “singular causal relation” from Armstrong (1997) where he uses it to 
distinguish causal relations between particulars from causal relations between properties (the latter 
specify laws). Pace nominalists, I take this distinction to be plausible. At the very least, the distinction 




approach is merely a strategy and is not meant by Kripke to be a theory of content.18 
As Kripke (1980, p. 97) points out, it appeals to intentional terms like “pointing”, 
“naming”, “communicating”, and “understanding” which means that intentionality 
has not been reduced.19 In what follows, I argue that there are substantial problems 
for trying to account for the content of representations of particular objects only 
through non-intentionally specified causal relations between particular objects.  
 
The paradigm example of nomic theories of content is Dretske (1982). 
Dretske’s account and its problems is what gave rise to ADA. On Dretske’s account a 
symbol’s content is what the symbol carries information about. What a symbol carries 
information about is what the symbol enters in a lawful (nomic) causal co-relation 
with. Dretske argues20 that there is a learning period during which a symbol is 
correlated with a certain cause. After the learning period is over, other things than the 
cause can trigger the tokening of the symbol. Since they would not be what triggered 
the symbol during the learning period, the symbol would misrepresent them, even if it 
carries information about them.  
 
Before I continue, I want to point out that the reason it is ADA, rather than 
Dretske’s account, that was chosen for this dissertation is that I was persuaded by 
                                                 
18 Devitt & Sterelny (1999) is an example of someone who attempts to give a singular causal theory of 
content. 
19 Cf. Kripke (1980, p. 97): “[my account] takes the notion of intending to use the same reference as a 
given”. 




Fodor’s criticisms of Dretske’s account: Fodor (1990, p. 41) roundly criticizes 
Dretske’s approach because a) the learning period is specified in an ad hoc manner; 
b) Dretske’s account applies only to learned symbols; and c) it ignores the relevant 
counterfactuals. The point in (c) is that Dretske’s account assumes that symbols carry 
information about their referents. That is, it assumes that there are nomic relations 
between the two. But nomic relations are counter-factual supporting. This means that 
they cover not only what actually happens at time t, but also what would have 
happened at time t, if circumstances were different. Thus, even if at time t a cat 
caused ‘cat’, if the light were weaker and small dogs were around, it would have 
happened that a small dog would have caused ‘cat’ at time t. Thus, ‘cat’ enters in 
nomic relations with (and therefore carries information about) both cats and small 
dogs at dark. If this is the case, then what actually happens at time t (or in the learning 
period) is not as important as what was nomologically possible to happen if 
circumstances were different. Thus, Dretske’s account does not explain why ‘cat’ 
refers to cats as opposed to small dogs in the dark. 
 
 
1.C. Representing particulars in singular causal strategies: 
 
 
In this section I analyze what I take to be the main problem for singular causal 
strategies of content: the “which link” problem. I discuss a solution proposed by 





On singular causal strategies of content a symbol’s referent is the particular 
object which, through a causal chain, causes a token of the symbol. This is the most 
obvious way to account for representations of particular objects. However, it also 
faces an equally obvious problem: what has been called the “which link” problem. 
Suppose that a token of a symbol is linked with a causal chain to a particular object. 
The causal relation between the two is, in most cases, a complex one. It involves 
many intermediate causal relations. In other words, in most cases, there are many 
intermediate links each of which bears a causal relation (direct or indirect) with a 
token of the symbol. That makes every link be a particular object which, through a 
causal chain, causes a token of the symbol. The “which link” problem is the problem 
of individuating a particular link as the symbol’s content.  
 
Fodor (2008) presents a way of solving the “which link” problem—through 
triangulation:  
 
Imagine there is not just the actual Adam with the perspective that he actually has, but 
also a counterfactual Adam (‘Adam2’) who is, say, three feet to the actual Adam’s right. 
Adam2 has a (counterfactual) perspective on the (actual) visual scene; one that differs 
from Adam’s perspective in accordance with the usual (i.e. the actual) laws of parallax. 
Assume that Adam2 tokens a representation of the same type that Adam does. Draw a 
line that starts at Adam2’s token and represents its causal history (i.e. the causal history 
that Adam’s token would have had if Adam had been at the position that Adam2 occupies 




given the two causal histories, solve for the referents of the tokens. RTM allows us to do 
so. It says that the two tokens have the same referent iff Adam’s line and Adam2’s line 
intersect at a link; and that their referent is the link at which they intersect. (Fodor (2008, 
p. 213)) 
 
According to a charitable interpretation of this account, the link in the causal 
chain that is the referent of a token symbol is the first intersection of the causal chain 
with a counterfactual causal chain that leads to the same token symbol, but from 
slightly different counterfactual perspective.21 This proposal has three key elements: 
a) intersection of causal and counterfactual chains; b) the counterfactual chain has a 
slightly different perspective; and c) the referent is the first intersection. The 
intersection of the actual and the counterfactual chains is a causal link at a spatio-
temporal location. The causal link is shared by both chains. According to the 
triangulation account we move the observer and as a result, the actual and the 
counterfactual chains pass through different space-time points up to the space-time 
                                                 
21 As I pointed out in Section 1.B, there are two types of causal relations: nomic ones (between 
properties) and singular ones (between particular objects). Only the latter ones can intersect in a spatio-
temporal manner (which is what is required to individuate a particular object) because only they 
occupy spatio-temporal regions. They occupy spatio-temporal regions because they involve specific 
individuals. For example, a causal relation between two particulars is located in the line segment where 
the particulars are at the ends. The nomic relations on the other hand, being relations between 
properties, while instantiated in particulars, are not located anywhere—just as properties are not 
located in a specific place (this, of course, assumes that properties are different from classes of 
particulars—i.e. they are more than the members in their extension). Not being located anywhere 




location of the link where they intersect and merge (they continue merged back to the 
Big Bang). The referent is not the Big Bang because the referent is the first 
intersection and the Big Bang is a later intersection.  
 
Now I will present three arguments as to why the triangulation account, under 
this intuitive interpretation, cannot work: 
 
1.C.I. Interference effects: 
 
The first problem for Fodor’s triangulation account is that the first intersection 
need not be the one we would intuitively label as the “right” one. We get such cases 
when the causal chains are instantiated by light beams. The reason we get them is 
because of a fundamental property of light—it interferes with itself. The upshot, as I 
explain below, is that the first intersection of the actual and the counterfactual causal 
chains is the link where the interference happens and that is not the intuitively “right” 
referent. In more detail: 
 
Suppose that a laser is directed at a transducer22 and that all the photons from 
the laser end up at the transducer. Suppose that there is no other light present and 
                                                 
22 A transducer is a detector of the sensory system that maps ambient energy onto mental 
representations. Cf. Fodor (2008, p. 187): “Computation (like, for example, thinking) takes mental 
representations onto other mental representations. Transduction (like, for example, registering 




finally suppose that the laser is instantiating a causal chain that via the transducer 
leads up to a token of a symbol (‘x’).23 A problem emerges once we consider lasers 
and interference effects: 
 





Figure 1.1.: This is the interference pattern that obtains when a laser beam is shone 
on a barrier with two parallel slits on it.  
                                                                                                                                           
hallucinations and such) perceptual integration starts with the registration of sensory information. 
Were there no transducers, perception couldn’t get started.” 
23 Were the transducer to be moved, the actual causal chain would no longer lead up to the token ‘x’. 
Moreover, were it the case that only the transducer was moved and nothing else changed, then there 
would no longer be any (counterfactual) causal chain leading to a (counterfactual) token of ‘x’. This 
might seem to suggest that the triangulation account would not work here, because in the 
counterfactual conditions we would lack the counterfactual causal chain necessary for the 
triangulation. But the obvious solution is to counterfactually change a bit more than merely the 
position of the transducer: we can counterfactually change also the direction of the laser. The idea is 
that, whatever the source of the laser, we can assume that in the counterfactual circumstances the laser 
shines upon the transducer at its new (counterfactual) location. Then, whatever the source of the laser 





The same interference pattern obtains (over time) even if one photon per day 
passes through the slits. There have to be at least two slits for the pattern to obtain and 
the pattern does not obtain if one slit is closed. This observation suggests that there is 
something that interferes with the photons so as to cause them to change direction 




                                                 




Figure 1.2.: Schemata of a source emitting a laser, photons of which pass (one per 
day) through one of the slits in a barrier. Since a second slit is open, there are 
interferences, which explain the interference pattern. 
 




Figure 1.3.: Schemata of a source emitting a laser, photons of which pass (one per 
day) through one of the slits in a barrier. Since a second slit is open, there are 




counterfactual paths of photons. L0 denotes the actual location of a transducer, while 
L1 and L2 denote two counterfactual locations of the transducer. 
 
Suppose that a transducer is placed at L0—in the path of a photon that has 
been interfered with. Let’s apply the triangulation account here: if the transducer were 
to be placed at L2 and if a photon were to travel down that path, then we would have 
an actual and a counterfactual causal chains (they would be bent a little, but that 
matters not) that intersect at Source, which is the answer that we intuitively want. So 
far, so good. However, suppose the transducer were to be moved in location L1. 
Suppose that in this counterfactual scenario the photon that moved along Path1 now 
moves along Path3. Then, the two causal chains would intersect at the point of 
interference (Interference1) and so Interference1 would be the referent of ‘x’. First of 
all this seems wrong. Furthermore, another problem is that depending on where we 
choose to place the transducer, we get two different intersections of the causal and the 
counterfactual chains: Source and Interference1. This means that the triangulation 
account does not determine a unique referent of ‘x’.  
 
Note that while I assumed that the point of interference for the photon that 
passed through Slit1 stays the same, we don’t need to hold the point of interference 
constant: in the counterfactual scenario the point of interference might be at a 
different location than in the actual scenario—say, several centimeters after or before 
the actual interference point. The conclusion above still follows as long as the photon 




and the counterfactual chains will still intersect prior to Source and this will still give 




Figure 1.4.: Schemata of a source emitting a laser, photons of which pass (one per 
day) through one of the slits in a barrier. Since a second slit is open, there are 
interferences, which explain the interference pattern. The striped lines denote the 
counterfactual paths of photons. L0 denotes the actual location of a transducer, while 





To avoid the above problem, one might try to postulate that the counterfactual 
chain travels along a different path from the actual one, excepting the path after the 
first intersection. They will merge at the referent of ‘x’ and continue as a single causal 
chain back to the Big Bang. This would seem to eliminate the counterfactual chain 
that starts at Source and continues to L1 because it travels on part of the path of the 
actual chain that starts at Source and continues to L0. Then, purportedly, we would be 
left only with the counterfactual chain that starts at Source and continues to L2 for 
triangulation and the problem above would seem to be solved. The problem with this 
approach, however, is that Path1 and Path3 satisfy the above constraint, but still 
produce an intersection other than Source—at Interference1: 
 
 Consider the fork that starts at Source and has prongs with tips at L0 and L1. 
These prongs split at Interference1. We have another fork—one that starts at the Big 
Bang and has prongs with tips L0 and L2. These prongs split at Source. According to 
the above constraint, the counterfactual chain must travel along a different path from 
the actual one excepting the “handle” of the fork (from Source to Big Bang). Since 
the counterfactual chain that ends up at L1 travels part of the route of the actual chain, 
it should be dismissed. But if the “handle” of the fork (from Source to Big Bang) is 
allowed to be an exception, then there is nothing wrong with taking the route from 
Source to Interference to be a “handle” and treat it as an exception, as well. Then, the 
prongs with tips at L0 and L1 travel along different routes (Path1 and Path3), 





One could object that the problem above assumes that the “right” link can be a 
link at a point of light interference—a microscopic event. However, the objection 
continues, our vision is not designed to detect microscopic events but macroscopic 
ones. This would seem to deal away with the problem above. However, it is not 
obvious that eyesight is not designed to detect microscopic events. Frogs eyesight is 
so sensitive that they can detect single photons25. More importantly, it is possible for 
systems to refer to particular objects at a level below the macroscopic one. The move 
above would leave such systems unexplained.  
 
1.C.II. Single-slit diffraction: 
 
A second problem with the triangulation account can be seen once we 
consider single-slit diffraction. When light passes through a single slit it can be 
observed to spread out (or “fray”)26: 
 
                                                 
25 Cf. Deutsch (1997, p. 34) and Donner (1989). 




   
 
Figure 1.5.: Schemata of a source emitting a laser, photons of which pass through a 
slit in a barrier. The striped line denotes a counterfactual path of a photon. L1 is the 
location of the actual observer. L2 is the counterfactual location of the observer. 
 
Now, consider an observer at L1 and let’s apply the triangulation account: 
were she to move, say to L2, then she would be in the path of a fraying light beam 
that intersects the actual light beam at the location of the slit. The actual and the 
counterfactual light beams intersect and converge at Slit. By the triangulation account 
then, it is the photons at the location of Slit which are the referent of a token symbol 
‘x’. However, as Cole points out27, “we can refer to things further back on the causal 
                                                 
27 Cf. Cole (2009, p. 442). In his thought experiment he uses sound waves passing through a key hole, 




chain than any perceptual intersection”. That is, if I am standing at L1 and observing 
the light beam, I am tokening ‘x’ and using it to refer not to the location of Slit, but to 
a point behind it. Thus, the triangulation account gives the wrong result. 
 
One could object that the case above is a “weird” case: Fodor’s triangulation 
account is meant to be an account that explains how, ceteris paribus, we refer to 
particular objects. Cases of occlusion, like the one above, are to be dismissed via the 
ceteris paribus clause. A response to this objection is as follows: ceteris paribus 
conditions are there to weed out cases where it should be expected for a theory not to 
apply. Perhaps in the case of light fraying, we can grant that it is a weird case of 
representing particular objects: the hole has to be very small so that we can talk about 
light beams actually intersecting at it. Such scenarios are not common enough to need 
to be covered by a theory of how particular objects are represented. However, as in 
Cole’s example, cases where we hear people through holes in closed doors are surely 
not uncommon. Sound waves passing through holes as big as keyholes spread out and 
causal chains instantiated by sound waves can be said to intersect at such holes. 
Given that this is not an uncommon scenario, I take it that it would be a scenario that 
we would like an account of how particular objects are represented to explain. Thus, 
it would be a weakness for the triangulation account to try to sweep it under the 
ceteris paribus carpet.28 
                                                                                                                                           
intersection. Suppose e.g. you and I listen to a conversation through a keyhole. We can be thinking 
about the speakers, even though our perceptual causal chains intersect at the keyhole.” 
28 Another problem raised by Cole is the “cat assassin” problem (Cole (2009, p. 442)). The essence of 





1.C.III. Objects, tropes, and states of affairs: 
 
The triangulation account is an account of how particular objects get 
represented. It takes for granted that only objects enter in singular causal relations. As 
a result, when it individuates a singular causal link, the link can only be an object. 
Now, objects enter in singular causal relations in virtue of the properties they have. 
That is the same as saying that nomic relations between properties “cover” the 
singular causal relations that objects enter in. Yet another way to put the point is that 
properties play a causal role in singular causal relations between objects. So when we 
                                                                                                                                           
suppose that I stand in front of a cat assassin (while looking at my cat) and so prevent him from killing 
my cat. Suppose that behind my cat is the mother of my cat. I am tokening ‘x’ as a result of a causal 
chain that goes through my cat, through my cat’s mother, back to the Big Bang. Were I to move, 
however, then the cat assassin would vaporize my cat, and I won’t see it, but will instead see its 
mother. Thus, the counterfactual chain that causes counterfactual-me to token ‘x’ would not contain 
my cat but my cat’s mother. The actual and the counterfactual chain would then intersect and converge 
at the mother of my cat, which would make it, and not my cat, the referent of ‘x’. This, as Cole points 
out, is the wrong result, because, “I am thinking about my cat, not [about] something that in nearby 
worlds would come into view.” Furthermore, this shows that depending on how we choose the 
counterfactual scenario we get different results: my cat and my cat’s mother. This means that the 
triangulation account does not determine a unique referent of ‘x’. But one could avoid this problem by 
pointing out that, intuitively, we can restrict the counterfactual scenarios to those relevant for 
triangulation—the ones where I move, but the cat assassin does not strike. How “relevant for 
triangulation” is specified here is unclear, but the intuition seems to be that in triangulating we allow 
only what instantiates the causal chains to “move” and we “freeze” the rest of the world. This would 




are individuating via triangulation a causal link in a singular causal chain, why are we 
specifying only an object and not also the properties that the object has? One answer 
is that we are individuating a particular at a space-time location. Objects can have 
space-time locations. Properties don’t. But now, it seems that a lot hinges on what 
metaphysical view we are committed to: 
 
Suppose that one denies that properties are universals and appeals instead to 
tropes—super-determinate properties instantiated at space-time locations. On this 
view, instead of a property being causally relevant to a singular causal relation that an 
object enters in, we have a trope, instantiated at the space-time location of the object, 
being causally relevant. Triangulation, then, triangulates two particular entities at the 
same space-time location—an object and a trope at the space-time location of the 
object. Both play a causal role in the causal chain leading to a token symbol ‘x’. So, 
which one is the referent of ‘x’? One can argue that since both are playing a causal 
role in the singular causal chain, both, together, should be the referent of ‘x’. This is 
treating them as an event or, alternatively, a state of affairs (a particular object 
instantiating a property at a space-time location). But if one goes this way, then one 
has given an account of how states of affairs (or events) are represented, not how 
objects are. Note that the two are different, since objects, unlike states of affairs (and 
events), can move through space-time, while the latter can’t. This means that if one 
makes the metaphysical moves above, then triangulation ceases to be the account of 
representation of particular objects that we are looking for. Granted, the metaphysical 




defended in the literature by nominalists and, in any case, the point is merely that if 
the triangulation account is an account of how objects are represented, then it needs to 
be elaborated to prevent “sketchy” moves like the ones above being made.  
 
Before I move on, let me briefly address another option here: instead of 
appealing to actual and counterfactual causal chains and their intersections—an 
ingenious but metaphysically problematic idea—appeal to intersections of actual 
causal chains. That is: take the causal chains leading to the eyes (technically we need 
three to triangulate an object in 3-D, but I will ignore this complication) and the first 
place where they intersect is the referent of ‘x’. The proposal is intuitive, since our 
visual system is able to triangulate objects through convergence and information 
about which retinal receptors are activated.29 However, the obvious problem here is 
that this account does not explain systems that can refer to objects without 
                                                 
29 Cf. Palmer (1999, p. 205): “[A] source of information about [absolute] depth comes from eye 
convergence: the extent to which the two eyes are turned inward (toward each other) to fixate an 
object. The eyes fixate a given point in external space when both of them are aimed directly at the 
point so that light coming from it falls on the centers of both foveae simultaneously. Since each fovea 
has only one center, only one point can be precisely fixated at any moment. The crucial fact about 
convergence that provides information about fixation depth is that the angle formed by the two lines of 
sight varies systematically with the distance between the observer and the fixated point”. Cf. Palmer 
(1999, p. 338): “An object’s position on the retina relative to the center of the retina specifies its 
direction relative to the observer’s direction of gaze because each retinal receptor signals light coming 
into the eye from one particular direction… information about retinal position is preserved in the early 
stages of visual processing via the many retinotopic maps that preserve relative position in the 2-D 




triangulation through actual causal chains: imagine a system that has one eye and 
takes information about azimuth and altitude from the location of the eye within the 
eye orbit and integrates this information with information about distance from the 
ciliary muscles.30, 31 
                                                 
30 Distance can be registered through sensors that register accommodation: cf. Palmer (1999, p. 203-4): 
“Accommodation is the process through which the ciliary muscles in the eye control the optical focus 
of the lens by temporarily changing its shape. It is a monocular depth cue because it is available from a 
single eye, even though it is also present when both eyes are used…[T]he lens of the human eye has a 
variable focusing capability, becoming thin to focus light from faraway objects on the retina and thick 
to focus light from nearby ones…. If the visual system has information about the tension of the 
muscles that control the lens's shape, then it has information about the distance to the focused object.” 
31 Rey (p. c.) has pointed out to me that there may be a further problem with singular causal theories of 
content: If, as singular causal theories would have it, the demonstrative ‘x’ gets its content based on 
what causes it, then ‘x’ would be individuated by the particular entity that caused it. This means that 
for an indefinite number of causes of demonstratives, we need an indefinite number of demonstratives: 
for example, if we translate this to visual indexicals (FINSTs), this means that a FINST that is caused 
by apple1 is a different FINST than one caused by orange1 and is different from one caused by apple2. 
But then, throughout our lives we are faced with different causes of FINSTs in our visual system. This 
means that we would need an indefinite number of FINSTs to deal with the indefinite number of visual 
stimuli. Prima facie, this may sound implausible not only because of the required proliferation of 
symbols, but also because minds are assumed to be instantiated in computational systems with finite 
alphabets of symbols. Having a mind with an indefinite number of symbols seems to threaten this 
assumption. However, the assumption applies only to how minds are instantiated in computational 
systems—i.e. the requirement is that there is a finite number of elements with 
syntactic/inferential/functional roles. This requirement can be met while assigning to the same element 
(individuated purely by its syntactic/inferential/functional role) different contents, based on contexts 






1.D. Complexity in representing particulars and properties: 
 
 
In this section I argue that the nomic approach that I am pursuing in this 
dissertation is not more complicated than the singular causal approach. Both 
approaches need to appeal to at least two more strategies for accounting for content. 
The fact that the approach that I am proposing is about as complicated as the singular 
causal approach, is a reason for considering it—a reason that will stand regardless of 
whether the singular causal approach manages to solve the “which link” problem, or 
not.  
 
Suppose that one chooses singular causal relations to ground the relations 
between symbols and external entities. Thus, suppose, as the proponents of singular 
causal strategies of content hold, that representations of particular objects get their 
content in virtue of entering into singular causal relations with the particular object 
that is their cause. There is now the problem of accounting for how representations of 
properties get their content. Obviously, predicates cannot get their content in the same 
way as representations of particular objects do, since that would make them 
representations of particular objects, as opposed to representations of properties. So 
there must be another way and this way can appeal only to representations of 




allowed. How do we get from representations of particular objects to representations 
of properties? Perhaps we can generalize over the represented objects? But to 
generalize over represented objects we must first be capable of representing the 
properties of these objects so that we can cluster the representations of objects based 
on those representations of properties. But, obviously, to appeal to representations of 
properties in trying to explain how representations of properties get acquired is to beg 
the question. Without representing the objects’ properties, however, there seems to be 
no principled way in which to generalize over the represented objects if we stay 
within the limits of singular causal strategies of content. There are moves that can be 
made here, though:  
 
One could supplement singular causal strategies of content with 
teleosemantics and have the latter account for the content of primitive representations 
of properties32. Alternatively, teleosemantics may be used to solve the ad hoc 
                                                 
32 Devitt & Sterelny (1999, p. 162), who defend a singular causal theory of content, make a similar 
move both for the reason pointed out in the main text and also to deal with the qua problem with 
respect to properties: “We are attracted by a less ambitious use of teleology to explain meaning. 
Instead of taking biological functions to determine the contents of thoughts we take them to determine 
the contents of more basic representational states, perceptions. Perceiving a rabbit as a rabbit is a 
matter of being in a state with the biological function of representing a rabbit. An interesting thing 
about this idea is that it does not replace the historical-causal theory of reference fixing, it supplements 
it. That theory, it will be remembered, suffered from the qua-problem [with respect to properties]: In 
virtue of what is a particular grounding of ‘rabbit’ a grounding in rabbits rather than mammals, 




problem: if one can distinguish between representations of particular objects and 
representations of properties based on their function (i.e. through teleosemantics), 
then one can define their content through an appeal to the respective causal relation.  
 
Another reason to appeal to teleosemantics is to account for 
misrepresentation. Representations are taken to be different from natural signs in that 
representations can misrepresent, while natural signs cannot be miseffects of their 
causes. Thus, a theory of representation has to be a theory of misrepresentation, as 
well. Demonstratives are representations and a theory of them should give an account 
of how they misrepresent. But singular causal strategies of content do not seem 
capable of doing so. On singular causal strategies of content demonstratives would 
simply refer to what caused them, leading to the unpalatable conclusions that a) 
anything that causes a demonstrative is its content; and b) demonstratives do not 
misrepresent.33 Consider what happens when a token of a representation of a 
particular object is caused by the pokings of a neurosurgeon—being the cause of the 
                                                                                                                                           
because it involves a perceptual state that has the function of representing rabbits. The teleological 
theory of perception becomes an essential part of the theory of groundings.” 
33 Kaplan (1989, p. 490) argues that hallucinations are an instance where demonstratives misrepresent. 
But Kaplan’s demonstratives are mediated through intentions. This would make Kaplan’s 
demonstratives mediated through sensory percepts (as Levine (forthcoming) argues). When the 
percepts misrepresent (as in cases of hallucination), so does the demonstrative. The question then 
becomes whether these sensory percepts can misrepresent. As far as singular causal strategies are 
concerned, an unmediated sensory demonstrative (e.g. a visual index (Pylyshyn’s FINST)) would face 




representation, then the representation would refer to the pokings—surely an 
unintuitive result. More importantly, whatever the cause of the token of a 
representation of a particular object, it is going to have a referent—the cause. This 
means that it will never misrepresent. Here it looks like another theory of content, like 
teleosemantics, is needed to account for the normal conditions when a demonstrative 
is tokened. Then the two conclusions above can be avoided—pokings by a 
neurosurgeon will not fall under the normal conditions under which a representation 
of a particular object is tokened and when they are the cause of the representation, it 
can be claimed that the representation misrepresents.  
 
Now, we have seen that a singular causal strategy needs to appeal to 
teleosemantics to account for representations of properties and misrepresentations. 
But that is not all. Singular causal strategies also need to appeal to conceptual role 
semantics to account for logical operators. Since the content of logical operators is 
taken to consist of types of inferential relations between symbols, conceptual role 
semantics is standardly taken to provide the best account of their meaning.  
 
 The above suggests that in appealing to singular causal strategies one would 
end up appealing to teleosemantics (for representations of properties and to account 
for misrepresentation) and to conceptual role semantics (for logical operators). Now, 
the approach that I suggest pursuing also appeals to three strategies—it has nomic, 
singular causal, and conceptual role semantics elements. In Chapter 3 I argue that this 




content and for how they misrepresent. Since it has nomic elements it is obviously 
capable of accounting for representations of properties. Since it also has conceptual 
role semantics elements, it can account for logical operators. As a result, in that it 
doesn’t appeal to more strategies than the supplemented singular causal approach, my 






I have argued that singular causal strategies of content face a significant 
problem in the “which link” problem. The latter cannot be resolved by an appeal to 
triangulation (whether actual or counterfactual). The troubles of singular causal 
strategies with the “which link” problem constitute a reason to pursue other strategies, 
which is what I do in this dissertation. Furthermore, in order to account for 
representations of properties, misrepresentation, and logical operators, the singular 
causal strategies seem to be in need of being supplemented with teleosemantics and 
conceptual role semantics. Now, the approach that I will explore in this dissertation 
also has three elements—nomic, singular, and conceptual role semantics’ ones. This 
makes my approach equally complex and this is therefore a reason to pursue its 











In this dissertation I examine how viable Fodor’s asymmetric dependency 
account (ADA) is, as a theory that explains how the mind connects with the world. As 
I explain in this chapter, ADA falls under nomic strategies of content—strategies 
centered on lawful causal relations between properties and symbols. The reasons for 
choosing to explore the potential of nomic strategies were laid out in the last chapter 
where I argued that singular causal strategies of content (strategies centered on causal 
relations between particulars) face the “which link” problem, which cannot be 
resolved by an appeal to triangulation (whether actual or counterfactual). In this 
chapter I first present the motivations behind ADA (Section 2.B), then ADA itself 
(Section 2.C), and finally the problem for it that will be of concern in this 










ADA is designed by Fodor as a key step in the quest for naturalizing 
psychology. Crudely put, if a property P can be naturalized, then P is a property that 
“it is possible for physical things to have” (Fodor (1995, p. 5)). Fodor assumes that 
every non-basic state and non-basic law can be naturalized to some basic states and 
basic laws. Thus, if basic states and laws are the states and laws of the stuff of which 
the universe is made, then Fodor assumes that non-basic states and laws supervene34 
or reduce35 to basic ones. Psychology is a non-basic science. As such, if Fodor’s 
naturalization assumption is right, then psychology’s laws must be naturalizable. That 
is, a) the states that its laws subsume must be such that it is possible for physical 
things to have them; and b) the psychological nomic relations must be implementable 
in mechanisms specified through properties and laws from the basic sciences. These 
implementing mechanisms are ones “in virtue of whose operation the satisfaction of a 
law’s antecedent reliably brings about the satisfaction of its consequent” (Fodor 
(1995, p. 8)). The way the mechanism M1 → M2 (where M1 and M2 are basic states 
and M1 is sufficient for M2) implements the non-basic science law L1 → L2 (where L1 
and L2 are non-basic states and L1 is sufficient for L2)36 is by L1 being sufficient for 
M1 and M2 being sufficient for L2 (cf. Fodor (1995, p. 10)). Then M1 naturalizes L1, 
M2 naturalizes L2, and M1 → M2 naturalizes L1 → L2.  
                                                 
34 A property A supervenes on a property B iff there can be no change in A without a change in B.  
35 A property A reduces to a property B iff A is identifiable with B. Importantly, reduction is not the 
same as elimination: while A might reduce to B, still both A and B are real. 





Fodor argues that the laws in psychology are intentional—they are about 
propositional attitudes (beliefs that Px, desires that Px, etc.). His argument is that 
intentional laws form the best psychological explanations and no other alternative 
explanations are even remotely plausible: 
 
That people (and, surely, other higher organisms) act out of their beliefs and desires, and 
that, in the course of deciding how to act, they often do a lot of thinking and planning, 
strikes me as maybe empirical in principle but surely not negotiable in practice. (Fodor 
(1995, p. 3-4)) 
 
If psychology is naturalizable, as Fodor believes, then intentional laws must somehow 
be naturalized. This would involve naturalizing the following properties of intentional 
states:  
 
a) Thought is productive (there is an indefinite number of thoughts that can be 
thought) and systematic (e.g. being able to think ‘if p then q’ entails the ability 
to think ‘if q then p’).  
 
b) Intentional states can be causally responsible for our behavior.37 
                                                 
37 This deserves a bit of elaboration. Some, like Davidson (1970), believe that the laws that cover 
intentional causes have to be strict laws (with no ceteris paribus clauses). The reason provided is that if 
they are not strict laws (i.e. if they are like the laws of psychology), then they could not be causal laws, 





c) Thought processes could be rational—they can take the form of valid 
arguments. 
 
d) Propositional attitudes have semantic properties—they are about things (e.g. a 
belief that the sun is yellow is about the sun and the property of being yellow) 
and can be true or false.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
one where the causes are nomologically sufficient for the effects). This argument entails that mental 
states, if they are to be covered by causal laws, are identified with physical properties (since only 
physical properties enter in strict causal laws). The problem is that many, not just Fodor, believe that 
mental states and symbols are multiply realized. That is to say that a) any disjunct of a disjunction of 
lower-order properties is sufficient for the instantiation of the higher-order property that is the symbol; 
and b) the instantiation of the symbol is sufficient for the instantiation of the disjunction, but not for 
the instantiation of any of the disjuncts (this definition of multiple realization is paraphrased from 
Fodor (1995, p. 11)). For example, the property of being a neural state of type P can be sufficient for 
the instantiation of symbol ‘x’ while the instantiation of ‘x’ is sufficient only for the instantiation of the 
disjunction [the property of being a neural state of type P, or the property of being a circuit state of 
type Q, or the property of being…] but not for any of the disjuncts. Now, if mental states are multiply 
realized, then they cannot be identified with particular physical properties as Davidson’s argument 
entails. Fodor’s reply (cf. Fodor (1990, Ch. 5)) is to deny the premise that if a law is not strict, then it 
cannot be causal. He argues that ceteris paribus laws can be causal laws when their ceteris paribus 
clauses are satisfied. In this dissertation I will assume that something like Fodor’s response to 




If the naturalization is to be accomplished successfully, then these properties 
of intentional states above have to be naturalized in a way that does not presuppose 
any intentional properties.  
 
The natural way to explain how thought is productive and systematic is to 
treat intentional states as sentences in a language (cf. Fodor (1990, p. 18-19)). Natural 
languages are productive because of a finite set of words (their vocabulary) an 
indefinite number of sentences can be constructed. So, if we postulate mental 
representations (symbols38) in the mind and rules for combining them, then we can 
explain the productivity of thought—out of a finite set of symbols an indefinite 
number of thought-sentences can be made. The systematicity of thought can be 
similarly explained in the same way it is explained for natural languages—being able 
to think ‘if p then q’ entails that one possesses the symbols ‘p’, ‘q’, and the 
implication operator ‘→’. This in turn entails the ability to think ‘if q then p’. Since 
Fodor explains the naturalization of the productivity and systematicity of thought 
through symbols with semantic and syntactic properties, this commits Fodor to a) a 
                                                 
38 I use the words “symbol” and “mental representation” interchangeably. Being a symbol is a property 
of the symbol’s tokens (instantiations). A neural state can be an example of a token of a symbol. 
Treating symbols as mental representations is contentious, however, since symbols are discrete and 
there are arguments that there are analog mental representations (e.g. the fineness of grain of 
experience argument). However, since nothing in my dissertation hangs on whether mental 




representational theory of mind and b) a “language of thought”39 view (cf. Fodor 
(1990, p.16)). In other words, Fodor is committed to treating thought as possessing 
characteristics (syntax and semantics) that natural languages also possess. 
 
All of this, of course, leaves one the task of naturalizing the symbols and 
syntax. Symbols are individuated by their semantic and syntactic properties. Thus, the 
task of naturalizing symbols is the task of explaining how physical entities can have 
semantic and syntactic properties. The semantic properties of a symbol are those that 
determine its meaning. Fodor’s view on how physical entities can have semantic 
properties will be explained when I get to Fodor’s asymmetric dependency account in 
Section 2.C. The syntactic properties of a symbol are those that determine which 
combinations with other symbols it can enter in. In this regard, Fodor says that a 
physical entity’s syntax is “one of its second-order physical properties…its syntactic 
structure [is] an abstract feature of its (geometric or acoustic) shape” (Fodor (1990, p. 
22)). The idea is that a symbol’s syntax supervenes40 on a physical property like 
shape. As an illustration, consider a set of building blocks with different shapes 
                                                 
39 More precisely, the language of thought is the language that our minds use to think. As any 
language, the language of thought is a system composed of a vocabulary of symbols (representations) 
and rules for the formation and transformation of the latter. Cf. Fodor (1975). 
40 Fodor actually says that “to all intents and purposes, syntax reduces to shape” (Fodor (1990, p. 22, 
italics mine)). This would mean that syntax is identified with shape. However, if syntax is “an abstract 
feature of…shape”, it cannot be then identified with shape. As a result, in my opinion here syntax is 
better treated as supervening on shape. This in no way interferes with Fodor’s other points and can be 




where, because of its shape, a block can combine with some, but not other blocks. 
Here it is a block’s shape that determines the block’s syntactical properties and it is 
the blocks’ shapes that determine the system of rules for combination of blocks that is 
the syntax of the construction set. Note that different physical entities can have the 
same syntax when they have the same shape (this is part of the reason why symbols 
are multiply realized). Importantly, syntax supervenes on a disjunction of sets of 
shapes. For example, two different sets of building blocks can have the same rules of 
combination, despite having members with vastly different forms. The result is that 
the members of one set of physical entities can have different shapes from the 
members of another set, but both sets can have the same syntax (this is also part of the 
reason why symbols are multiply realized).  
 
Another of the characteristics of intentional states, of intuitive and explanatory 
plausibility, is that intentional states have causal powers: if I am thirsty, then my 
belief that there is water in the fridge will cause me, ceteris paribus, to go to the 
fridge. If intentional states are naturalized into symbols, then the causal powers of 
intentional states must be explained through the causal powers of symbols. We saw 
above that the syntax supervenes on shape. Shape is a physical property and as such 
determines some of the causal powers of symbols. Among those causal powers are 
the powers to combine with other symbols. A symbol has these ‘syntactic causal 
powers’ in virtue of its syntax, which, as we saw above, is an abstract feature of its 
shape. Fodor argues that it is a symbol’s syntax that would explain how the semantic 





To see this, the first step is to appeal to a fact from formal logic that is owed 
to Gödel—namely that (in first-order logic) there is a correspondence between 
semantic truth and syntactic provability. This means that semantic relations among 
symbols can be, as Fodor says, “mimicked” (Fodor (1990, p. 22)) by syntactic ones. 
Türing has further shown that a machine that operates by transforming symbols can 
be structured in a way in which its syntactic transformations of symbols correlate 
with semantic relations between the symbols. Namely, the relations of inference 
between symbols in a valid argument can be mimicked by a machine whose 
transformations of symbols are governed by the symbols’ syntactical properties.41 
This explains in non-intentional language how intentional states can be rational and it 
shows how the semantic properties of symbols can have causal powers—when they 
correlate with the syntactic properties of symbols in an appropriate fashion. In a few 
words: mental processes are computationally implemented (cf. Fodor (1995, p. 14)). 
 
The remaining problem in the naturalizing of intentional states is to explain 
how symbols have semantic properties. This is the topic of the next section: 
 
 
                                                 
41 Cf. Fodor (1990, p. 22-23): “the machine is so devised that it will transform one symbol into another 
if and only if the symbols so transformed stand in certain semantic relations; e.g., the relation that the 
premises bear to the conclusion in a valid argument. Such machines—computers, of course—just are 
environments in which the causal role of a symbol token is made to parallel the inferential role of the 




2.C. The asymmetric dependency account: 
 
 
2.C.I. Holism, the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the disjunction problem: 
 
The remaining problem in the naturalizing of intentional states is to explain 
how symbols have semantic properties. According to Fodor, one misguided way to do 
so is to try to define the semantic properties of symbols through their inferential or 
functional relations with other symbols. This is the way of conceptual role semantics 
where a symbol’s meaning is identified with the symbol’s role in a computational 
system. Fodor, however, argues that this can’t be the right way to go: he points out 
that ever since Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” there has been substantial 
doubt that an analytic/synthetic distinction can be made.42 With respect to conceptual 
role semantics, this means that one cannot define in a principled manner the meaning-
constitutive relations of a symbol, unless the meaning-constitutive relations are all of 
the relations a symbol enters in. But since it is practically impossible for two people 
to share all of their beliefs, desires, etc., it follows that no two people ever share all of 
their inter-symbol relations. That is, if all of a symbol’s relations are meaning-
constitutive, it follows that no two people ever share thoughts with the same content. 
                                                 
42 A statement is analytic if it is true in virtue of the meaning of its constituent parts (e.g. “bachelors 
are unmarried”). A statement is synthetic if it is true in virtue of how the world is (e.g. “bachelors are 
party-goers”). Quine has argued that this distinction cannot be substantiated. For an extensive review 
of the arguments see “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction” by Rey in Stanford Encyclopedia of 




But that would make psychology dead in the water as a science, because, after all, 
psychology is about generalizations over the intentional states of different people. If 
no two people can share their intentional states, then psychology cannot be done. This 
problem is known as the “holism problem”.  
 
In order to avoid the holism problem Fodor foregoes conceptual role 
semantics and defends informational semantics. According to informational 
semantics a symbol’s meaning supervenes on the symbol’s causal relations: ‘dog’ 
means DOG because dogs cause ‘dog’. The attraction of informational semantics is 
that they are atomistic—‘dog’ can be the only symbol in the universe and it can still 
mean DOG if it is caused by dogs. This entails that on informational semantics a 
symbol’s meaning is independent from its relations with other symbols. According to 
Fodor, this is a positive feature of informational semantics, because it makes such 
theories immune to the holism problem. However, while informational semantics 
accounts avoid the holism problem, they face an intimidating problem of their own—
the “disjunction problem”: 
 
The disjunction problem is to explain a property of our mental representations 
that Fodor calls “robustness” (Fodor (1990, p. 91))—a symbol can be caused in many 
different ways, some of which are not meaning-constitutive. Thus, ‘dog’ can be 
caused by cats on dark nights, while keeping its meaning DOG (and not switching to 
DOG OR CAT ON A DARK NIGHT, for example). The problem for informational 




non-meaning-constitutive ones is known as the “disjunction problem”. Avoiding or 
solving this problem is what is required if one is to use informational semantics to 
naturalize intentional states. This is what Fodor attempts to do through his own 
version of an atomistic informational semantics account: 
 
2.C.II. The current version of ADA: 
 
Fodor’s informational semantics theory is now widely called his “asymmetric 
dependency account” (ADA). It has endured a few changes since its introduction in 
Psychosemantics.43 Below is the most current version of it: 
 
The symbol ‘x’ means the property X if: 
 
i) There is a nomic relation between the property of being an instantiation of X and 
the property of being a tokening of ‘x’44. 
 
ii) Tokenings of ‘x’ are “robust”, i.e. they could be caused by instances of Y, where Y 
≠ X. 
                                                 
43 Fodor (1995) drops the condition in his (1990) that “[s]ome ‘X’s are actually caused by Xs” (Fodor 
(1990, p. 121)). Cf. Fodor (1995, p. 90): “What a thought represents is largely independent of its actual 
causal history if the informational version of externalism is true. Thoughts of cats are thoughts of cats 
not because cats do cause them but because cats would cause them under circumstances that may be 
largely or entirely counterfactual.” See also the Appendix B in Fodor (1995)).  





iii) For all the instances of Y, where Y ≠ X, if an instance of Y causes a tokening of 
‘x’, then its doing so asymmetrically depends on (i), i.e. on the nomic relation 
between the property of being an instantiation of X and the property of being a 
tokening of ‘x’. 
 
iv) The dependence in (iii) is synchronic. 
 
The first thing to note is that ADA specifies a sufficient, but not a necessary 
condition for ‘x’ meaning X. Thus, the theory is safe from objections that ‘p’ means 
P, but without satisfying ADA’s conditions. Symbols can have their content because 
they satisfy conditions other than ADA’s. Second, note that the nomic relations 
(between the property of being an instantiation of X and the property of being a 
tokening of ‘x’) are instantiated in singular causal relations (between instantiations of 
X and tokenings of ‘x’) where these singular causal relations can involve causal 
chains with links that are tokens of symbols other than ‘x’. However, while these 
tokens of symbols help form the singular causal chains that instantiate the nomic 
relations, they do not play a role in individuating ’x’’s content. The latter is 
individuated only through the nomic relation between the property of being a 
tokening of ‘x’ and a property of being an instantiation of X. The particulars that help 
instantiate this nomic relation are not meaning-constitutive. This makes ADA an 
atomistic account—an account where a symbol’s content is defined independently of 




that it is possible that some physical entities can have semantic properties without 
being related to other physical entities with semantic properties.  
 
Now for an explanation of the conditions: Condition (i) involves nomic 
relations. Thus, a word on the ontological assumptions of Fodor with respect to nomic 
relations is in order. He assumes that nomic relations involve only properties. This is 
evident from the fact that to avoid the problem of representing particular objects (see 
next section), Fodor does not argue that there are nomic relations between particular 
objects, but suggests that every individual has a corresponding property of being that 
individual.45 Furthermore, nomic relations are counterfactual-supporting for Fodor46. 
That they are so specified means that even if no instances of X and no tokenings of 
‘x’ entered in singular causal relations with each other, there could still be a nomic 
relation between the property of being an instantiation of X and the property of being 
a tokening of ‘x’.47 The nomic relations not in the basic sciences are also ceteris 
                                                 
45 Also, see Fodor (1990, p. 93): “Ontologically speaking, I’m inclined to believe that it’s bedrock that 
the world contains properties and their nomic relations; i.e., that truths about nomic relations among 
properties are deeper than—and hence are not to be analyzed in terms of—counterfactual truths about 
individuals.”  
46 Cf. Fodor (1990, p. 93): “I assume that if the generalization that Xs cause Ys is counterfactual 
supporting, then there is a “covering” law that relates the property of being X to the property of being a 
cause of Ys: counterfactual supporting causal generalizations are (either identical to or) backed by 
causal laws, and laws are relations among properties.” 
47 That they are so specified also means (according to Fodor) that even if no instances of X and no 
tokenings of ‘x’ existed, there could still be a nomic relation between the property of being an 




paribus laws. This means that they resist exceptions when those exceptions are due to 
a failure of the ceteris paribus clauses. As a result, when the ceteris paribus clauses 
of a law relating the property of being X with ‘x’ are broken, tokenings of ‘x’ could 
be caused by instances of Y (where Y ≠ X) and instances of X may fail to cause 
tokenings of ‘x’, without such cases being counterexamples to the law.48 Finally 
nomic relations “cover” singular causal relations where the latter obtain between 
particular objects. In Fodor’s words: 
 
[S]ingular causal statements need to be covered by causal laws. That means something 
like: 
 
4. Covering principle: If an event e1 causes an event e2, then there are properties F, 
G such that: 
 
4.1. e1 instantiates F 
4.2. e2 instantiates G 
                                                                                                                                           
ADA to account for how we represent uninstantiated properties like being an instance of a unicorn. Cf. 
Fodor (1990, p. 100-101): “I take it that there can be nomic relations among properties that aren’t 
instantiated; so it can be true that the property of being a unicorn is nomologically linked with the 
property of being a cause of “unicorn”s even if there aren’t any unicorns. Maybe this cashes out into 
something like “there wouldn’t be nonunicorn-caused “unicorn” tokens but that unicorns would cause 
“unicorn” tokens if there were any unicorns. And maybe that cashes out into something like: there are 
nonunicorn-caused “unicorn” tokens in worlds that are close to us only if there are unicorn-caused 
“unicorn” tokens in worlds that are close to them.”  







4.3. “F instantiations is sufficient for G instantiations” is a causal law 
 
When a pair of events bears this relation to a law…the individuals are each covered or 
subsumed by that law and…the law projects the properties in virtue of which the 
individuals are subsumed by it…[W]hen an individual is covered by a law, it will always 
have some property in virtue of which the law subsumes it. (Fodor (1990, p. 142-143)) 
 
These assumptions will be taken for granted in this dissertation, pace 
nominalists (who do not believe that properties (as universals) exist), Humean bundle 
theorists (who treat particulars as bundles of properties), and regularity theorists (who 
treat nomic relations as mere constant conjunctions). Now for the rest of the 
conditions: 
  
What distinguishes natural signs from symbols is that symbols can 
misrepresent. Or, as Fodor puts it, symbols are “robust”. A natural sign is always a 
sign of its cause—whatever the cause is. It is merely a register, as the effect, of 
whatever caused it to come into existence. Thus, a natural sign can never be 
mistaken—it can never be a mis-effect—and this is what makes it different from a 
representation. Thus, condition (ii) is to account for the difference between natural 
signs and symbols—to account for the ability of symbols to misrepresent. But here, of 




nomic relations it enters in and if the symbol can misrepresent, then this means that 
only some of the nomic relations are going to be veridical (i.e. meaning-constitutive). 
That is why condition (iii) is needed. Condition (iii) says that the way to distinguish 
between the meaning-constitutive nomic relations involving ‘x’ and the other ones is 
to look at the counterfactuals: the meaning-constitutive nomic relations involving ‘x’ 
are the ones, but for which the others wouldn’t exist. Thus, if there was no nomic 
relation between dogs and ‘dog’, then there wouldn’t be a nomic relation between 
dog-looking-cats and ‘dog’, but not vice versa. 
 
ADA’s final condition states that the asymmetric dependence is synchronic as 
opposed to diachronic. Thus, for example, one’s present disposition to apply ‘dog’ to 
dogs must not depend on any present dispositions to apply ‘dog’ to cats, and one’s 
present disposition to apply ‘dog’ to cats must depend on one’s present disposition to 
apply ‘dog’ to dogs (cf. Fodor (1987, p. 108-9)). This condition is included to deal 
with cases where one’s disposition to apply ‘x’ to X is acquired entirely through non-
instances (Y, where Y ≠ X). For example, the disposition to apply ‘horse’ to horses 
may be acquired entirely through horse-looking-cows.49 Once the disposition to apply 
‘horse’ to horses is acquired, the disposition to apply ‘horse’ to horse-looking-cows 
would depend on the disposition to apply ‘horse’ to horses. However, the present 
disposition to apply ‘horse’ to horses also depends on the past disposition to apply 
‘horse’ to horse-looking-cows. Thus, we don’t have a case of asymmetric 
dependence, but we still have error (application of ‘horse’ to horse-looking-cows), 
                                                 




contrary to ADA which explains error through asymmetric dependence. The fourth 
condition deals with this case because it is a case of diachronic dependence of one’s 
present disposition to apply ‘horse’ to horses on the past disposition to apply ‘horse’ 
to horse-looking-cows. 
 
2.C.III. Rey’s fifth condition: 
 
Rey complements Fodor’s ADA account (p. c.) with a fifth condition:  
 
v) The asymmetric relation in (iii) is one on which other asymmetric relations 
involving a law between ‘x’ and X depend, but not vice versa. 
 
This condition helps ADA cope with a problem raised by Rey (p. c.) of 
multiple asymmetric dependencies involving the same symbol. The problem goes as 
follows: suppose that because of a nomic relation between ‘x’ and women there is a 
nomic relation between ‘x’ and people with skirts, but not vice versa. Now it is 
possible that because of the nomic relation between ‘x’ and people having skirts, 
there is a nomic relation between ‘x’ and people with baggy pants, but not vice versa. 
We now have a case of ‘x’ being involved in two asymmetric dependencies between 
nomic relations. The problem is to decide in a principled manner which one is the 
meaning-constitutive one. Rey’s fifth condition is such a principled manner. The 
suggested condition takes nothing of the externalist spirit of ADA and helps ADA 






2.D. The problem of representing individuals: 
 
 
Multiple objections have been raised for ADA, as to whether it succeeds to 
solve the disjunction problem. I will not analyze here whether these objections are 
successful or not, but will assume that ADA, or some modification of it, might offer a 
plausible way to solve the disjunction problem. 50 What I will analyze in this 
                                                 
50 ADA faces the problem of distinguishing between necessarily co-instantiated properties (examples 
of necessarily co-instantiated properties are rabbit and undetached-rabbit-part. They are not co-
extensive (the part is not identical to the whole) and co-occur in every world in which one of them 
exists. Fodor’s asymmetric account would not distinguish between representations of them precisely 
because they never appear separated. A special case of this problem is distinguishing between 
necessarily un-instantiated properties (some examples of necessarily un-instantiated properties are 
(being a) round-square, miracle, and monster) (cf. Rey (1997, p. 250)). First, Fodor’s asymmetric 
account would not be able to account for them because necessarily un-instantiated properties do not 
enter in nomic relations. Second, even if we can talk about nomic relations with the null set, then ADA 
would have the unpalatable consequence that representations of miracle and monster would have the 
same content. Another problem for ADA is that it risks gratuitous lockings (gratuitous lockings are 
referential relations of symbols that have no cognitive significance (cf. Rey (1995, p. 6-7)). For 
example, ‘cow’ might enter in asymmetrically dependent nomic relations with cows and cow-looking-
horses. But it might also enter in asymmetrically dependent nomic relations with pokings-by-a-
neurosurgeon-when-potassium-levels-are-high and pokings-by-a-neurosurgeon-when-sodium-levels-
are-low. However, the latter asymmetrically dependent nomic relations are cognitively insignificant—




dissertation is whether and how ADA can account for how representations of 
particular objects get their content. It has been argued that ADA cannot account for 
representations of particular objects: 
 
Adams & Aizawa (1997, p. 274-5) point that ADA cannot account for how 
representations of particulars get their content. ADA is based on nomic relations and 
Fodor himself assumes that there are no nomic relations between particular objects. 
Nomic relations are assumed to be between properties. This leaves ADA as incapable 
of addressing the question of how representations of particular objects get their 
content. One way to help ADA here is to appeal to properties such as the property of 
[being an instance of Aristotle] and to nomic relations between the property of being 
an instance of Aristotle and the property of being a token of ‘Aristotle’.51 But, as 
Adams (2003, p. 156) objects, this makes ‘Aristotle’ mean a property that can be 
shared by clones of Aristotle—entities that are numerically different from (the 
original) Aristotle, but share with (the original) Aristotle the property of being an 
instance of Aristotle. What makes it the case that ‘Aristotle’ means the original, as 
opposed to the clones? Fodor could insist on treating the property [being an instance 
                                                                                                                                           
should be ignored (‘cow’ better be not ambiguous between cows and pokings-by-a-neurosurgeon-
when-potassium-levels-are-high). These problems have already been widely discussed (cf. Fodor 
(1987, 1990) and Loewer & Rey (1991)). Since a conclusive argument for or against ADA has so far 
not been provided, for the purposes of examining whether and how ADA deals with the problem of 
representing particulars I will simply assume that it, or some version like it, has the tools to deal with 
all the other problems.  




of Aristotle] as unique for an individual. But this is dubious: as Adams (2003, p. 156) 
points out, “why would anyone ever have thought that individuals do not feature in 
laws?” Allowing such properties and laws between such properties entails a vast 
profligacy of laws—surely not the result we want if we are after a lean ontology.  
 
A third way to try to avoid this problem is to note that it is not really a 
problem for ADA—ADA specifies only sufficient conditions for ‘x’ meaning X. 
Thus, the fact that it cannot account for how individuals get represented does not 
show that there is something wrong with it. One, however, might object that not being 
able to account for how representations of individuals get their content makes ADA 
lack in explanatory power and that if another strategy for accounting for content (e.g. 
a strategy that appeals to both broad and narrow content) does better, then one should 
pursue the latter strategy and renounce purely atomistic externalist strategies like 
ADA. This is in effect what I will argue in Chapter 3. 
 
A fourth way to try to avoid this problem is by arguing that representations of 
particular objects are not in fact needed: Quine (1960b, p. 343-347) argues that we 
can transform a sentence with singular terms/arguments/variables into a sentence 
without one. To this purpose six combinators are used:  
 
a. Derelativization: (Der P )xl…xn-1 if and only if there is something xn, such that 
Px1…xn; 




c. Minor Inversion: (inv P)xl…xn, if and only if Pxl…xn-2xnxn-1; 
d. Reflection: (Ref P)xl…xn-1, if and only if Pxl… xn-1xn-1; 
e. Negation: (Neg P)xl… xn, if and only if not Pxl… xn; 
f. Cartesian Multiplication: (P x Q)xl… xn, yl… yn, if and only if Pxl… xn, and Qyl… 
yn. 
 
An example (from Robin Clark, “Variables, Interpretations and Quine-like 
Combinators”, p. 2): 
 
a. ExEy(Pxy * Qxyx) 
b. (P x Q)xyxyx by Cartesian Multiplication, f 
c. (Inv (P x Q)xxyxy by Major Inversion, b 
d. (inv (Inv (P x Q)))xxyyx by Minor Inversion, c 
e. (Inv (inv (Inv (P x Q))))xxxyy by Major Inversion, b 
f. (Ref (Inv (inv (Inv (P x Q)))))xxxy by Reflection, d 
g. (Der (Ref (Inv (inv (Inv (P x Q))))))xxx by Derelativization, a 
h. (Ref (Der (Ref (Inv (inv (Inv (P x Q)))))))xx by Reflection, d 
i. (Ref (Ref (Der (Ref (Inv (inv (Inv (P x Q))))))))x by Reflection, d 
j. (Der (Ref (Ref (Der (Ref (Inv (inv (Inv (P x Q))))))))) by Derelativization, a 
 
As Robin Clark (p. 3-4) points out, what Quine actually shows is that we can 
eliminate only the syntactic contribution of variables. The semantic contribution 




do not need to be explicitly tokened/written. Whatever their syntactic contribution to 
a sentence is, it can be substituted via the use of Quine’s combinators. But this does 
not entail that we can eliminate the semantic contribution of variables. The semantic 
contribution is needed by Quine’s own admission to define the arity of predicates. So 
we still need variables. In Robin Clark’s words: 
 
Variables play a dual role in first order logic. First, they act as place-holders which 
indicate the arity of the predicate. Second, multiple occurrences of the same variable may 
indicate identity of reference. Quine himself notes that “. . . the essential utility of 
variables is that they mark positions.” In particular, consider Quine’s Cartesian 
Multiplication operator: 
 
we can express our example ‘Bxy and not Fwxz’ as a single predication ‘(B x Neg 
F)xywxz’. (In reading this we have to know, of course that ‘B’ is two-place and F’ is 
three-place.) 
 
The combinatory calculus developed by Quine eliminates the second of the above 
functions of variables. Although variables are not explicitly present in a combinatory 
expression, we need arity markers for predicates in order to properly interpret Cartesian 
Multiplication. We conclude that semantic variables have not really been eliminated since 
the arity of the predicates must be known, as Quine says explicitly when discussing his 
Cartesian Multiplication. (Clark, Robin (“Variables, Interpretations and Quine-like 





The upshot is that, even if we can get rid syntactically of variables, we still 
need their semantic contribution. This means that attempting to deal away with 
representations of particular objects via Quine’s combinators in order to avoid the 






In this chapter I have overviewed Fodor’s asymmetric dependency account 
(ADA): Fodor designs ADA to be a theory of content that solves the disjunction 
problem without being vulnerable to the holism problem. In the rest of this 
dissertation I will assume that ADA, or some modification of it, offers a plausible 
solution to the disjunction problem. At the end of this chapter I pointed out the 
problem with ADA that will be the impetus for the rest of the dissertation: the 
problem of representing individuals. This problem will be analyzed in the next 
chapter where I will argue that to explain how particular objects are represented, the 
logico-syntactic roles of representations of particular objects need to be taken into 
account, and for this ADA needs to be complemented by conceptual role semantics. 
 
 








3.A. Introduction:  
 
 
In Chapter 1 I argued that a) singular causal strategies face the “which link” 
problem; and b) nomic strategies are about as complex as singular causal strategies. 
The upshot was that the nomic strategies also deserve consideration. In the previous 
chapter I presented an example of such nomic strategies—Fodor’s ADA—and 
explained how it solves the disjunction problem. But I also pointed out that ADA 
faces the problem of representing individuals. In this chapter I examine whether and 
how ADA can deal with this problem. I argue that to explain how particular objects 
are represented a) the logico-syntactic roles of representations of particular objects 
need to be taken into account, and for this ADA needs to be complemented by 
conceptual role semantics; and b) an appeal to the temporal and first-person 
indexicals must be made, and for this ADA must be supplemented with singular 





In Section 3.B I briefly overview ADA and the problem of representing 
particulars. In Section 3.C I present the notions of configurations, determinates, and 
determinables and then I tentatively propose in Section 3.D that with the help of 
super-determinate configurations and conceptual role semantics, ADA can account 
for how representations of particular objects get their content. The idea is to use 
conceptual role semantics to account for the logico-syntactic roles of representations 
of particular objects. The role of representations of particular objects is that of an 
argument in a definite description. The argument is concatenated with a predicate 
referring to a super-determinate spatio-temporal configuration instantiated at a space-
time region—a trope. The configuration involves four objects (x, l, n, and r) forming 
a pyramid with sides of length drx, dlx, dnx, drl, drn, and dln. This configuration is so 
determinate that there is only one particular at a time that can be at the pyramid’s 
vertex. I use this observation to argue that representations of particular objects get 
their content through definite descriptions of the sort: right now x is the one and only 
particular that has the relational spatial property of being at the non-base vertex of the 
super-determinate configuration described above, where this configuration has its 
base positioned on my eyes and nose. I also point out in Section 3.D that this view 
makes use of conceptual role semantics for more than the logical apparatus needed 
for the definite description. It is also used to define the narrow content of ‘I’ and is 
needed for the narrow content of the temporal indexical ‘now’. I also argue that 
singular causal relations are needed to account for the broad content of the first-






3.B. ADA and the problem of representing individuals:  
 
 
Fodor (1987, 1990, 1995) developed ADA to show that nomic theories of 
content are capable of solving the disjunction problem. According to ADA it is solved 
as follows: the nomic relations that do not involve a symbol’s referent depend on the 
nomic relations that involve the symbol’s referent, but not vice versa. In more 
schematic form: 
 
The content of representation ‘x’ means the property X if: 
 
i) There is a nomic relation between the property of being an instantiation of X and 
the property of being a tokening of ‘x’. 
 
ii) Tokenings of ‘x’ are “robust”, i.e. they could be caused by instances of Y, where Y 
≠ X, while still referring to X. 
 
iii) For all the instances of Y, where Y ≠ X, if an instance of Y causes a tokening of 




between the property of being an instantiation of X and the property of being a 
tokening of ‘x’.52 
 
Thus, ADA is an externalist account grounded in nomic relations between 
properties and symbols. Fodor makes the following ontological assumptions with 
regards to nomic relations: a) nomic relations involve only properties; b) they are 
counterfactual-supporting; c) the nomic relations not in the basic sciences are also 
ceteris paribus laws; d) nomic relations “cover” singular causal relations where the 
latter obtain between particular objects. These assumptions have been explained in 
the previous chapter and will be taken for granted. 
 
Given Fodor’s assumption that nomic relations involve only properties, it 
follows that particular objects do not enter in nomic relations. Since particular objects 
do not enter in nomic relations, it is not clear how ADA can account for 
representations of particular objects.53 Fodor (1995) has argued that it can, by 
appealing to properties such as the property of [being an instance of Aristotle] and to 
nomic relations between the property of being an instance of Aristotle and the 
property of being a token of ‘Aristotle’. But, as Adams (2003, p. 156) objects, this 
makes ‘Aristotle’ mean a property that can be shared by clones of Aristotle—entities 
that are numerically different from (the original) Aristotle, but share with (the 
                                                 
52 Fodor’s fourth (“synchronic”) condition and Rey’s fifth condition (about dependencies between 
asymmetric relations) have been omitted, since they will not be of concern in this chapter. 




original) Aristotle the property of being an instance of Aristotle. What makes it the 
case that ‘Aristotle’ means the original, as opposed to the clones? Fodor could insist 
on treating the property [being an instance of Aristotle] as unique for an individual. 
But this is dubious: as Adams (2003, p. 156) points out, “why would anyone ever 
have thought that individuals do not feature in laws?” Allowing such properties and 
laws between such properties entails a vast profligacy of laws—surely not the result 
we want if we are after a lean ontology. For the purposes of this chapter I will assume 
that Adams & Aizawa are right and ADA, by itself, cannot account for 
representations of particular objects.  
 
 
3.C. Super-determinate configurations: 
 
 
Since ADA is based on nomic relations and nomic relations cannot exist 
between particular objects, ADA, by itself, cannot account for how particular objects 
get represented. In Section 3.D I will present how ADA, with some help from 
conceptual role semantics, singular causal relations, and representations of super-
determinate spatio-temporal configurations, can account for how particular objects 
get represented. But first, in Section 3.C.I, I explain the notion of super-determinate 
property. Then, in Section 3.C.II I go over issues involving their representation and 





3.C.I. Determinates and determinables: 
 
Before I begin with spatio-temporal configurations—a brief word on 
determinates and determinables: the paradigmatic examples are colored/red and 
red/scarlet. Red is a determinate of colored and a determinable of scarlet. One aspect 
of the determinate/determinable relation that Funkhouser (2006, p. 548-9) provides is: 
“for an object to have a determinate property is for that object to have the 
determinable properties the determinate falls under in a specific way”. For example, 
being red is a specific way of being colored and being scarlet is a specific way of 
being red. Funkhouser presents two “truisms” about the determinate/determinable 
relation: First, the relation between the determinate and the determinable is transitive: 
if scarlet determines red, and red determines colored, then scarlet determines 
colored. Conversely, if colored is a determinable for red, and red is a determinable 
for scarlet, then colored is determinable for scarlet too. Second, the transitive chain 
of determinates and determinables “does not go on forever”. Thus, there are 
determinables that do not determine anything and determinates that are not 
determinables to anything. The former Funkhouser calls “super-determinables” and 
the latter, “super-determinates”. I am going to adopt his usage. The examples of 
super-determinables and super-determinates that he gives are colored and Coca-Cola 
red, respectively.  
 
Funkhouser also points out that every determinable has “determination 




example, with respect to triangular, the determination dimensions are the lengths of 
the sides and the angles between the sides. Determinables and their determinates 
share what Funkhouser calls “non-determinable necessities”: features that the 
determinables and their determinates share but which do not allow for variation. For 
example, the non-determinable necessities of triangular are “3-sided, closed, plane 
figure”. I will now apply these notions to spatio-temporal configurations: 
 
3.C.II. Representing spatio-temporal configurations: 
 
In Section 3.C.II.1 I start presenting my account how particular objects are 
represented, which appeals to spatio-temporal configurations. Being complicated it 
naturally invites the objection: well, even if this works, why not do it in this simpler 
way? In Section 3.C.II.2 I examine one such simpler way to account for 
representations of spatial relations, and explain why I do not think it is actually 
simpler.  
 
3.C.II.1. The configurations approach: 
 
A quick bit of terminology, before I proceed: space points are particulars. 
Spatial relations (i.e. configurations54) are relational properties of particulars. An 
                                                 
54 Configurations are not identical to shapes. A shape is a non-relational property of an object’s 
boundaries and is defined in terms of these boundaries, while a configuration is a relational property of 




example of a spatial relation is the one that obtains between two objects separated by 
5 m.  
 
Configurations, being properties, can enter in nomic relations. As a result, 
ADA can account for representations of them (regardless of whether they are super-
determinate or not), without having to appeal to representations of the particulars that 
compose the configurations.55 The notion of configuration will end up doing a lot of 
work in accounting for representations of particular objects. For starters, note that 
since ADA can account for representations of super-determinate configurations, it can 





                                                 
55 While a particular plays a causal role in the tokening of a representation of a property, it need not be 
represented for that. According to ADA, a token ‘P’ represents P if the property of being a tokening of 
‘P’ enters in the requisite asymmetric nomic relations with P and other properties. That there be a 
nomic relation between ‘P’ and P requires that instantiations of P cause tokens of ‘P’. Since ADA is 
the assumed account of reference and not singular causal accounts, merely entering in a singular causal 
relation can be held as not being sufficient for being a representation of the cause. Therefore, a token 




Figure 3.1.: This is an instance of a super-determinate configuration involving four 
objects x, l, n, and r forming a pyramid with sides of length drx, dlx, and dnx and a base 
of a triangle with sides drl, drn, and dln.  
 
The represented property here is: [being a configuration involving four objects (x, l, 
n, and r) forming a pyramid with sides of length drx, dlx, dnx, drl, drn, and dln], where 
drx, dlx, dnx, drl, drn, and dln, are specific lengths. This gets us a lot of what we need to 
account for how representations of particulars get their content:  
 
If the base of the pyramid is instantiated in a particular creature in a particular 
way, then only one particular object at a time can be at the vertex of the pyramid. 
Thus, if the base is instantiated in me so that its three vertices are my two eyes and 
nose (so drl, drn, and dln would be the lengths between the eyes and the nose), then 
only one particular object at a time can be at the vertex.56 We can have the following 
super-determinate configuration then: [being a configuration such that: 
 
a) it involves the objects x, l, n, and r forming a pyramid;  
 
b) the sides of the pyramid are of lengths drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, and dnx;  
                                                 
56 Note that this does not mean that we need to represent the eyes and the nose or their respective 
locations. Just like I can represent a property, without representing the particular that caused the 
representation of a property, so I can represent a configuration, without representing the particulars that 
caused the representation of a configuration. Note that none of this denies that the particulars and their 









Figure 3.2.: This is an instance of a configuration involving four objects x, l, n, and r 
forming a pyramid with sides of length drx, dlx, and dnx and a base of a triangle with 
sides drl, drn, and dln. The configuration instance is instantiated so that l, r, and n are 
the left, right eye, and the nose of “Pinocchio” here.  
 
Representations of this configuration (‘Cj’58) are problematic for ADA 
because the configuration involves a particular person—O. I have assumed with 
Fodor that only properties enter in nomic relations. This raises a dilemma for ADA: 
either the configuration is denied the status of a property because it is specified 
                                                 
57 I am slightly oversimplifying here: note that there can be two particulars that enter in the pyramidal 
configuration above—one in front of the observer and one behind her (a mirror reflection of the 
pyramid around its base). The way to discard the second particular (the one behind the observer) is to 
add a fourth particular in the base (one that is not in the same plane as the eyes and the nose). I will not 
do that for presentation purposes—the spatial configuration would become much more complicated 
than the intuitive pyramidal one I am using.  




through a particular, or it is treated as a property but of a very special kind: a trope59, 
a property instance like being scarlet at this space-time point. The first horn of the 
dilemma commits us to denying that ADA can account for representations of the 
super-determinate configuration above. The second horn commits us to tropes. But if 
tropes are to help ADA, then they have to enter in the nomic relations of ADA. 
However, tropes entering in nomic relations is problematic—the same doubts about 
particular objects entering in nomic relations apply to tropes.60  
 
Suppose, however, that we complement ADA with the first-person and 
temporal indexicals. This then would be enough to explain how the trope above is 
represented. The idea is to have a predicate ‘Cj’ that satisfies the following two 
conditions: a) it nomically covaries with super-determinate configurations like [being 
a configuration such that it involves four objects (x, l, n, and r) forming a pyramid 
where the respective distances are drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, and dnx and where l, n, and r are 
the left eye, right eye, and nose of some or other observer]; and b) it is inferentially 
and functionally related to a first-person reflexive term (‘I’) and an indexical for time 
(‘t’). In virtue of ‘Cj’ being related to ‘I’ and ‘t’ it doesn’t pick out just any pyramidal 
super-determinate configuration, instead it picks out a particular instance of it: the 
                                                 
59 Tropes, also known as property instances, concrete properties, and abstract particulars can be 
schematized as follows (cf. Funkhouser (2006, p. 14)): “[(O, t), P]. This is to be read as “O’s 
having/being P at t.” O is an object or spatial location, t a time (span), and P a property type. Such 
property instances occur if, and only if, O really is P at t.” 
60 Note that even though it is problematic to allow for tropes to enter in causal relations that are nomic, 




one that is set on me, now. This makes the configuration a trope. Note that there is no 
requirement that ‘Cj’ gets nomically related to the trope, as there would be if ADA 
were to account for how the trope is represented by itself. Instead, the trope is picked 
out in virtue of the ‘Cj’’s nomic relations with the property of being the super-
determinate spatial configuration Cj and in virtue of the ‘Cj’’s inferential and 
functional relations with ‘I’ and ‘t’. The picking out of a trope is cashed out as the 
satisfaction relation that obtains between Fregean definite descriptions and their 
referents.61 In short: when ‘I’ and ‘t’ in ‘Cj’ are saturated, then the referent of ‘Cj’ is a 
trope.  
 
                                                 
61 Where “q” and “g” denote tropes, “R(g, I, t)” denotes the three-place relation of [being a trope 
centered on me at some or other time t], and “Ci” denotes a particular super-determinate pyramidal 
configuration, the definite description is as follows: (Eq)(g)((R(g, I, t) & Ci(g)) ↔ (q = g))). This 
description need not be explicitly represented in the mind, of course, and perhaps isn’t. When it is 
implicit, ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’ is simply related to ‘I’ and ‘t’. Then a token of ‘C(x, 
l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’ refers to the super-determinate pyramidal configuration with which 
the predicate is nomically related that is based on the tokening organism (the referent of ‘I’) at the 
moment of tokening (the referent of ‘t’). Importantly, I am sympathetic to the objection that merely 
being related to a) the super-determinate pyramidal configuration; and b) related to ‘I’ and ‘t’, does not 
make ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’ a representations of a trope. If this is true, then I can 
argue (as I do for particular objects) that we need explicitly represented definite descriptions for ‘C(x, 
l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’ to refer to a trope. But, since my main focus in this dissertation is to 
account for how objects are represented, I can be charitable and grant that while we need explicitly 
represented definite descriptions for representations of objects, we do not need them for tropes. Either 




So, an organism representing this configuration at time t would use the 
following predicate: ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’. Here ‘x’, ‘l’, ‘n’, and ‘r’ 
are variables with the logico-syntactic role of arguments, but which, importantly, do 
not need to have referents for the predicate to be tokened. The variables ‘drx’, ‘dlx’, 
‘dnx’, ‘drl’, ‘drn’, and ‘dln’, range over numbers in a sequence. The variable ‘t’ is an 
indexical for time and ‘I’ is a first-person reflexive term, which I will show later can 
be made implicit and dropped.62, 63 
 
This proposal for representing super-determinate configurations at a space-
time location may appear implausible: a) there is what seems to be an ad hoc 
reference to a creature’s eyes and nose; b) the proposal entails that different creatures 
would not share the same spatial representations; and c), since ‘x’, ‘l’, ‘n’, and ‘r’ 
have the same functional roles, ‘x’ can just as well be the nose or one of the eyes—a 
problem, if I want to claim, as I do later on, that ‘x’ refers to the object at the tip of 
the pyramid. I take those in turn: 
                                                 
62 Note, by the way, that this proposal is not committed to an infinite number of nomic relations 
between the pyramidal configurations and predicates, since the visual system does not have infinite 
resolution. Furthermore, the proposal does not entail that our visual system uses an infinite number of 
non-complex symbols, despite implementing variables that range over numbers. That is because only 
two non-complex symbols (‘0’ and ‘1’) are enough to represent any number.  
63 Note that all six of the distance variables are needed here in order to account for a specific pyramid. 
For a particular organism, however, after a certain age the distances between the eyes and the nose 
remain set, which means that just three variables would be enough—those that specify the distances 
between the eyes and nose to the observed particular (we need all three of them to account for irregular 





With respect to (a): The proposal appeals to configurations involving a 
creature’s eyes and nose. Even ignoring the question of how to locate them64, why are 
these chosen and not other organs? Well, the answer is that I chose them for 
simplicity’s sake—a three-sided pyramid is the simplest one. But it would have been 
more accurate to choose a pyramid with a complex base that has sixteen vertices, 
where the vertices are the two foveas65, the two ciliary muscles66, and the twelve 
muscles (six per eye) that control the position of the eyes in their orbits. Why the 
foveas and the ocular muscles? Because I suspect that for retinocentric and head-
centered vision it is only these sixteen organs that play a role in locating an object. 
Were we concerned with a bat, for example, it would be the ears and the muscles that 
control them. Thus, the appeal to these organs is not completely ad hoc—they are 
appealed to because they are instrumental in detecting spatial relations.  
 
With respect to (b): The proposal above entails that different creatures would 
not share the same spatial representations. For example, bats will represent different 
configurations than cats, since bats will represent configurations formed in part by 
their ears, whereas cats will represent ones that consist (in part) by the cats’ eyes. 
Furthermore, the pyramid’s base would need to be smaller for smaller creatures like 
                                                 
64 I am presuming that there must be some principled way to do so. After all, the psychologists that 
study retinocentric vision, for example, do appeal to a center in the eye—the fovea.   
65 The fovea is a part of the retina where the photoreceptors are more densely packed. 
66 The ciliary muscles are the two muscles (one per eye) that change the shape of the eye’s lens to 




mice, since their eyes and nose are located more compactly. This means that larger 
organisms will represent different configurations than the ones represented by smaller 
organisms. And it get’s worse: wide-eyed-Bob’s spatial concepts would be different 
from narrow-eyed-Andy’s because Andy’s eyes would be located differently than 
Bob’s. This makes it seem that the current proposal runs against the intuitive view 
that different creatures can share spatial concepts.  
 
There are two types of spatial concepts that we have—ones referring to spatial 
properties and ones referring to spatial points. With regards to relational spatial 
properties like distance, azimuth, and altitude—they can be represented without 
appealing to specific distances between the organism’s perceptual organs. For 
example, we can talk about being 5 m away from the midpoint of the line between a 
creature’s perceptual organs for space.67 This means that the above problem does not 
arise for such properties. What about space points? The account that I give in Section 
3.D.II of how particular objects are represented can easily be modified to account for 
how space points are represented. For present purposes, all that is important to know 
                                                 
67 For azimuth we have: being on a line L1 that a) starts off at point M where it intersects line L2 (where 
L2 i) passes through the midpoint (M) of the line running through the organism’s visual sensory organs 
(L3); and ii) is in the plane of the visual sensory organs and the vestibulary organs (P)); and b) is in P 
and “leaning” towards the sensory organ closer to the stimulus. For altitude we have: being on a line L1 
that a) starts off at point M where it intersects line L2 (where L2 i) passes through the midpoint (M) of 
the line running through the organism’s visual sensory organs (L3); and ii) is in the plane of the visual 
sensory organs and the vestibulary organs (P)); and b) is in the plane that contains L2 and is 




is that in that account I appeal to definite descriptions containing representations of 
tropes like the pyramidal ones above. Now, if different organisms don’t share these 
representations, they will have different definite descriptions. However, as long as the 
organisms represent space points de re, as opposed to de dicto, this does not matter—
the representations of space points will have the same content, despite this content 
being picked out via different descriptions.  
 
With respect to (c): In the proposal above since ‘x’, ‘l’, ‘n’, and ‘r’ have the 
same functional roles, ‘x’ can just as well be the nose or one of the eyes—a problem, 
if I want to claim, as I do later on, that ‘x’ refers to the object at the tip of the 
pyramid. To avoid this problem we can stipulate that ‘l’, ‘n’, and ‘r’ carry information 
about the sensory organs, while ‘x’ doesn’t. Note that this does not mean that ‘l’, ‘n’, 
and ‘r’ represent the particular organs. It just assumes that they carry information 
about the property of being a sensory organ. Now, ‘x’ will be different in that it 
carries no information about the organs. This will make it semantically different from 
‘l’, ‘n’, and ‘r’, and will individuate it as referring to an entity that is not a sensory 
organ (i.e. an entity that is not on the base of the pyramid). 
 
I have presented an account of how super-determinate configurations can be 
represented. I also argued that representations of super-determinate configurations 
can be an essential step in accounting for representations of particulars. The key lies 
in the observation that some configurations are so determinate that only one particular 




appealed to is one that a) involves the objects x, l, n, and r forming a pyramid where 
the respective distances are drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, and dnx and where l, n, and r are the 
left eye, right eye, and nose of some or other observer. I now examine the details of 
this proposal: 
 
3.C.II.2. Coordinate systems: 
 
Just as shape is a super-determinable and square, triangle, circle, etc. are 
determinates of it, so too configuration is a super-determinable and square-
constellation, triangle-constellation, and circle-constellation, etc. are its determinates. 
One example of a super-determinate of configuration is the configuration of two 
particulars separated by 5 m. Being types of properties, super-determinates can enter 
in nomic relations. This means that ADA can account for representations of them. 
This allows for ADA to account for representations of super-determinates of distance 
(distance being another determinate of configuration).  
 
Now suppose that the predicates ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’ are representations of super-
determinates of distance. These are 3-place predicates whose arguments refer to the 
objects between which the distance obtains and the length of the distance: Pxydxy.68 
Wouldn’t then the argument of which all three predicates are predicated at the same 
time (‘Pxydxy & Qxmdxm & Rxrdxr’) refer to a point in 3D space? And if so, doesn’t 
                                                 
68 Importantly, the arguments can have only the syntactic role of place holders—they do not need to 




this solve the problem of representing particulars for ADA? The answers to these 
questions are two qualified “yes”-s. A particular space point could be represented by 
‘x’ when ‘Pxydxy & Qxmdxm & Rxrdxr’, only if certain conditions are satisfied: one 
must know a) the distances dxy, dxm, dxr (represented by ‘Pxydxy’, ‘Qxmdxm’, and 
‘Rxrdxr’); b) the directions of these distances69; and c) how y, m, and r are related 
with each other (at a time). Now, knowing how four points are related with each other 
(and assuming they are not all in the same plane) is sufficient to specify a coordinate 
system70 in 3-D. Thus, if we introduce a fourth point, o (for origin), then we can have 
o, y, m, and r specify a coordinate system. The introduction of o would allow to avoid 
mentioning the directions of the distances dxy, dxm, dxr, because the information about 
their direction would be implicit in the information about the distances dxy, dxm, dxr, 
dxo and how o, y, m, and r are related with each other. The upshot is that   ‘Pxydxy & 
Qxmdxm & Rxrdxr’ would not individuate a point but ‘Pxydxy & Qxmdxm & Rxrdxr & 
Sxodxo’ would, if one also knows how o, y, m, and r are related with each other (at a 
time) and not all four of them are on the same plane:  
 
                                                 
69 This qualification is needed to distinguish between mirror images of configurations comprised of x, 
y, m, and r. 






Figure 3.3.: One can individuate a particular x if one knows a) the distances dxy, dxm, 
dxr, dxo (represented by ‘Pxydxy’, ‘Qxmdxm’, ‘Rxrdxr’, and ‘Sxodxo’); b) how o, y, m, 
and r are related with each other (at a time); and c) not all four of them are on the 
same plane. 
 
Above I said that ‘Pxydxy & Qxmdxm & Rxrdxr & Sxodxo’ would individuate a 
particular if one also knows how o, y, m, and r are related with each other (at a time). 
But note what we get when we specify how o, y, m, and r are related with each other 
and their respective distances to x: we get a configuration, much like the one I have 
used above (the only difference is that the current one has five (when x is included), 




devolves into the approach that I pursue in this chapter or is so close to it that it 
doesn’t really matter which one is picked.  
 
 
3.D. Definite descriptions, narrow content, and representing particulars: 
 
 
I have argued that whereas ADA cannot account for representations of 
particular objects, it can account for representations of super-determinate 
configurations, and, when supplemented with the first-person and temporal 
indexicals, it can account for representations of tropes like the pyramidal ones above. 
I will now argue that to represent particular objects, more is needed than just such 
representations, namely: logical operators sufficient to build definite descriptions. I 
will also argue that with respect to the content of indexicals one needs to appeal to a) 
theories of narrow content; b) singular causal relations. Before I present my proposal 
in Section 3.D.II.1 of how objects are represented, I will provide the theoretic 
background that underpins it in Section 3.D.I. In Section 3.D.II.2 I simplify it by 
pointing out how some of the symbols appealed to in Section 3.D.II.1 can be left 
implicit and dropped. In Section 3.D.III I apply the proposal to the problem of 
tracking particular objects.  
 





What my proposals boil down to is that the reference of a representation of a 
particular object is determined through a definite description. The definite description 
contains the predicate ‘Cj’, which, as explained above, refers to my pyramidal tropes 
in virtue of being functionally related to indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘now’. Importantly, I 
am not making the claim that the definite description is the sense of the representation 
of a particular object. Thus, while I will say that tokens of ‘Cj’, ‘I’, and ‘now’ 
causally mediate the tokening of a representation of a particular object, I will not 
claim that the definite description containing ‘Cj’, ‘I’, and ‘now’ is constitutive of the 
content of a representation of a particular object. 
 
That the reference of a representation of a particular object is determined 
through a definite description means that my proposal is not Russellian in that 
Russellian definite descriptions are quantifier expressions and as such do not refer 
(even under the guise of ordinary names). Russell’s definite descriptions contain 
constituents with whose referents we are acquainted, where to be acquainted with an 
entity is to refer to it in a manner unmediated/unconstituted by the meanings of 
descriptions or of other concepts71: 
 
All propositions intelligible to us, whether or not they primarily concern things only 
known to us by description, are composed wholly of constituents with which we are 
acquainted. (Russell (1917, p. 128))  
 
                                                 
71 Cf. Russell (1917, p. 108): “I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive 




According to Russell, the only terms with which we are acquainted are sense-data, 
universals (which for Russell are concepts)72, and ourselves. Like Russell’s definite 
descriptions, my definite descriptions contain terms whose referent is not 
mediated/constituted by the sense of a description: the predicates ‘Cj’ that refer to the 
pyramidal tropes.73 However, whereas for Russell concepts refer to types of sense-
data, in my case predicates refer to external entities. 
 
One can distinguish Russell’s definite descriptions from Fregean definite 
descriptions74 where none of the terms refer directly. Jeshion calls the theory that 
subsumes such descriptions “Pure Fregean Descriptivism”: 
 
Pure Fregean Descriptivism is the theory according to which all aboutness – all linguistic 
reference and all intentional contents – is secured by means of an individual “fitting” or 
“satisfying” or “being in the extension of” a certain mental representation of it… A 
                                                 
72 Universals for Russell are predicates that have in their extension sense-data. Cf. Russell (1917, p. 
111): “Awareness of universals is called conceiving, and a universal of which we are aware is called a 
concept. Not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of 
yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow…. And the universal 
yellow is the predicate in such judgments as “this is yellow,” where “this” is a particular sense-datum.” 
73 I pointed out before that I would be sympathetic to a view that takes definite descriptions to 
determine the content of ‘Cj’. Importantly, this would not mean that the content of ‘Cj’ would be 
mediated/constituted by the sense of the description—that a description determines a content does not 
mean that the description has to be part of the content. 





singular term possesses purely descriptive semantic content just in case the reference of 
all of its contained terms is determined satisfactionally. (Jeshion (forthcoming, p. 5)) 
 
In the definite descriptions that I use there are terms whose referent is not 
determined entirely by their sense/character/role. These terms are the predicates ‘Cj’ 
that refer to the super-determinate pyramidal tropes. ‘Cj’ refers to a trope not only 
because of being related to ‘I’ and ‘now’, but also because it is nomically related to 
pyramidal super-determinate configurations. Thus, it does not possess a purely 
descriptive semantic content. In this respect my definite descriptions are unlike 
Fregean definite descriptions.  
 
That the reference of a representation of a particular is determined through a 
definite description makes my proposals sound Fregean (for Frege, definite 
descriptions are the senses75 of terms and they determine the terms’ referents (if there 
are such)) or Kaplanian (for Kaplan the rigidifier ‘dthat’ has as referent the denotation 
of a definite description76). Importantly, they are not Fregean: on Fregean views the 
sense of a term (“something like a description in purely qualitative terms”77) is its 
meaning (propositional content), whereas in my account of how particular objects are 
represented, the meaning of a representation of a particular object is only its referent. 
This makes my view Kaplanian, since for Kaplan the meaning of a demonstrative is 
                                                 
75 The sense of a term is its mode of presentation. The referent of a term is what the term is about. 
76 Cf. Kaplan (1989, p. 521). 




merely the referent and not the sense of the description that picks out the referent. 
Below I briefly explain my reasons for taking a Kaplanian line: 
 
One reason for not treating the meaning of representations of particular 
objects as (pure) Fregean sense is to avoid the problem raised by Strawson that if 
meaning were just Fregean sense, then we would not be able to distinguish between 
particular objects in massively qualitatively identical (real world) duplications. We 
can use as rich a description as we want, but the possibility remains that the universe 
contains another particular object that fits it just as well. Similarly, if meaning were 
just Fregean sense, then the terms of one definite description would be defined 
through other definite descriptions whose terms would be defined (directly or 
mediated by other definite descriptions) through the first definite description. This 
gives us only information about how the terms’ referents are functionally related, but, 
however complex the functional relation is, it is always possible that more than one 
set of entities can satisfy it. Thus, the terms’ referents would not be individuated. 
 
As I said above, I take a Kaplanian line with respect to representations of 
particular objects: representations of particular objects have a character that 
determines a referent without the character being narrow content. The reasons for 
taking a Kaplanian line contra Frege and contra 2-factor theorists of content who 
argue that a representation of a particular object has both broad and narrow content 
are purely strategic. In this dissertation I just want to make the points that: a) we need 




representations of particular objects can be accounted for by appeal to representations 
of spatio-temporal tropes. If I appeal for a 2-factor theory of content, then I can make 
the points (a) and (b) above, but also (c): the content of representations of spatio-
temporal tropes is constitutive of the content of representations of particular objects. 
While I do plan to defend this view in the future, I do not need to appeal to it to 
defend (a) and (b).78  
 
                                                 
78 One reason for appealing to a 2-factor theory of content for representations of particular objects is 
that visual demonstratives can be tokened when there is nothing in the visual field (as with Macbeth’s 
dagger). Here, appeal to narrow content would help explain the content of such hallucinations. Were I 
to appeal to a 2-factor theory of content, then my definite descriptions could account for cases where 
there is no object in the visual field to serve as the referent of ’x’. In this case some property is 
misrepresented as the property of being a Spelke object (the latter is represented by a predicate in the 
definite description). My definite descriptions could even account for cases where there is no space-
time location in the visual field to serve as the referent of ’x’ (image yourself on the edge of the 
universe looking out). In this case the ‘Cj’ predicate is mis-tokened: some property is misrepresented as 
the property of being a pyramidal space-time trope even though there is nothing (not even a space-time 
point) being the tip of the pyramid. However, it is not obvious that Kaplanian accounts cannot deal 
with cases of hallucination. They can hold that in cases of hallucination ‘x’ is an empty term and there 
is no singular thought (i.e. Russellian proposition) (cf. Corazza and Whitsey (2003)). The question is 
whether this will suffice to explain the rationality of the intentional states and behavior that results 
from the purportedly non-existent singular thought. It may: one strategy is to appeal to the character of 
the empty terms to explain their cognitive significance (but see Recanati (1990, p. 707-712) for 





As I said above, my definite descriptions are Fregean in the sense that they 
specify the referent of a representation of a particular object (this is what Kaplan’s 
definite descriptions also do for the referent of a ‘dthat’ term). But there are famous 
arguments against Fregean definite descriptions. In what follows, I briefly address 
these objections: 
 
Two standard objections against Fregean definite descriptions are Perry’s 
perspectivalist argument and Strawson’s duplication argument: Strawson (1959, p. 
20) points out that Fregean definite descriptions would not be able to distinguish 
between massively qualitatively identical (real world) duplications. “DK” can be as 
rich a description as one wants, but the possibility would remain that the universe 
contains another individual that fits it just as well as I do—one just needs to imagine 
that the universe is like a set of monitors each one of them receiving the same 
broadcast so that what goes on in our sector of the universe is mirrored by what goes 
on in the other sectors. This is due to the fact that any Fregean description leaves out 
the sort of information contained in thoughts with indexicals and demonstratives—
anchoring information that would pick out an entity, time, and place. I call this 
Strawson’s “duplication argument”. The need for indexicals in definite descriptions is 
demonstrated also by Perry (1979): 
 
The propositional content of Fregean definite descriptions is absolute in the 
sense of not being relative to a particular person at a time-place. Perry (1979) targets 




suffice only to provide an objective representation of an object that is independent of 
a subject’s perspective on it. This means that any Fregean description would leave out 
the sort of information contained in thoughts with indexicals. On the Fregean picture 
the thought “I need to go shopping” is short-hand for the thought “DK needs to go 
shopping” where DK is a definite description that applies only to me. The problem 
raised by Perry is that the thought “DK needs to go shopping” will cause me to go 
shopping only if I also believe that I am DK. That means that indexicals are 
essential—if the Fregean picture is to explain cognitive significance, it needs to 
appeal to indexicals. I call this Perry’s “perspectivalist argument”.  
 
I agree with Perry that indexicals are essential and that is why they are 
embedded in my definite descriptions.79 But my proposals would still suffer from the 
perspectivalist argument if the indexicals embedded in them are themselves Fregean 
definite descriptions in disguise (because these descriptions would not be specific 
enough to pick out a particular referent by the duplication argument). But if it is 
denied that the indexical are definite descriptions in disguise, then my proposals will 
be trivially immune to the perspectivalist argument. That is indeed my strategy in 
avoiding it: the narrow content of an indexical (its psychological character) is not a 
                                                 
79 In that my descriptions are similar to Chalmers’ primary intensions with their ordered triples of a 
world, an individual present in that world, and a time in that world. Schiffer (1981) also proposes to 
avoid problems like the one raised by Perry and Strawson by using definite descriptions together with 
the indexicals “I” and “now”. Schiffer’s definite descriptions are analogous to the approach of my 
proposal where the referents of representations of particular objects are specified through definite 




definite description defined in purely qualitative terms, but the indexical’s occurent 
inferential/functional role. Rey defines this role as follows:  
 
α is a FPRT [a first-person reflexive term] for agent x iff: (1-1) Whenever an input φ is 
received, x stores ‘φα’; (1-2) Whenever x is in a mental state M, x is prepared to comp-
judge a predication ‘φα’ that (ordinarily) gets released only when x is in M; (1-3) All 
preference states, and all basic action descriptions in x’s decision system that lead up to 
action in a standard decision theoretic way are states and descriptions whose subject is α. 
(Rey (1997, p. 291)) 
 
The occurent inferential/functional role of an indexical qualifies as narrow content 
because it explains the generalization that subsumes my Twin Earth twins and me—
that even though our token indexical thoughts have different referents, these tokens 
have the same type80—they are all about our selves81.  
 
Because of α’s role, it is guaranteed that when DK tokens the thought “α 
needs to go shopping”, DK will go shopping because α is the subject of DK’s action 
descriptions (by 1-3) and α means DK. Were DK to token the thought “β needs to go 
shopping” (where β also means DK, but is not the subject of DK’s action 
descriptions), then DK would not go shopping because DK does so only when α is the 
subject of DK’s action descriptions. This deals with the perspectivalist argument, but 
                                                 
80 Cf. Carruthers & Botterill (1999, p. 131-132). 




leaves the question open as to why ‘α’ refers to me and not to a duplicate of me in a 
massively qualitatively identical duplication in the universe: 
 
Strawson’s duplication problem is applicable to my proposal: I appeal to 
conceptual role semantics, in particular, Rey’s proposal, to define the narrow content 
(occurent inferential/functional role) of indexicals and an indexical’s role is mirrored 
not only in massively qualitatively identical duplications, but across people as well. 
However, because a token indexical can affect only the states of the token system 
within which it plays its role, the broad content (referent) of a token indexical would 
be the token system within which the token indexical plays its role. A token indexical 
plays its role in virtue of entering in singular causal relations with other tokens in a 
token system. So, a thought like “I am hungry” will be about me because the token ‘I’ 
a) has a specific inferential/functional role; and b) enters in a singular causal relation 
with me and not with a clone of me in a massively qualitatively identical part of the 
universe. That a particular system is identified in virtue of singular causal relations is 
very important because it means that appealing only to nomic causal relations would 
not help me explain how representations of particular objects get their content (the 
nomic relations (including the ones that implement the inferential/functional roles of 
symbols) will be the same for indexicals in all massively qualitatively identical 
duplications).82  
                                                 
82 Note that we do not get the “which link” problem for first-person indexicals because we can just 
stipulate that the referent of a token indexical is the last link in the causal chain leading to the token—





This concludes my discussion of Perry’s perspectivalist argument and 
Strawson’s duplication argument. In what follows I argue that the other well known 
arguments against Frege’s descriptivist proposal do not apply to my own proposals:  
 
Kripke argues that the descriptive notion of narrow content cannot account for 
the meaning of singular terms. His argument is broken down in three parts: the 
ignorance and error, rigidity, and unwanted necessity problems.83  
 
The ignorance and error problem shows that associating a definite description 
with a term is neither necessary nor sufficient for the term to refer to the denoted 
referent: suppose that the only thing I know about Einstein is that he is a physicist. 
But [a physicist] is not a definite description and can be satisfied by more than one 
person, even though, purportedly, I can successfully refer to Einstein. Thus, it is not 
necessary for a term to refer to its referent that it be associated with a definite 
description. Furthermore, suppose that I associate [the physicist who invented the 
nuclear bomb] with ‘Einstein’ due to an error. Oppenheimer might be given the 
credit, not Einstein: when I utter, “Einstein is the physicist who invented the nuclear 
bomb”, I utter something false. This means that even though the definite description 
identifies an individual, the name that the definite description is associated with might 
                                                 
83 Cf. Kripke (1980, p. 3-15, 48-78). For discussion cf. Devitt & Sterelny (1999) and Reimer’s 




not refer to the same individual. Thus, associating a definite description with a term is 
not sufficient for the term to refer to the referent denoted by the description.  
 
To see how the ignorance and error problem might (but does not) apply to my 
proposals consider visual indexicals (Pylyshyn’s FINSTs). They refer to particular 
objects. One could argue that a) a visual indexical can refer to a particular object even 
if no definite description is associated with it; and b) a visual indexical can refer to a 
particular object even when it is erroneously associated with a definite description 
that refers to another particular. Thus, associating a definite description with a visual 
indexical is neither necessary, nor sufficient for the indexical to refer to the referent 
denoted by the description. The difficulty with such claims, however, is that they are 
so far just hypotheses and as such are in competition with hypotheses that deny the 
statements in (a) and (b) (this is what I do in my proposals). In the case of natural 
language, there are strong natural language intuitions that a) one can successfully 
refer to an individual, even when one has no definite description to associate with the 
individual; and b) the definite description associated with a name need not refer to the 
same individual the name does. Such natural language intuitions have to be accounted 
for and Fregean definite descriptions fail to do so. But with regards to the 
representations that connect the mind with the world there are no such intuitions to 
rely upon. Instead, the available empirical data can be interpreted in multiple ways. 
As a result, the application of the ignorance and error problem to my definite 





Two other problems that Kripke raises for the descriptive view are the rigidity 
and unwanted necessity problems. Kripke’s rigidity problem stems from the fact that 
descriptions like [the most famous student of Plato] are not rigid: they can pick 
different people in different worlds. Names, like ‘Einstein’, however, are rigid: they 
pick the same person in every possible world in which that individual exists, whether 
or not the person in that world has all the properties that he has in the actual world. 
The reason for treating descriptions as non-rigid is to explain our intuition that it is 
true that Dionysius II could have been the most famous student of Plato. The reason 
for treating names as rigid is to explain our intuition that it is true that Aristotle could 
have been the second most famous student of Plato. Because of their different modal 
characteristics, this shows that names are semantically different from definite 
descriptions.  
 
Similarly, Kaplan (1989, p. 518) argues that demonstratives should be rigid. 
Consider the sentence:  
 
(1) He is the male being demonstrated at time t1 
 
It is possible that (1) is false. Yet, if Frege is right and the content of ‘he’ is 
“the male being demonstrated at time t1”, then (1) would express a necessary truth. 




demonstrated at time t1”. That is, ‘he’ refers rigidly and its reference does not change 
across circumstances of evaluation.84 
 
Prima facie, Kaplan’s points would seem to apply to my proposals, since in 
my proposals the representation of a particular object is a visual demonstrative whose 
content is specified by a definite description. Kaplan shows that demonstratives are 
rigid designators—that is the content of a demonstrative does not change across 
circumstances of evaluation. This would suggest that that my descriptions would need 
to be rigidified in the manner in which Kaplan’s dthat rigidifies demonstrative 
descriptions (p. 521). That is—the demonstrative representation of a particular would 
need to be treated as Kaplan’s ‘dthat’. However, in the early visual system, with 
which I am concerned, the rigidity problem does not apply, since the language of the 
early visual system deals with occurent perception and not with possible situations.85 
                                                 
84 Kaplan also has a further argument (p. 513): the utterance of “he lives in Princeton” while pointing 
at Paul who indeed does lives in Princeton expresses the proposition p: “Paul lives in Princeton at time 
t1”. When evaluating the truth of p in counterfactual scenarios we are concerned with whether p is true. 
On the Fregean account, the utterance expresses the Fregean proposition q: “the male being 
demonstrated at time t1 lives in Princeton”. We can imagine counterfactual scenarios where p is true 
but q is false. This means they are not the same proposition and that in turn entails that the utterance 
above expresses a Russellian proposition (it is directly about Paul) because any Fregean proposition 
(that is indirectly about Paul) would not be the same as p by the above argument. 
85 Evaluations of counterfactuals is done later than tracking as well—possibly at the stage at which 




That is to say that the language of the early visual system has no modal operators and 
as a result the rigidity problem does not apply here.86  
 
A similar move works for addressing Kripke’s unwanted necessity problem. 
The crux of this problem is that if the sense of ‘Aristotle’ is [the most famous student 
of Plato], then “Aristotle is the most famous student of Plato” should sound trivial. 
The reason it doesn’t is because Aristotle could have been the second most famous 
student of Plato. This means that [the most famous student of Plato] cannot be the 
content of ‘Aristotle’.  
 
Kaplan (1989) shows how the problem applies to indexicals, as well: on 
Frege’s account ‘I’ has as a sense “the speaker who is speaking”. However, this 
would mean that utterances like: 
 
(2) It is possible that I am not speaking 
 
                                                 
86 Note that in my account of how particular objects are represented, I am in fact appealing to the 
Kaplanian ‘dthat’ analysis (for strategic reasons, as I explained above): according to my view a definite 
description specifies the content of a representation of a particular object without being constitutive of 
the content of the representation of a particular object. However, it is important to point out that 
Kaplan’s argument does not work for the early visual system. This would allow me in the future to 





are always false, since “It is possible that the speaker who is speaking is not 
speaking” is always false. Which is false—(2) is true. Thus, Kaplan argues that “the 
speaker who is speaking” is not synonymous with ‘I’.87 It can express the semantic 
rule that fixes the content of ‘I’ in a context (the character of ‘I’), but not the content 
of ‘I’. Then, the truth of (2) can be accounted for by fixing the referent in the actual 
context (the speaker) and evaluating (2) in circumstances of evaluation (possible 
worlds) where the referent does not speak.  
 
But again—in the early visual system, with which I am concerned, the 
unwanted necessity problem does not apply, since the language of the early visual 
system deals with occurent perception and not with possible or counterfactual 
situations. 
 
I have briefly addressed the standard objections to Fregean definite 
descriptions and explained why my account does not suffer from them. I now turn to 
the specifics of my proposal for representing particular objects: 
 
3.D.II. Representing particulars through definite descriptions: 
 
The essence of my proposals is that particular objects are represented through 
definite descriptions. Since there is evidence that particular objects are represented in 
the early visual system (Pylyshyn’s FINSTs), the definite descriptions must not 
                                                 




incorporate concepts that only appear in higher cognitive capacities. I will now 
consider two proposals where different cognitive capacities are required for the 
representation of particulars. The first proposal is more intuitive for the theorist, but, 
as I will go and show in the second proposal, we can represent particular objects 
without some of the cognitive capacities the first proposal requires. It is the second 
proposal that I believe works better, if only because of its simplicity. 
 
3.D.II.1. First proposal for representing particulars: 
 
This proposal is more intuitive for the theorist because it appeals to explicit 
representations of a time and an observer: crudely put, given a time and an observer, 
only one particular object can enter in a super-determinate configuration with the 
observer’s eyes and nose. In the next proposal, I will show that the representation of 
an observer can be made implicit. But first things first—take the following definite 
description:  
 
(Ex)((y)(C(y, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, dry, dly, dny, t, I) ↔ (x = y))) 
 
To explain this definite description remember, from Section 3.C.II.2, that the 
predicate ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’88 refers to a trope: being a 
configuration at time t such that: a) it involves the objects x, l, n, and r forming a 
pyramid where the respective distances are drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, and dnx; and b) r, l, and 
                                                 




n form the base of the pyramid and r and l are my eyes, while n is my nose. In this 
super-determinate configuration x is at its non-base vertex and there can be only one 
such x. Note that this definite description can be modified to include a representation 
of the property S of being a Spelke object (bounded, unified, and persisting through 
time)89 as follows: 
 
(Ex)((y)((C(y, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, dry, dly, dny, t, I) & Sy) ↔ (x = y))) 
 
The whole definite description then reads as follows: right now x is the one and only 
particular object that has the relational spatial property of being at the non-base vertex 
of the super-determinate pyramidal trope C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I). Here 
is an illustration: 
 
 
Figure 3.4.: This is Pinocchio looking at a particular object (x) in front of him. The 
particular object that Pinocchio is looking at is the one and only particular object that 
enters in a configuration with the left eye (l), the right eye (r), and the nose (n) of 
Pinocchio at time t, so that the respective distances are drx, dlx, dnx, drl, drn, and dln. 
                                                 




This is reflected in the form of the definite description above: only one particular, 
given a time and an observer, would satisfy this relational spatial property. 
 
In this definite description the symbol ‘I’ is a first person reflexive term. The variable 
‘t’ is a temporal indexical. The variable ‘x’ has the inferential/functional role of an 
argument90.  
 
In virtue of using the definite description above, the ontological assumption 
that only one entity can be at the tip of the pyramidal trope is implicitly represented. 
                                                 
90 As to how this role may be specified, one may look to Strawson (1959, p. 167-170) and Strawson 
(1974, p. 103). I give his view merely as an example, while acknowledging that there may be problems 
with it: Strawson notes three ways that subjects and predicates differ from each other. First, while 
different predicate instances can be concatenated with one subject (e.g. ‘Socrates’ smile’ and 
‘Socrates’ frown’ can be concatenated with ‘Socrates’), only one subject can be the subject of a 
predicate instance (e.g. ‘Socrates’ smile’ can be concatenated only with ‘Socrates’). Second, with 
regards to predicates there are incompatibility groups, whereas there are no such groups with regards to 
subjects. An incompatibility group is such a range of predicates that if a predicate out of that range is 
concatenated with a subject, no other predicate out of this range can be concatenated with the subject. 
There are no such incompatibility groups with regards to subjects: a subject being the subject of a 
predicate does not preclude any other subject being the subject of that predicate. Third, with regards to 
predicates there are involvement relations, whereas there are no such relations with regards to subjects. 
Crudely put, an involvement relation is a relation between predicates such that one implies the other, 
but not vice versa (e.g. the determinate/determinable relation: being scarlet implies being red, but not 
vice versa). More precisely, there is a predicate P such that, for any subject x, Px entails Dx, where D 
is P’s determinable. There are no such involvement relations with regards to subjects: there is no 




If a definite description was not used, then the representing system would implicitly 
represent the world as a world where more than one entity can be at the tip of the 
configuration, which would mean that a particular entity would not be individuated. 
 
In virtue of being embedded in the definite description as it is, ‘x’ represents a 
particular. But what makes ‘x’ not a mere representation of a particular but of a 
particular object? After all, tropes are particulars and so are states of affairs. Before I 
present what I think is the right answer, let me go through several answers that I do 
not think work:  
 
One could argue that what makes the content of the argument ‘x’ different 
from that of the predicate ‘Cj’ (which refers to a trope) is that ‘Cj’ enters in 
asymmetric nomic relations with properties, while ‘x’ doesn’t. But we could easily 
imagine a situation where both enter in asymmetric nomic relations. One could 
instead argue that ‘x’ and ‘Cj’ have different contents because they get their content 
in different ways: ‘Cj’ does not enter in definite descriptions as an argument and as a 
result gets its content only through asymmetric nomic relations and inferential 
relations with indexicals. The argument ‘x’, on the other hand, enters in definite 
descriptions as an argument and as a result gets its content also through definite 
descriptions. This means that whereas the content of ‘Cj’ is constant (or robust), the 
content of ‘x’ is not—it can change based on what the definite description is. But that 
leaves it open that ‘x’ can refer at different tropes (or states of affairs) at different 




arguments relate to predicates in a way that mimics how objects relate to properties 
(as Strawson points out). Then, because ‘x’ is an argument, ‘x’ gets to have as content 
objects and not mere tropes, whereas because ‘Cj’ is a predicate, it gets to refer at 
most to tropes. I am actually somewhat sympathetic to this last approach. It is similar 
in structure to the point that because syntactic relations mimic semantic inferences the 
former can be taken to mean the latter. However, I still think that the approach is 
ultimately a problematic one because it seems plausible that other things than objects 
and properties can enter in relations identical to those between objects and properties. 
Pointing out that we can at least treat predicates as referring to properties (by appeal 
to ADA), and so eliminate some of the entities that enter in identical relations to those 
between objects and properties, does not resolve this problem because it seems 
possible that properties and other things than objects can enter in relations identical to 
those between objects and properties.91 
 
I think the right answer as to why ‘x’ refers to an object and not merely to a 
trope (or state of affairs) has to do with the complex role of ‘x’ and in particular its 
relation to memory (see also Section 3.D.III.2): ‘x’ gets its content through definite 
descriptions. The definite description is stored in memory in a file (an “object file” 
similar to the one that Kahneman and Treisman (1992) propose). In the cases where 
the definite description that causes the tokening of ‘x’ changes from time t1 to t2 while 
the same token ‘x’ keeps being tokened, then the definite description is updated in the 
                                                 
91 For example, note that Strawson’s three different ways that subjects and predicates differ from each 




object file. The previous description is not deleted but stored. This fact means that ‘x’ 
keeps its inferential relation to it. It is ‘x’ having both of these relations that explicitly 
represents that ‘x’ refers to the same particular at t2 that it referred to at t1. We have 
‘x’ be related with two definite descriptions both of which define its content. That 
is—both definite descriptions individuate the same entity under different modes of 
presentation. Suppose that the entity in question were a trope. This would mean that 
the definite description containing ‘t1’ and the definite description containing ‘t2’ 
would refer to the same trope. But the definite description containing ‘t1’ individuates 
a trope at t1. Likewise, the definite description containing ‘t2’ individuates a trope at 
t2. These two tropes cannot be the same since a trope is a super-determinate at a 
spatio-temporal location—if the time is different, the trope is different. We have the 
consequence that the content of ‘x’ is two distinct entities: a trope at space-time 
location t1 and a trope at a space-time location t2. However, as stated above the 
content of ‘x’ as specified by the two definite descriptions has to be the same. Thus, 
‘x’ cannot refer to particular that is a trope (or state of affairs92), but only to a 
particular that is an object. Thus, due to this updating and storing, ‘x’ represents the 
same particular object, and it represents it as being in different spatio-temporal 
relations relative to the observer. 
 
                                                 
92 The same point applies for states of affairs: a state of affairs is a particular object instantiating 
properties, where, importantly, spatio-temporal relations are among the properties being instantiated. 





This, of course, leaves the problem of giving an account of how predicate 
logic, ‘I’, ‘t’, and the numbers over which ‘drl’, ‘drn’, ‘dln’, ‘drx’, ‘dlx’, and ‘dnx’ range 
are instantiated in the brain. Here, at most, I can give a general sketch of an 
approach—an appeal to conceptual role semantics and singular causal relations—
since accounting for them in detail would be beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 
Appeal to conceptual role semantics has been a favored method in explaining 
the meanings of logical operators. Take for example ‘&’: the inferential role of ‘&’ is 
such that there are dispositions to infer ‘α’ from ‘α & β’, ‘β’ from ‘α & β’, and ‘α & 
β’ from ‘α’ and ‘β’. Because of its inferential role, we can say that the meaning of ‘&’ 
is that of conjunction.93 If this is plausible, then perhaps the same approach would 
work for quantification operators, the implication operator, and perhaps identity. 
Working out the details is a future project, though. Right now I only want to point out 
a plausible direction in which the meanings of logical operators can be accounted 
for.94  
 
With regards to ‘I’, Rey (1997) suggests that if we help ourselves to 
conceptual role semantics, we can use the inferential roles of ‘I’ to define its 
meaning.95 According to Rey, ‘I’ or what he calls “first-person reflexive term” or 
“FPRT” is defined as follows: 
                                                 
93 There are problems with this approach, though, which I will discuss in the next chapter (Section 
4.D.II). 
94 Discussion of the merits and problems of conceptual role semantics follows in the next chapter.  





α is a FPRT for agent x iff: 
(1-1) Whenever an input φ is received, x stores ‘φα’; 
(1-2) Whenever x is in a mental state M, x is prepared to comp-judge a predication ‘φα’ 
that (ordinarily) gets released only when x is in M; 
(1-3) All preference states, and all basic action descriptions in x’s decision system that 
lead up to action in a standard decision theoretic way are states and descriptions whose 
subject is α. (Rey (1997, p. 291)) 
 
One might be suspicious of the individuation of ‘α’ because intentional terms 
such as “φ”, “M”, “decision system” are invoked. However, on Rey’s view, 
conceptual role semantics doesn’t have to avoid every intentional property. It just has 
to avoid, for fear of vicious circularity, those intentional properties it is trying to 
explain through inferential roles. Here, Rey grants that accounting for the meaning of 
“φ”, “M”, “decision system” might involve appeal to relations with external 
properties (as on an externalist account of content). 
 
On Rey’s view of FPRTs, ‘α’ means “receiver of present inputs, the instigator 
of outputs, and the subject of intervening mental states”. That is not enough for ‘α’ to 
individuate a particular subject, though—after all the same functional/inferential role 
is had by tokens of ‘α’ in other people’s minds as well. However, because a token ‘α’ 
can affect only the states of the token system within which it plays its role, the broad 
content (referent) of ‘α’ would be the token system within which the token indexical 




other tokens in a token system. So, a thought like “I am hungry” will be about me 
because the token ‘I’ a) has a specific inferential/functional role; b) enters in a 
singular causal relation with me and not with a clone of me in a massively 
qualitatively identical part of the universe.  
 
In this proposal I adopt something like Rey’s account of first-person reflexive 
terms, while accepting that this requires me to justify my appeal to inferential roles 
and conceptual role semantics (which I do in the next chapter). I do not adopt Rey’s 
account as it is, because it is highly implausible that the first-person reflexive term 
which figures in the visual system is the same symbol that Rey talks about above—
the one that we use to attribute mental states to ourselves. If there is a first-person 
reflexive term in the visual system, then it has roles that relate it to other symbols in 
the early visual system and to actions in the early visual system, such as tracking, 
saccading to, and focusing on a target. Thus, we need an account more or less as 
follows: 
 
‘β’ is a visual FPRT in an agent x’s visual system v iff: 
(1-1) Whenever the input ψ is processed only by the modules for retino- or 
egocentric space, v stores ‘ψβ’; 
(1-2) Whenever the input ψ is processed also by the modules for allocentric space, 




(1-3) All basic action descriptions in v that lead up to action through 
computational processes96 are descriptions whose subject is ‘β’. 
 
This proposal implies that there is an explicit representation of a visual FPRT. 
However, as I will shortly show in the second proposal below, we can do without any 
explicit representation of first-person indexicals.   
 
Giving an account of ‘now’ and of how time is represented, is a topic that I 
plan to pursue but which right now is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Now I 
will just wave at the work of Roberts (1998) and Gallistel (2009) who present 
evidence for biological clocks in a variety of creatures. In analyzing how an animal 
succeeds in representing time, Roberts argues that a biological clock consists of 
“something that changes (pacemaker) and something that measures the changes 
(register)”. Without getting too specific, one can at least see how one can go about 
giving an account of how temporal spans are represented: the value of the predicate 
‘Ti’ is the number recorded in the register of the changes of the pacemaker.97 Changes 
                                                 
96 This qualification is needed because some of the processes of the visual system are non-
computational. For example, selecting the most active input for processing does not require 
computation but only lateral inhibition. 
97 Perhaps the fact that ‘Ti’ ranges over numbers in a sequence can be used to represent the fact that 
time is directional. As I explain below, a set-theoretic definition of numbers is built on the successor 
function and perhaps the asymmetricity of the successor relation can be used to account for the 
asymmetricity of time. This could be used to treat ‘Ti’ not merely as a representation of temporal spans 




of value of this number are nomically correlated with changes of the pacemaker. 
Now, if the changes of the pacemaker are nomically correlated with temporal 
changes98 and assuming that nomic relations are transitive99, then the change of value 
of ‘Ti’ is nomically correlated with temporal changes. Assuming that the temporal 
changes and the changes of value of ‘Ti’ are incremental, then the value of ‘Ti’ would 
nomically co-vary with the length of temporal spans. This would suggest that an 
externalist account like ADA which accounts for content through nomic relations can 
explain how temporal spans are represented. It would define the content of ‘T1’ as 
that super-determinate temporal configuration consisting of two temporal points on 
                                                                                                                                           
represent temporal spans and not time to compute velocities and to distinguish past from present 
instantiations of the same object, I would not pursue here the much more difficult question of how time 
is represented. 
98 Can we take it as obvious that the changes of the pacemaker nomically co-vary with temporal 
changes? If they don’t, then ‘Ti’ doesn’t represent temporal spans but just the number of changes of the 
pacemaker. Suppose that time can flow with different speeds in between the changes of the pacemaker. 
This would mean that the changes of the pacemaker do not nomically co-vary with temporal changes. 
If this is correct, then we would perhaps need narrow content to argue that, since the organism uses ‘Ti’ 
to predict an object’s future position (given its position and velocity), then ‘Ti’ is a representation of 
perceived temporal spans (as opposed to just being a representation of the number of changes of the 
pacemaker). I leave this issue for another time. 
99 Armstrong (1997, p. 234-235) denies that non-superveneint nomic relations can be transitive but 
allows that supervenient nomic relations can be. Tooley (1977, p. 697) does allow for transitive nomic 




the line of time (a temporal span) with which ‘T1’ enters in a nomic relation (‘T1’ 
stands for a particular value of ‘Ti’)100.  
 
What has been said so far seems to cover how temporal spans get represented, 
not how ‘now’ (or ‘t’) gets its content (and the content of ‘t’ needs to be accounted 
for ‘t’ plays a role in my definite descriptions). But based on the above, we are in a 
good position to explain how ‘t’ means NOW: ‘t’ is always concatenated with the 
current ‘Ti’. ‘Ti’ is shorthand for a particular predicate (e.g. ‘T1’) representing a 
particular temporal span. In virtue of always being concatenated with the current ‘Ti’, 
‘t’ represents the current time—i.e. it means NOW. The concatenation ‘Tit’ is like the 
moving arrow of a clock—it at once represents how much time has passed and what 
time it is now. If this is right, ‘now’ (or ‘t’) would have the following 
inferential/functional role: 
 
‘t’ is a visual “now” in an agent x’s visual system v iff: 
(1-1) ‘t’ is always concatenated with the current ‘Ti’ where ‘Ti’ is the number 
currently recorded in the register of the changes of the pacemaker; 
(1-2) Whenever input ψ is received, v stores ‘ψt’;  
 
Remember how the content of a particular token of ‘I’ was accounted for—
both through functional/inferential relations and through singular causal roles. The 
                                                 
100 Assuming, of course, that this nomic relation is explanatorily basic—it explains other nomic 




reason was that ‘I’’s functional/inferential role is had by tokens of ‘I’ in more than 
one person’s mind and so ‘I’’s functional/inferential role does not individuate a 
particular person. In the same way, ‘t’’s functional/inferential role is had by tokens of 
‘t’ in people at different temporal locations. Thus, ‘t’’s functional/inferential role does 
not individuate a particular point in time. To do so we need to appeal to singular 
causal roles again: a particular token of ‘t’ enters in a singular causal relation with a 
particular register and pacemaker and this picks out an entity with a particular 
temporal location.101 Thus, a particular token of ‘t’ has as its content the particular 
time of its tokening in virtue of a) its functional/inferential role that defines ‘t’ as a 
visual “now”; and b) a singular causal relation between the token of ‘t’ and a 
particular register and pacemaker that picks out a particular temporal location. 
 
This leaves one to specify how numbers and identity are accounted for. This is 
another topic for research which cannot be explored here and about which I will only 
say the following: a set-theoretic definition of numbers is built on the successor 
function S(k) = k + 1.102 If one were to show how the successor function can be 
defined in terms of inferential/functional roles, then an appeal to conceptual role 
                                                 
101 This works only if the entity tokening ‘t’ has a temporal part—by picking out the entity tokening ‘t’ 
one also picks out its temporal part which in turn picks out a particular temporal location. However, 
the entity tokening ‘t’ might not have a temporal part, as on 3D accounts (where objects persist by 
existing at two or more different times and not by having temporal parts). Then picking out the 
particular entity tokening ‘t’ would not individuate a particular time. I reserve discussion of 3D 
accounts for future research. 




semantics would be a promising strategy in giving an account of numbers. Given that 
another function, such as the ‘&’ function, is a paradigmatic example of how 
conceptual role semantics works, it is not implausible to believe that a successor 
function could also be provided in a similar manner103. So, if some symbols enter in 
asymmetric and transitive functional/inferential relations that can be described as 
successor relations, then these symbols would be promising candidates for 
representations of numbers. Perhaps something similar can work for the relation of 
identity (R): an inferential/functional relation between symbols can be described as R 
if a) the relation is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive; and b) if ‘α’ is R-related to 
‘β’, then if ‘Pα’, then ‘Pβ’. 
 
3.D.II.2. Second proposal for representing particulars: 
 
The first proposal requires that there be a complex representation tokened, 
complete with indexicals and quantifier, implication, and identity operators. Also, the 
first proposal depends on the indexical ‘I’ to individuate a particular human whose 
eyes and nose enter in a super-determinate configuration with the represented 
particular object. The reason ‘I’, as defined by Rey (1997), locks onto me is because 
‘I’ a) has a specific inferential/functional role; and b) enters in a singular causal 
relation with me and not with a clone of me in a massively qualitatively identical part 
of the universe. But, perhaps, we can deal away with explicitly representing ‘I’. The 
                                                 
103 Pace Fodor (2004) who argues that conceptual role semantics cannot non-circularly account even 




idea is that just like a token ‘I’ picks out a particular person because of singular causal 
relations with this person, so a token ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t)’104 picks 
out a configuration involving a particular visual system because of singular causal 
relations with this visual system. In this way, the system that is tokening ‘x’ and ‘Cj’ 
is implicitly specified (as opposed to explicitly, through ‘I’). The benefit of adopting 
this suggestion is that ‘I’ is no longer needed in the definite description, which is a 
plus when we are concerned with early representation—a stage of representation 
when it is dubious that the representing system has the capacity to token first-person 
reflexive terms.  
 
Explicit representation of the visual system is needed for the capacity to 
represent objects in allocentric space, since such capacity allows one to distinguish 
between spatial relations that involve one from those that do not. Take, for example, a 
cat observing two mice separated by 5 m with the cat being 5 m away from one of the 
mice. Suppose that there is a nomic relation between the spatial relation [being a 
configuration involving two objects separated by 5 m] and a symbol ‘5 m away’. For 
the cat to be able to distinguish the spatial relation [being separated by 5 m] that 
involves it from the spatial relation [being separated by 5 m] that does not, then ‘5 m 
away’ must be related to a visual ‘I’ when the spatial relation involves the cat, and not 
related with the visual ‘I’ otherwise. However, for visual systems that represent 
objects only in egocentric space, the visual ‘I’ is not needed. Such systems do not 
represent spatial relations that do not involve the systems, and as a result they do not 
                                                 




need to distinguish between spatial relations that involve the systems from those that 
do not. Since now I am concerned only with egocentric space, I do not need a visual 
‘I’ to be explicitly represented in the definite description that refers to particular 
objects. 
 
One might think that we can also get rid of the ‘t’: isn’t the time of the ‘Cj’’s 
tokening enough to specify a time implicitly? However, getting rid of ‘t’ would be 
plausible only if we were concerned with representing objects at a moment. But we 
are not—our visual systems are capable of distinguishing past from present 
instantiations of the same object. Likewise, explicit representations of time are 
needed to process the velocities of moving objects. This implies that objects’ 
temporal coordinates are represented explicitly and this is a reason to keep ‘t’ in the 
definite description. Furthermore, as I argued above, in order to explain why ‘x’ 
refers to an object and not merely to a trope (or state of affairs), one has to appeal to 
two different definite descriptions—one that contains ‘t1’ and one that contains ‘t2’. 
That is, without the explicit representation of time in the definite descriptions, we 
would not be able to explain how particular objects are represented. 
 
The upshot is that we are left with the following definite description:   
 





This proposal is simpler than the first one in Section 3.D.II.1 and relies almost 
as much on conceptual role semantics: the only difference is that here we do not have 
‘I’ and so do not need to appeal to conceptual role semantics for its meaning. But we 
still need conceptual role semantics to account for predicate logic, representations of 
numbers, and ‘t’.105  
 
3.D.III. Tracking of particulars: 
 
If we are concerned with representing particular objects at a time and if the 
above is on the right track, then we have a general sketch of how particular objects 
are represented. However, we are interested not only in representing particulars at a 
time but through time, as well. In tracking a moving object we obviously represent it 
as being the same one through time. That is to say that even though at time t2 the 
object may have changed its spatial and non-spatial properties, we still represent it as 
                                                 
105 Prior to Fodor (2004), Fodor assumed that ADA goes hand in hand with conceptual role semantics, 
where the latter only concerned itself with accounting for the logico-syntactic roles of symbols. An 
important implication of my proposals is that conceptual role semantics is needed to account for more 
than the logico-syntactic roles of symbols. The reason I am stressing this is to point out that my 
proposal does not treat representations of particulars as complex representations composed by 
constituents bound by logical operators where the contents of those constituents are accounted for by 
ADA. If that was my proposal, then I would have held that ADA, prior to Fodor (2004), would have 
been able to account for representations of particulars. In my proposals, however, the definite 
descriptions incorporate ‘now’ and representations of numbers, and those do not get their content 
merely through nomic relations with external properties. That is why I believe that ADA, prior or after 




being identical to the one it was at time t1. The “tracking problem” is to explain how 
this is achieved—by appealing to either implicit or explicit re-identification. 
 
An explicit re-identification account is one where in virtue of an object 
representation ‘x’ at t1 being related to an object representation ‘y’ at t2’, the two are 
treated as representing the same object. An example is where ‘=’ is used to identify 
the referent of ‘x’ at t1 with that of ‘y’ at t2’. An implicit re-identification account is 
one where no relation between the two representations is taken to constitute them 
being treated as representing the same object. The most plausible example of such an 
account goes as follows106: if tokens of ‘x’ are causally connected with the object x 
from t1 to t2, then ‘x’ tracks x from t1 to t2.107 Here we can say that ‘x’ tracks x not in 
virtue of a token ‘x’ at t1 being connected with a token ‘x’ at t2, but in virtue of the 
tokens being continuously causally related with x. However, the problem with such 
an account is that it cannot explain visual tracking through occlusion (a case where 
the visually tracked object is briefly occluded by an intervening obstacle). The reason 
is that while the visually tracked object is occluded, there is no causal chain 
connecting tokens of ‘x’ with x. This suggests that if we want an account of visual 
                                                 
106 One could try to define implicit re-identification as “continuously referring to an object”. However, 
I can continuously refer to Bob from t1 to t2 (by continuously thinking about him) without being able to 
recognize Bob at t2, due to him drastically changing his appearance, for example. Thus, if we define 
implicit re-identification as above, it is not clear how we are re-identifying anymore.  
107 The need to use a token of ‘x’ in the antecedent of the conditional, as opposed to just the symbol 
‘x’, is because I am assuming (see Chapter 1) that objects enter only in singular causal relations, where 




tracking through occlusion, then we probably need to include some explicit 
representation of re-identification. Below I give an account of such explicit re-
identification that is based on my account of how particular objects are represented. 
 
First note that the problem of explicit re-identification is not solved merely by 
appealing to ‘=’ to connect two representations of particular objects. The reason is 
that one still would have to explain why they are treated as identical in content with 
each other. Here one cannot simply say that they are treated as identical in content 
with each other, if they refer to the same object. The reason is that one can have two 
concepts that refer to the same object under different descriptions, without treating the 
concepts as identical in content with each other. We need a mechanism to explain 
how the system treats the content of ‘x’ at t1 as identical to that of ‘x’ at t2. I provide 
such a mechanism below: 
 
To solve the tracking problem I suggest appealing to the definite descriptions 
in the two proposals above: 
 
(Ex)((z)((C(z, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drz, dlz, dnz, t) & Sz) ↔ (x = z))) 
 
Where ‘y’ and ‘x’ are representations of particular objects, the idea is to associate the 




closest to x at time t1.108 The metric for closeness piggy-backs on the predicates ‘C(z, 
l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drz, dlz, dnz, t)’ (‘Cj’). For exposition’s sake, let’s call the variables in 
the definite description of ‘x’: {‘drx’, ‘dlx’, and ‘dnx’}, and likewise for ‘y’.109 Then, 
how close to each other x and y are represented as being is reflected by the values of 
the variables in the following two sets: {‘drx’, ‘dlx’, ‘dnx’} and {‘dry’, ‘dly’, ‘dny’}. The 
distance between x and y can be computed based on these values. This distance then 
serves to ground the closeness relation. Then x is associated with y if the distance 
between them is the smallest when compared to the distances between x and other 
represented particular objects.  
 
More specifically: at t1 ‘x’ is tokened together with ‘Cj’. At t1 ‘x’ refers to the 
object denoted by the definite description that contains ‘Cj’ (let’s call it: D-‘Cj’). D-
‘Cj’ is stored in the object file associated with ‘x’. At t2, we have ‘Ck’ being tokened 
as a result of a perceived super-determinate pyramidal configuration (where ‘Cj’ ≠ 
‘Ck’). ‘Cj’ together with ‘Ck’ are used to compute a distance in virtual space between 
the point defined by {‘drx’, ‘dlx’, ‘dnx’} and the point defined by {‘dry’, ‘dly’, ‘dny’}. If 
                                                 
108 Some further condition is needed to specify a small time period within which such association is to 
take place. Particular objects represented at times whose temporal difference exceeds this time period, 
will not be associated with each other. The purpose of this condition is to eliminate most of the cases 
where two distinct particular objects get associated with each other: if the time period is sufficiently 
small, then, unless the particulars are moving really fast, the particular object at time t2 that will be 
closest to the particular object at time t1 will be the same particular object as that at time t1. 





this distance is the smallest when compared to the distances produced by other 
predicates referring to super-determinate pyramidal configurations, then D-‘Cj’ is 
updated with D-‘Ck’ in ‘x’’s object file. Now (at t2) ‘x’ refers to the object denoted by 
D-‘Ck’. Importantly, when D-‘Cj’ is updated, it is not deleted, but stored in the object 
file. This fact means that ‘x’ keeps its inferential relation to it (on top of its relation to 
D-‘Ck’). It is ‘x’ having both of these relations that explicitly represents that ‘x’ refers 
to the same particular at t2 that it referred to at t1.  
 
So, given this account, what happens in cases of occlusion during visual 
tracking? The answer may go as follows: at t1 ‘x’ represents an object denoted by D-
‘Cj’—x. D-‘Cj’ is stored in the object file associated with ‘x’. At t2, when x is 
occluded, no ‘Ck’ is tokened and there is no D-‘Ck’. However, we still have D-‘Cj’ in 
‘x’’s object file. As a result, ‘x’ still refers to x, in virtue of D-‘Cj’. At t3 we have D-
‘Ck’ which updates D-‘Cj’, where the latter remains stored. ‘x’ at t1 is identified with 
x at t3 not because ‘x’ keeps referring to x from t1 to t2, but because of ‘x’’s relation 






                                                 
110 Importantly, the above is an account of tracking that can deal with occlusions. I grant that we do not 




In this chapter I have argued that to explain how particular objects are 
represented a) the logico-syntactic roles of representations of particular objects need 
to be taken into account, and for this ADA needs to be complemented by conceptual 
role semantics; and b) an appeal to the temporal and first-person indexicals must be 
made, and for this ADA must be supplemented with singular causal relations. In 
particular, I have argued that a representation of an object ‘x’ gets its content via a 
definite description that denotes ‘x’’s referent without constituting ‘x’’s content. The 
definite description contains a predicate ‘Cj’ that refers to a super-determinate 
pyramidal configuration instantiated at an observer and a time—a trope. ‘Cj’ refers to 
this trope in virtue of a) a nomic relation á la ADA with the pyramidal configuration; 
and b) functional relation with the indexicals ‘I’ and ‘t’. The definite description 
containing ‘Cj’ reads as follows: right now x is the one and only particular that has 
the relational spatial property of being at the non-base vertex of the super-determinate 
configuration, where this configuration has its base positioned on my eyes and nose. 
This view makes use of conceptual role semantics for more than the logical apparatus 
needed for the definite description. It is also used to define the narrow content of ‘I’ 
and ‘t’. In this chapter I have also argued that particulars are tracked in virtue of an 
updating and storing of the definite descriptions that determine the content of 
representations of particular objects.  
 
In these proposals I have appealed to conceptual role semantics to account for 
predicate logic, representations of numbers, ‘I’, and ‘t’. But conceptual role semantics 




doesn’t even think it can account for its paradigmatic examples—logical operators. I 








4.A. Introduction:  
 
 
In Chapter 1 I argued that a) the singular causal strategy for accounting for the 
conent of representations of particular objects faces the “which link” problem; b) the 
nomic strategy pursued in this dissertation is at worst as complex as the singular 
causal strategy. The upshot was that the nomic strategy also deserves consideration. 
In chapter 2 I presented an example of the nomic strategy—Fodor’s ADA—and 
pointed out that it faces the problem of representing individuals. In the previous 
chapter I argued that ADA, as a nomic theory, when complemented with conceptual 
role semantics and singular causal relations for indexicals can account for how 
particular objects are represented and tracked. In this chapter I will discuss my use of 
conceptual role semantics: why I have chosen it instead of the other accounts of 
narrow content, and will argue that it has the potential to deal with the most serious 
objections thrown in its way. 
 
Conceptual role semantics is not the only conception of narrow content that 
might be able to help nomic theories account for how representations of particular 




content (the descriptivist, the mapping, and Devitt’s one), and explain that I picked 
conceptual role semantics over them because it is able to help with the problem of 
representing particular objects better than the other accounts. However, there are two 
serious problems against conceptual role semantics: the holism and the 
analytic/synthetic distinction problem. Following Rey, I suggest that these problems 
can be dealt with if one appeals to asymmetric dependencies between symbol 
relations. This is presented in Section 4.C. Another problem raised against conceptual 
role semantics that I discuss in this section is the circularity problem.  
 
 
4.B. Notions of narrow content: 
 
 
According to narrow content theories, a representation can have a content that 
is not individuated merely by the representation’s relation with external entities. This 
is in contrast with broad theories of content where a representation’s content is 
defined only through causal relations with the external world. On narrow content 
accounts, the meaning of a representation is not to be equated with the 
representation’s referent, whereas on broad theories of content the meaning of a 
representation is the representation’s referent. For example, according to ADA, if ‘pet 
fish’ enters in asymmetrically dependent nomic relations with pet fish, then the 
content of ‘pet fish’ is simply its referent—the property of being a pet fish. Whereas, 




referent, but the inferential/functional relations that ‘pet fish’ enters into with percepts 
in the sensory systems. In this section I overview some of the different notions of 
narrow content and some of the problems they face.  
 
4.B.I. The mapping notion of narrow content: 
 
An example of the mapping notion of narrow content can be found in Fodor 
(1987): the narrow content of a term is a function from contexts to contents111. Thus, 
for Fodor, a term’s narrow content is not equated with the term’s contents or truth-
conditions. A term’s narrow content is what is left once the truth-conditions of a term 
have been abstracted away and what remains is the function only. The narrow content 
of a term is a “set of ordered pairs” (Fodor in Loewer & Rey (1991, p. 299)) of 
worlds and properties where in each world (context) a term’s (narrow) content picks 
the term’s extension (broad content). Thus, to specify the narrow content of a term 
one must specify all the ordered pairs. This means that a) a particular term’s narrow 
content is a “construct out of broad content” (Fodor in Loewer & Rey (1991, p. 
301))—the broad contents of the term in each possible world define the term’s narrow 
content; and b) the individuation condition of a term’s narrow content is just the set of 
ordered pairs of contexts and contents—thoughts with identical sets have the same 
(narrow content).112 
                                                 
111 As such, the mapping notion is essentially Kaplanian in character. 
112 Cf. Fodor (1987, p. 48)): “Your thought is content-identical to mine only if in every context in 





So how helpful is Fodor’s mapping notion in the project of accounting for the 
content of representations of particular objects? This question should be split into two 
parts: a) does Fodor’s notion of narrow content help by itself; and b) can Fodor’s 
notion of narrow content replace conceptual role semantics in the account given in 
Chapter 3? The answer to the first question is, “No”. The problem of accounting for 
the content of representations of particulars is to explain why it is the case that in a 
given context a token symbol refers to a given object. Fodor’s mapping notion can at 
most tell us that given a context a symbol will have a given referent, but it does not 
explain why it is the case that in this context the symbol has this referent.113  
 
Can Fodor’s mapping notion replace conceptual role semantics in the account 
given in Chapter 3? The answer is, “No”. In my account of how particular objects are 
represented I argued that we need to appeal to logical operators. However, Fodor’s 
mapping notion is of no help when it comes to defining the meanings of logical 
operators because logical operators have no referents (that is why Fodor, prior to his 
                                                 
113 As Curtis Brown describes this problem in “Narrow Mental Content” in SEP: “although the 
mapping conception gives us an abstract, formal conception of narrow content, it does not give us an 
algorithm for finding the narrow content of a particular state. Although apparently any function from 
contexts to contents would count as a “narrow content” in Fodor's sense, some of these functions could 
not really be the content of a mental state. To use a computational analogy, we are really interested 
only in “computable” functions from context to content, functions that can be implemented somehow 
in a human mind, and this suggests that it is not the function itself that is of interest but rather the 




(2004) appeals to conceptual role semantics to account for the meanings of logical 
operators). This means that even if Fodor’s mapping notion can account for the 
contents of indexicals and numbers, Fodor’s notion would not completely suffice for 
all that I need narrow content to do for me in Chapter 3. Instead of adopting multiple 
notions of narrow content, considerations of simplicity suggest to stick with 
conceptual role semantics if it can help me with predicate logic, numbers, and 
indexicals, as I argued that it can in the previous chapter.114 
 
4.B.II. The descriptive notion of narrow content: 
 
This notion is most notable in the work of Frege. For Frege the sense of a term 
is a definite description which determines the referent of the term. Thus, the referent 
of ‘water’ is determined by its sense: [the clear, odorless, liquid that freezes at 0 
degrees Celsius] and the referent of ‘Barack Obama’ is determined by its sense: [the 
current president of the USA].115  
                                                 
114 A substantial problem for Fodor’s notion of narrow content is that it, unlike the other notions to be 
discussed below, does not seem promising in solving the necessarily co-instantiated properties problem 
(the Gavagai problem). This, as Rey (1997) points out, generalizes to necessarily un-instantiated 
properties: an account, like Fodor’s, would have to treat terms like ‘free will’ and ‘magic’ as identical 
in narrow content, since in every world they will refer to the empty set. The other notions of narrow 
content, however, do offer hope in dealing with this problem, which can be a reason for preferring 
them to Fodor’s notion. 
115 Note that this notion of narrow content offers to deal with the problem of distinguishing between 





Does the descriptive notion of narrow content help by itself to account for 
how representations of particular objects get their content? The answer is, “No”, 
because of well-known problems which were reviewed in the last chapter. For 
example, Strawson (1959, p. 20) points out that Fregean definite descriptions would 
not be able to distinguish between massively qualitatively identical (real world) 
duplications. DK can be as rich a description as one wants, but the possibility would 
remain that the universe contains another individual that fits it just as well as I do. 
 
Can the descriptive notion replace conceptual role semantics in the account 
given in Chapter 3? The answer is, again, “No”. In my account of how particular 
objects are represented I argued that we need to appeal to indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘t’. 
However, definite descriptions are unable to account for the content of such 
indexicals either by themselves or by being helped out by singular causal strategies. 
Definite descriptions cannot account for the content of ‘I’ and ‘t’ by themselves 
because of Strawson’s duplication argument. In the previous chapter I appealed to 
singular causal relations to account for the content of indexicals: because a token ‘I’ 
can affect only the states of the token system within which it plays its role, the broad 
content (referent) of ‘I’ would be the token system within which the token indexical 
plays its role. ‘I’ plays its role in virtue of entering in singular causal relations with 
other tokens in a token system. However, the same move is unavailable for the 
                                                                                                                                           
specifying through descriptions whether the referent of ‘rabbit’ is the property of being a rabbit or the 




descriptive notion theorists because they abstract away from a token term’s 
inferential/functional relations: a definite description specifies a term’s, as opposed to 
a token term’s, relations with other terms. Details about the causal interactions of the 
token terms are omitted. As a result, if one appeals only to definite descriptions, then 
one cannot also appeal to singular causal relations involving the token terms to 
determine the content of indexicals, the way I did in the previous chapter.  
 
4.B.III. Devitt’s notion of narrow content: 
 
According to Devitt,  
 
narrow meaning (or content) is very rich. Not only does it include all the functional roles 
that determine the syntactic structure of sentences, but also the inner functional roles that 
partly determine the reference of words. The latter roles are what is left of wide word 
meaning when the extra-cranial links are subtracted. The roles constitute narrow word 
meanings. Those meanings are functions taking external causes of peripheral stimuli as 
arguments to yield wide (referential) meanings as values. Narrow word meaning is 
(mostly) not a matter of syntax. (Devitt (1990, p. 380))  
 
Devitt provides the qualification “mostly” because almost all terms enter in 
more than syntactical relations with other terms—they enter in functional relations 
with proximal stimuli and states of the organism. The syntactic and functional 




determining the term’s reference given a context.116 Likewise, descriptions (that are 
instantiated via inferential/functional relations) can also be part of a term’s narrow 
content—as long as they play a part in determining the term’s wide content. So, 
Devitt & Sterelny’s idea is that the narrow content of a term is specified by the 
relations in which the term enters, including those relations holding between the term 
and proximal stimuli. Once the context is provided—the distal causes causing the 
proximal stimuli—the narrow content determines a referent: the cause of the proximal 
stimuli. If a description is used to categorize the referent, then the description is also 
part of the term’s narrow content. 
 
Devitt divides terms into three kinds: “pure-causal terms”, “descriptive-causal 
terms”, and “descriptive terms”.117 The first are terms whose narrow content involve 
only “the functional-role connections between peripheral stimuli and the term”. For 
pure-causal terms, these connections, given a context, suffice to determine a referent. 
The descriptive-causal terms require a richer narrow content to determine, given a 
context, the referent: their narrow content involves a) links between the terms and 
stimuli; and b) associations with other terms. The narrow content of descriptive terms 
involves only associations with other terms and its broad content is determined 
through the broad contents of these other terms.118  
                                                 
116 Cf. Devitt & Sterelny (1999, p. 210): “Where then do we differ from two-factor theorists? The only 
functional roles that go into our meanings are ones that determine reference.” 
117 Cf. Devitt (1990, p. 380). 
118 Devitt’s view is attractive because it avoids the holism charge levied at most functionalist accounts 





Does Devitt’s notion of narrow content help by itself to account for how 
representations of particular objects get their content? The answer is, “Almost”. 
Devitt’s descriptive-causal terms and descriptive terms allow for a rich narrow 
content. This means that, if we ignore for a moment the logical operators to which I 
appeal in my definite descriptions, my definite descriptions can be treated as the 
narrow content of one of Devitt’s terms that determines the term’s reference—much 
like it is on my own account. However, there is an important difference between 
Devitt’s notion of narrow content and the conceptual role semantics notion that I 
appeal to: Devitt’s notion of narrow content is tied to a referent—no referent, no 
narrow content—whereas the conceptual role semantics notion is not so constrained. 
It is this difference that explains the answer “almost” above and explains why I chose 
conceptual role semantics instead of Devitt’s notion of narrow content:  
 
My definite descriptions appeal to logical operators. Logical operators do not 
seem to have referents and thus none of the roles of logical operators determine any. 
Obviously then, Devitt’s notion of narrow content, which determines, given a context, 
                                                                                                                                           
Devitt’s account the syntactical/inferential/functional roles which comprise the narrow content of a 
symbol are those instrumental in determining the term’s referent. His view also promises to deal with 
the Gavagai problem by appealing to descriptions which categorize the referents of terms but do not 
identify them (Cf. Devitt & Sterelny (1999, p. 80): “a name is associated, consciously or 
unconsciously, with a description in a grounding…the associated general categorial term does not 
identify the object”). For example, ‘rabbit’ refers to rabbit-hood in virtue of being associated with a 




the term’s referent, does not apply to logical operators. This means that if one appeals 
only to Devitt’s notion of narrow content, then one cannot use my proposal to account 
for how particular objects are represented. It also means that Devitt’s notion of 
narrow content cannot replace conceptual role semantics in the account given in 
Chapter 3 because it cannot account for the content of logical operators. But if it 
weren’t for the inability to account for the content of logical operators, then my 
account of how particular objects get represented would have been easily 
incorporated into Devitt’s account of narrow content and this would have meant that 
his account, by itself, would have been a promising strategy for accounting for the 
content of representations of particular objects. Hence, the “almost” above.  
 
Still, the above only shows that my account cannot be incorporated into 
Devitt’s account of narrow content. It does not show that Devitt’s account of narrow 
content cannot explain by itself how particular objects are represented. So can it? The 
answer is, “No”. If one appeals only to Devitt’s notion of narrow content, then one 
cannot appeal to definite descriptions to pick out the referents of representations of 
particular objects (because this entails an appeal to logical operators like ‘E’). If one 
cannot appeal to definite descriptions, then one can try appealing to singular causal 
strategies. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, this approach runs into the “which 
link” problem. One can try appealing to singular causal strategies and to the 
inferential/functional relations between a representation of a particular object (‘x’) 
and other terms. Here, the hope is that by relating ‘x’ with terms referring to shapes, 




time), one would specify a particular object. However, this also runs into problems: a) 
one cannot necessarily individuate a particular entity; and b) one cannot distinguish 
between a region and an object:  
 
With respect to (a): since I am concerned with explaining how particular 
objects are represented in the visual system, I am assuming that predicates such as 
‘being the only even prime’ are unavailable. Granted, such predicates can individuate 
a particular (in this case—the number 2), but they are too sophisticated to be found in 
the visual system. What about predicates like ‘Tj’: ‘being at the tip of a super-
determinate pyramidal configuration set on my eyes and nose right now’? Those 
aren’t too sophisticated. Wouldn’t a term concatenated with ‘Tj’ refer to a particular 
object? The answer is, “No”, because it is logically possible that there may be more 
than one object at the same space-time location. It is here that definite descriptions 
would help, were they available—they could define the referent of ‘x’ as the only one 
that has the property represented by ‘Tj’. In cases where there is more than one object 
at the same space-time location, the definite description would denote the complex 
object composed of all the entities at the location. But, granted, this may be too 
“sketchy” a possibility. Furthermore, what about predicates like ‘Rj’: ‘being the 
reddest entity in my visual field, now’? Purportedly, no two entities can be the reddest 
ones in my visual field, now. If there are two equally red ones, then ‘Rj’ would simply 
not get tokened. So, wouldn’t a term concatenated with ‘Rj’ refer to a particular 





With respect to (b): suppose that ‘x’ is concatenated with ‘Rj’. Doesn’t it refer 
to a particular object? The answer is, “No”, because the entity in question can be 
either an object (the reddest object in my current visual field) or a region (the space-
time region at which we have the property of being the reddest in my current visual 
field).119 What if the predicate ‘object’ were present? Wouldn’t ‘x’ refer to an object 
if it were also concatenated with ‘object’? First of all, being concerned with the visual 
system, I am assuming that predicates like ‘object’ are not available. But even if they 
were, the answer is again, “No”, because we still have a region available as a 
candidate—the space-time region at which we have the property of being the reddest 
object in my current visual field. Now, on my account of how particular objects are 
represented, I argued that it is in virtue of definite descriptions being stored and 
updated that ‘x’ represents an object, as opposed to a trope. Can’t we make the same 
move, but without appeal to definite descriptions? Here is how it may go: 
 
We store predicates like ‘Ri’. When observing the reddest entity in our visual 
field through time, we have a succession of ‘Ri’ predicates being stored in memory. 
Let ‘x’ be concatenated with one of them: ‘Rix’. This reads as “x has the property of 
being the reddest object in my visual field, at ti”. Let ‘x’ be concatenated with the 
others, as well. So we have ‘Rix’, ‘Rjx’, and ‘Rkx’. In virtue of being concatenated 
                                                 
119 One can object that the concatenation ‘Px’ means that x has P and that a region cannot have the 
property of being the red, for example. Only objects can have such properties. But it strikes me that the 
syntax of predicate logic does not make ontological assumptions about regions having properties. It 
makes assumptions only about there being particulars, properties, and properties being related to 




with all of them, ‘x’ represents an entity that has different temporal locations (at ti, tj, 
and tk). Given that a space-time point cannot be at two space-time places at once, ‘x’ 
can only refer to an object. This would work if we are concerned only with space-
time points. However, notice that points (being infinitesimal) can be problematic as 
the locations of properties—one wonders whether something square can be at an 
infinitely small point. Instead, let’s treat properties as being instantiated at regions. 
Similarly, instead of treating tropes as properties at space-time points, we can treat 
them as properties at space-time regions. Second, note that when observing the 
reddest object in my visual field through time, there is a space-time region occupied 
by the reddest object. At this region we have instantiated the property of being the 
reddest object in my visual field at ti, tj, and tk. That is to say that at this region we 
have instantiated the properties of being Ri, Rj, and Rk. So, let ‘x’ refer to the space-
time region at which we have instantiated the property of being reddest at ti, tj, and tk. 
We can represent the fact that at this region we have instantiated the properties above 
by having ‘x’ be concatenated with all three predicates at once: ‘Rix’ and ‘Rjx’ and 
‘Rkx’. Thus, the fact that ‘x’ is concatenated with all three predicates does not serve 
to define ‘x’’s content as that of an object, as opposed to a region. 120 
 
4.B.IV. The conceptual role notion of narrow content: 
 
                                                 
120 On my approach this problem is avoided because a definite description like (Ex)((y)(Rjy ↔ (x = 
y))) specifies the content of ‘x’ as wholly present at a space-time region. This means that the content of 





The notion of narrow content that I want to defend is the conceptual role 
notion. Block (1986), Peacocke (1992), Rey (1997, 2007, 2008), and Botterill & 
Carruthers (1999) are partial to this view. The conceptual role notion of narrow 
content defines the narrow content of a symbol as the symbol’s relations with other 
symbols. These relations are grounded in the casual and counterfactual relations 
between tokens of symbols. The counterfactual relations are specified by the 
syntactical rules that govern the formations and transformations of symbols. The 
syntactic transformations of symbols correlate with semantic relations between the 
symbols (e.g. implication, entailment, validity, etc.). In this sense, the inferential roles 
of symbols also constitute part of the symbols’ relations. Functional relations can also 
be part of the symbol’s relations. These include a symbol’s relation with states of the 
system (as opposed to other symbols). Thus, on the conceptual role notion of narrow 
content, the narrow content is the syntactic/inferential/functional roles of a symbol.  
 
Paradigmatic examples of how the conceptual role notion of narrow content is 
applied arise in explaining the meanings of logical operators. Take for example the 
logical operator ‘&’: the inferential role of ‘&’ is such that there are dispositions to 
infer ‘a’ from ‘a & b’, ‘b’ from ‘a & b’, and ‘a & b’ from ‘a’ and ‘b’.121 Because of its 
inferential role, we can say that the meaning of ‘&’ is that of conjunction. Thus, we 
can speak about a content of ‘&’ that is not broad, but narrow, and this content is its 
inferential role. Note that a symbol’s inferential role need not involve relations to 
specific symbols (or types of symbols). Instead, a symbol’s inferential role can be 
                                                 




defined through the structure of relations the symbol enters in. A symbol’s relations 
with specific symbols (or types of symbols) are the non-logico-syntactic inferential 
roles of the symbol. In contrast, the structure of relations that a symbol enters in is the 
symbol’s logico-syntactic inferential roles. For example, the inferential roles of ‘&’ 
above are logico-syntactic in that they specify a structure of relations. The inferential 
roles of ‘bachelor’ that tie it to ‘unmarried’ and ‘male’ are non-logico-syntactic in 
that they tie it to specific symbols.122  
 
Another example of how the conceptual role notion of narrow content is 
applied arises in explaining the narrow contents of indexicals. I presented the 
following example in the last chapter, but for purposes of illustration I present it here 
again: Rey (1997) defines the narrow content of ‘I’ (what he calls “first-person 
reflexive term” or “FPRT”) as follows: 
 
α is a FPRT for agent x iff: 
(1-1) Whenever an input φ is received, x stores ‘φα’; 
                                                 
122 Logico-syntactic and non-logico-syntactic roles are perhaps not completely independent: as 
Peacocke (1995, p. 231) points out, without some semantic assignment to the symbols in a 
syntactically defined operation, the operation cannot be said to perform a specific logical operation. 
For example, the same table of ‘1’ and ‘0’ symbols (imagine the truth table for ‘&’) can be used to 
describe an operation as conjunction (when ‘1’ is assigned to “true” and ‘0’ is assigned to “false”) or a 
disjunction (when ‘0’ is assigned to “true” and ‘1’ is assigned to “false”). This serves to show that 





(1-2) Whenever x is in a mental state M, x is prepared to comp-judge a predication ‘φα’ 
that (ordinarily) gets released only when x is in M; 
(1-3) All preference states, and all basic action descriptions in x’s decision system that 
lead up to action in a standard decision theoretic way are states and descriptions whose 
subject is α. (Rey (1997, p. 291)) 
 
On Rey’s view of FPRTs, ‘α’ means “receiver of present inputs, the instigator of 
outputs, and the subject of intervening mental states”. Thus, ‘α’’s narrow content is 
ME. Note that one need not be suspicious of the above use of intentional terms like 
“φ”, “M”, and “decision system”: as Rey points out, conceptual role semantics can 
appeal to intentional properties in its explanations, as long as it avoids those 
intentional properties it is trying to explain through inferential roles. 
 
As I argued in the previous sections, Devitt’s account of narrow content and 
the mapping notion account cannot explain how logical operators get their content 
because the accounts specify a term’s narrow content via the term’s referent, while 
logical operators have no referents. Also, the descriptivist account cannot explain 
how indexicals get their content because the account abstracts away from a token 
term’s causal relations, while the latter are needed to pick out a particular 
individual/time/place. In contrast, as argued in the previous chapter, the conceptual 
role notion of narrow content can account for the content of logical operators, 
indexicals, and perhaps numbers. That is why I chose it over the others. However, 






4.C. Problems for the conceptual role notion of narrow content: 
 
 
In this section I overview some of the strongest objections against conceptual 
role semantics and present replies to them.123 Importantly, the replies are meant 
merely to show that a conceptual role semantics account sufficient for my purposes 
can be defended against the objections thrown at it. I am not going to defend a 
conceptual role semantics account as the account of content or defend that it applies 
to all representations. I care about conceptual role semantics to the extent that it 
allows me to account for logical operators, indexicals, and numbers. Also, the section 
is more of an overview than an exhaustive analysis of all the possible moves. It 
should serve merely to show that conceptual role semantics does have coherent and 
plausible ways to defend itself. In Section 4.C.I I present Rey’s claim that the holism 
problem can be avoided if one appeals to asymmetric relations between symbols’ 
relations. The circularity problem is discussed in Section 4.C.II where I argue that it 
can be avoided on a 2-factor strategy of content.  
 
4.C.I. The holism problem: 
 
The holism problem for conceptual role semantics arises when one tries to 
define the meaning-constitutive roles of a symbol. One can argue that a) all of the 
                                                 




symbol’s relations are meaning-constitutive; or b) only some of the symbol’s 
relations are meaning-constitutive. The former option is the holistic option. The 
problem with holism arises when one tries to reconcile it with what Rey and Fodor 
call a “crucial condition on concepts”: “their being stable over a wide variety of 
cognitive systems sharable by different people at different times” (Rey (2009, p. 2)). 
If holism is right, then if two people share a symbol with the same narrow content, 
then the symbol has identical causal and counterfactual relations in both persons’ 
minds. However, humans do not have the same beliefs, desires, goals, etc. This means 
that it is practically impossible for people to share symbols with the same narrow 
content. This is counterintuitive since it means that if some of the content of some of 
our thoughts is narrow, then we cannot share those thoughts with others. Some other 
startling consequences about thoughts with narrow content are pointed out by Rey 
(1997): if beliefs have narrow content, then  
 
no normal person gaining new beliefs as she peers at the world around her could ever 
remember anything (after all, those new beliefs would change the contents of all old 
states).…One couldn’t hope to find new evidence for or against a belief, since the 
discovery of the evidence would change its liaisons and thus its content. (Rey (1997, p. 
240))  
 
The upshot is that psychology would be unable to make generalizations over people’s 





But perhaps, as Block (1986) suggests, the holism problem can be avoided by 
assuming that the thoughts with narrow content are sufficiently similar in narrow 
content. However, he admits that “there are no specific suggestions as to what the 
dimensions of similarity of meaning are or how they relate to one another” 
(forthcoming). Until such are provided the holism problem remains a threat—it is 
what has chased Fodor (1995) away from conceptual role semantics. 
 
We have seen that taking all of the symbol’s roles to be meaning-constitutive 
runs into serious problems. So why isn’t the obvious alternative to take only some of 
the symbol’s roles as meaning-constitutive? The reason is that doing so is also deeply 
problematic: as Fodor (1990, 1995, 2004) has pointed out, there doesn’t seem to be a 
principled manner of individuating a subset of roles as a symbol’s meaning-
constitutive roles in the mind. A symbol’s role is defined in terms of the symbol’s 
causal and counterfactual relations with other symbols. However, there is a multitude 
of such relations. Which one are the meaning-constitutive ones? For example: ‘&’ 
might have an inferential role specified as above, but it might, on top of that, have a 
role such that, whenever it is tokened, it causes ‘conjugal’ to be tokened, as well 
(because ‘conjunction’ and ‘conjugal’ sound similar, for example). Which of the two 
roles is meaning-constitutive, then?  
 
To define in a principled manner some of a symbol’s relations as the meaning-
constitutive ones is in essence to provide an analytic/synthetic distinction with 




distinguishing analytic from synthetic truths124. Fodor, convinced by Quine, 
concludes that there is no principled manner of distinguishing the meaning-
constitutive relations of a symbol from those that are not such. Since taking all of the 
symbol’s relations as meaning-constitutive is also implausible, and since these two 
options are the only ones for conceptual role semantics, Fodor concludes that 
conceptual role semantics cannot be the right account for narrow content.  
 
But not all hope is lost. Horwich (1992, 1998), contra Quine, argues that we 
can have an analytic/synthetic distinction. According to Horwich, the language 
faculty contains “meaning postulates” that define the meanings of their constituent 
linguistic concepts.125 A sentence gets to count as a “meaning postulate” of a concept 
if accepting this sentence explains why other sentences containing the concept are 
also accepted. In other words, all other meanings of the concept are explained through 
the meaning assigned to it in the meaning postulate. An example of a meaning 
postulate for the concept ‘bachelor’ is ‘a bachelor is an unmarried male’. All other 
meanings of ‘bachelor’ are defined through the meaning assigned to ‘bachelor’ in the 
meaning postulate. Devitt (2002), while disagreeing with Horwich’s proposal, points 
out that Horwich’s idea can be extended to apply to non-linguistic concepts. Thus, a 
sentence gets to count as a meaning postulate of a non-linguistic concept if the 
                                                 
124 But see Rey (2007, 2008) for a plausible objection to Quine. 
125 Another option is offered by Peacocke (1992): the meaning-constitutive relations are “primitively 
compelling”. The problem then becomes to give sufficient conditions for an inference being 
“primitively compelling” in a way that would not presuppose that certain roles are meaning-




presence of such a sentence in the belief box explains why other sentences containing 
the concept are also accepted. So, the suggestion is that Horwich’s proposal could 
provide the principled manner of defining the meaning-constitutive roles of a symbol 
that is needed to solve the holism problem. 
 
Fodor (1998), however, argues against meaning postulates because he does 
not see what work they do:  
 
Imagine two minds that differ in that ‘whale → mammal’ is a meaning postulate for one 
but it is ‘general knowledge’ for the other. Are any further differences between these 
minds entailed? If so, which ones? Is this wheel attached to anything at all? (Fodor (1998, 
p. 111-112)) 
 
But Horwich’s proposal does predict counterfactual differences between two such 
minds. In a mind where ‘bachelor → unmarried male’ is a meaning postulate, all the 
roles of ‘bachelor’ will be explained by the meaning postulate, but not vice versa. In a 
mind where ‘bachelor → unmarried male’ is not a meaning postulate, then this 
dependency relation will not hold. In other words, whether a sentence is a meaning 
postulate or not determines the counterfactual relations involving a symbol whose 
meaning is defined through the postulate. This leads to a common objection that 
Horwich, Rey, and Carruthers have all made against Fodor in different ways: that 
appealing to counterfactual relations allows the charge of holism to lose some of its 




belief’s dispositions to enter in relations with other beliefs—a belief’s counterfactual 
relations with other beliefs: 
 
[D]ifferent thinkers, despite their differences of belief, and despite the differences in the 
epistemic liaisons of any given belief, may nevertheless entertain many of the same 
beliefs. For the same conditionals can be true of them. For example, it can be true of me 
both before and after my formative experience with the reporter from the Guardian, that I 
believe Mrs Thatcher to be the longest serving UK prime minister of the twentieth 
century. For although the epistemic liaisons of that belief have changed, it will be true of 
me on both occasions that if I believe the Guardian to be reliable, then I shall regard, 'the 
Guardian says so', as a reason for holding my belief about Mrs Thatcher. (Carruthers 
(1996, p. 111)) 
  
As Rey has pointed out (p. c.), it is striking that Fodor has not seen the 
potential of counterfactuals to deal with the holism problem, given that he uses them 
to define the broad content of symbols in his ADA. According to Fodor, the way to 
distinguish between the meaning constitutive nomic relations involving ‘x’ and the 
other ones is to look at the counterfactuals: the meaning constitutive nomic relations 
involving ‘x’ are the ones, but for which the others wouldn’t exist. Rey (2007, 2008) 
noticed the common appeal to counterfactuals to define a symbol’s content in Fodor 
and Horwich and pointed out that Horwich’s idea is “simply a redeployment of the 
asymmetric dependency proposal, only this time inside the agent” (Rey (2009, p. 6)). 
Rey goes on to suggest an account of which both Fodor’s and Horwich’s proposal can 





(BAS-LOT) The content of an internal symbol in an agent’s LOT is determined by the 
property of a meaningful tokening of a term that is explanatory basic: the one on which 
all other tokens with that meaning asymmetrically/explanatorily depend by virtue of that 
property. (Rey (2009, p. 11)) 
 
Rey acknowledges that this account is not a reduction of meaning because it appeals 
to “meaningful tokenings”126. Nevertheless, assuming one can individuate which are a 
symbol’s meaningful tokenings, one can then distinguish between the symbol’s 
meaning-constitutive and non-meaning-constitutive inferential roles. In this way one 
can define the meaning of a concept that does not enter into the language faculty or 
the meaning of a concept in creatures that do not posses language faculties. This 
makes Rey’s proposal a more general solution to the holism problem than 
Horwich’s.127  
 
To sum up: the way to distinguish between the meaning constitutive 
inferential relations involving ‘x’ and the other ones is to look at the counterfactuals: 
                                                 
126 It is important to distinguish “meaningful” from “meaning-constitutive”. If a tokening of a symbol 
is the latter, then it is the former, but not vice versa. 
127 Rey (p. c.) points out that there is the following problem with BAS-LOT: suppose that I name my 
cat ‘Beauty’ and after her death, I use ‘Beauty’ to refer to one of her kittens that has taken her place in 
my home. According to BAS-LOT, since the reference of ‘Beauty’ to the kitten asymmetrically 
depends on the reference of ‘Beauty’ to my former cat, then ‘Beauty’ refers to my dead cat. But this 
seems wrong. One way this worry can be avoided is to use, á la Fodor, a condition that stipulates that 




the meaning-constitutive inferential relations involving ‘x’ are the ones, but for which 
the others wouldn’t exist. In other words, one can appeal to asymmetric dependencies 
between inferential relations to specify which of the symbol’s inferential relations are 
meaning-constitutive. What follows is an example. Just like ADA, it is a special case 
of BAS-LOT. Unlike ADA, however, it is about a symbol’s inferential roles. It is 
modeled on ADA and for ease of reference I will call it AIR (for Asymmetric 
Inferential Roles):  
 
The inferential role of a symbol ‘x’ is defined by its relation with 
representations ‘ψ’1, ‘ψ’2, … , ‘ψ’n if: 
 
i) There is an inferential128 relation between ‘x’ and ‘ψ’1, ‘ψ’2, … , ‘ψ’n.  
 
ii) Any inferential relation between ‘x’ and symbols other than ‘ψ’1, ‘ψ’2, … , ‘ψ’n 
depends on the one between ‘x’ and ‘ψ’1, ‘ψ’2, … , ‘ψ’n, but not vice versa.  
 
iii) There are inferential relations between ‘x’ and representations other than ‘ψ’1, 
‘ψ’2, … , ‘ψ’n.  
 
iv) The dependence in (ii) is synchronic. 
 
                                                 
128 Instead of “inferential”, I could have used “nomic”, just as in ADA. The reason is that inferential 




v) The asymmetric relation in (ii) is one on which other asymmetric relations 
involving a law between ‘x’ and ‘ψ’1, ‘ψ’2, … , ‘ψ’n depend, but not vice versa.129  
 
This proposed solution could solve the holism problem because it gives us a 
principled way of specifying which of the symbol’s inferential relations are meaning-
constitutive. One doesn’t need to define the inferential role of a symbol by specifying 
all of the roles the symbol has—just the ones that are meaning-constitutive.  
 
4.C.II. The circularity problem: 
 
Fodor (2004) argues that conceptual role semantics is unable to account even 
for the meaning of logical operators without running into circularity. If he is correct, 
then appealing to conceptual role semantics is a broken tool and cannot be of use in 
defining a conceptual role notion of narrow content.  
 
Fodor argues that the possession conditions of a concept cannot be 
deconstructed into inferential roles. The reason Fodor gives is that “understanding S 
is prior in the order of analysis to grasping its role in inference” (Fodor (2004, p. 
43)). In other words, only after one possesses and grasps a concept can one grasp the 
concept’s inferential relations with other concepts. Prior to grasping ‘bachelor’, I 
cannot grasp ‘bachelors are unmarried men’. ‘Bachelors are unmarried men’ can fix 
the meaning of ‘bachelor’ only if ‘bachelor’ is already possessed and its meaning 
                                                 




provided. Any attempt to fix the meaning of a concept through inferential roles ends 
up presuming that the concept is already possessed and such an attempt is therefore 
circular:  
 
Fodor illustrates this point with Peacocke’s account of conjunction:  
 
Conjunction is that concept C to possess which a thinker must find transitions of the … 
forms [F] primitively compelling, and must do so because they are of these forms. 
(Peacocke (1992, p. 6)) 
 
Here “[F]” stands for two elimination forms (pCq → p; pCq → q) and one 
introduction form (p, q → pCq). Prima facie, Peacocke’s account is not circular—it 
doesn’t appeal at all to conjunction to specify the inferential roles that supposedly 
define the possession conditions of ‘&’. Peacocke argues that the inferential 
transitions of the forms are primitively compelling because of their form. This is in 
order to avoid cases where the transitions are found compelling because of accidental 
or pathologic causes. It is in analyzing what this form is that Fodor finds the hidden 
circularity in Peacocke’s account of conjunction. 
 
Fodor points out that the reason for accepting these inferences cannot be 
because they have a certain logical form, for fear of circularity. To see the circularity, 
first note that the logical form of an inference is defined in terms of logical constants. 
So, if one tries to explain the meaning of logical constants via primitively compelling 




logical form via appeal to logical constants, then one would have tried to account for 
logical constants via logical constants.  
 
The reason for accepting these inferences cannot be syntactic form, either. 
Syntactic form is distinct from validity/acceptability because the latter are semantic 
notions. As a result, syntactic form cannot explain why a certain inference is found 
valid or acceptable:  
 
‘p and q → p’ is valid (not in virtue of its syntax, but) in virtue of the meaning of ‘and’. It 
is, to repeat, (only because you accept the argument (because you know the meaning of 
‘and’)) that your accepting it manifests your grasp of CONJUNCTION. (Fodor (2004, p. 
45)) 
 
Fodor concludes that Peacocke cannot give an account of ‘&’. Since Peacocke’s story 
of ‘&’ is the paradigmatic account of conjunction in conceptual role semantics, then 
supposedly conceptual role semantics cannot account for the possession conditions of 
‘&’. 
 
A related problem is raised by Peacocke130. Consider the inferences appealed 
to in defining ‘&’: the inferential/functional role of ‘&’ is such that there are 
                                                 
130 Cf. Peacocke (1995, p. 231): “An “and”-gate may be characterized simply relative to certain 
assignments of 0 and 1 to the nodes to which it is connected. That is not yet a semantical 
characterization—indeed, if falsity and not truth were the semantic significance of the assignment of 1 




dispositions to infer/token ‘a’ from ‘a & b’, ‘b’ from ‘a & b’, and ‘a & b’ from ‘a’ and 
‘b’. If we take the inferring/tokening of ‘a’ and ‘b’ to imply being true, then we can 
have the following truth table: 
 
                                                                                                                                           
falsity iff both the input nodes indicate falsity).” Peacocke makes this observation to show that if we 
completely abstract away semantic characterizations, then we are not going to be able to treat a system 
as performing any computations—even ones that are as simple as addition. For Peacocke this means 
that there is “no computation without representation” (Fodor’s words (cf. Fodor (1981) and Pylyshyn 
(1984))): every computational system operates on symbols with semantic properties and preserves the 
semantic properties of strings of symbols. For Peacocke the upshot is the one that Rey (2004) (see 
below) makes—conceptual role semantics need not be averse to appealing to a symbol’s intentional 
properties in its explanations, as long as these are not the very properties it is trying to explain.  
 
In arguing against “no computation without representation” Piccinini (2006) argues that if we take into 
account inputs and outputs, then a system’s function can be defined non-semantically in a mechanistic 
fashion. His point is that, contrary to Peacocke and Fodor, a computation need not be defined over 
symbols: for instance, instead of the computation involving symbol α, we can speak of the computation 
involving inscriptions on a tape of type “α”. While he is right that we can define a system’s function in 
such a mechanistic fashion, such an account seems problematic because a) it would miss 
generalizations among differently constituted mechanisms where the inscriptions are different (instead 
of “α” we have “a”); and b) the mechanistically specified computation that does not appeal to symbols 
would be of no use to conceptual role semanticists who are concerned with relations between symbols 
that can explain difference in content (if such a deflationary notion is used by conceptual role 
semanticists, then, as Fodor (2004a, p. 101) points out, the notion of having a concept would be 
equally deflationary, which would jeopardize the project of conceptual role semanticists to explain 




a b a * b
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
 
This, then, is the truth table of ‘&’. But if we take the tokening of ‘a’ and ‘b’ to imply 
being false, then the truth table above is the truth table of ‘v’ (‘or’). This suggests that 
we cannot define the meaning of ‘*’ through appeal to inferential/functional relations 
alone. Appeal to independently assigned semantic meaning seems necessary. 
  
Essentially Fodor’s (and Peacocke’s) point is that what is lacking in 
conceptual role semantics is an account of why a symbol’s inferential roles should be 
identified with its meaning. With respect to ‘&’, the point is that even if ‘&’’s 
syntactical role mimics its semantic one, this does not explain why the syntactical role 
should account for the meaning of ‘&’. Pure conceptual role accounts that attempt to 
explain that end up being circular. However, as Rey (2004) points out, Fodor makes a 
mistake in assuming that conceptual role semantics cannot appeal to any intentional 
properties in specifying the content of ‘&’. According to Fodor conceptual role 
semantics “wants an account of content that doesn’t presuppose semantic or 
intentional properties (Fodor (2004a, p. 110))”. But even if some conceptual role 
accounts strive to be pure, the strategy that I have adopted in this dissertation is of 




determined by the property of a meaningful tokening of a term that is explanatory 
basic—this property can be one that specifies the symbol’s nomic relations with 
external properties (á la ADA), the symbol’s relations with other symbols (á la AIR), 
or both at the same time. This means that we have the following way of addressing 
the circularity objection: one can appeal to nomic relations with external properties 
for some symbols and then use those to define á la conceptual role semantics the 
content of other symbols. As long as one avoids presupposing the symbol’s 
intentional properties that one is trying to explain, one can appeal to other symbols’ 
intentional properties while free of the charge of circularity. 
 
Rey (2004) gives an example of such an approach in accounting how the 
(narrow) content of ‘&’ is specified through conceptual role semantics: Fodor 
claimed that syntax is of no help in defining what counts as valid or acceptable. But 
its help is not needed to define what counts as acceptable. Rey (2004, p. 76) argues 
that one way of defining which inferences count as acceptable is to have a “Belief-
box”—if one has sentence ‘p’ in one’s ‘Belief-box’ then one believes/accepts that 
“p”.131 Slightly simplifying Rey’s story, we can say that what accounts for why ‘p’ 
means p is ADA. What accounts for ‘Perceptual module’ being a perceptual module 
is that it tokens symbols (that have content á la ADA about certain properties) when 
                                                 
131 Fodor (2004a) objects to Rey’s proposal by arguing that a conceptual role semantics cannot appeal 
to Rey’s solution, since Rey appeals to beliefs, and conceptual role semantics cannot presuppose any 
intentional properties in its account of ‘&’. However, as is pointed out above, conceptual role 
semantics doesn’t have to avoid any intentional properties. It just has to avoid those intentional 




there are objects having the specified properties causing the token symbols. What 
accounts for a certain sub-system being a ‘Decision system’ is that its outputs cause 
the machine to move in various ways. What accounts for a certain register being a 
‘Belief-box’ is that it takes as input outputs from ‘Perceptual module’ and stores them 
and also outputs to ‘Decision system’. What accounts for ‘p’ being a belief is that it is 
stored in ‘Belief-box’. Then, if a sentence is granted entry in ‘Belief-box’, it is 
accepted and believed. If not, then it isn’t.  One can then define ‘&’ as follows: ‘&’ 
means “and” iff [‘p & q’ would be granted entry to the Belief-box, only if ‘p’ and ‘q’ 
would be given entry to the Belief-box]. Then, one can think “p and q” iff [‘p & q’ 
would be granted entry in the Belief-box and ‘p’ would mean “p”, ‘q’ would mean 
“q”, and ‘&’ would mean “and”]. Note that in specifying the content of ‘&’ an appeal 
was made to other symbols with intentional properties (via the appeal to ‘Belief-box’, 
which was specified through ‘Perceptual module’, which in turn was specified 
through appeal to symbols that get their content á la ADA). Since the content of ‘&’ 
was not accounted for via an appeal to the intentional properties of ‘&’, circularity 
has been avoided. 
 
What this means is that, contrary to Fodor, one can fix the narrow content of a 
concept C through inferential roles without presuming that the concept is already 
possessed and grasped. That some intentional properties (e.g. broad content) of some 
symbols need to be assumed is granted, but these symbols would not be what 
conceptual role semantics gives an account of in the case of the concept C. This 




that conceptual role semantics cannot account by itself for all the intentional 
properties of the mind, it need not do so. It can avail itself of the fruits of externalist 







If what I have said above is on the right track, then conceptual role semantics 
has available and plausible moves to make in defending itself against the holism and 
the circularity problems. These two problems that are of prime concern to me, 
because I appeal to conceptual role semantics to account for how indexicals, logical 
operators, and numbers get their content. If the holism objection runs, then I would 
not be able to provide the meaning-constitutive roles of any of the above. If the 
circularity objection runs, then I would not be able to provide the content of logical 
operators in a non-circular manner. Granted, there are other objections against 
conceptual role semantics (e.g. the compositionality of thought problem (cf. Fodor 
(1998, 2004, 2004a)). However, such problems do not concern me, since they either 
                                                 
132 Granted, there are other objections against conceptual role semantics (e.g. the compositionality of 
thought problem (cf. Fodor (1998, 2004, 2004a)). However, such problems do not concern me, since 
they either attack the capacity of conceptual role semantics to be the account of content—something 
that I am happy to deny—or they attack its capacity to give an account of the content of concepts for 




attack the capacity of conceptual role semantics to be the account of content—
something that I am happy to deny—or they attack its capacity to give an account of 
the content of concepts for whose content individuation conditions I appeal to ADA 















In the previous chapters, I have argued that definite descriptions are necessary 
for the ability to represent particular objects. If the ability to form definite 
descriptions presupposes concepts, then a) FINSTs refer through conceptual spatio-
temporal representations; and b) FINSTs are conceptual representations themselves. 
In Section 5.B I will present Pylyshyn’s position (Section 5.B.I), expose the problems 
with his account that arise if it is interpreted to depend on a singular causal strategy of 
content (Section 5.B.II), and expose the problems with his account that arise if it is 
interpreted to depend on a nomic strategy of content (Section 5.B.III). In Section 5.C 
I will present problems with Pylyshyn’s account of how FINSTs track (Section 5.C.I) 
and then I will criticize Pylyshyn’s empirical argument that tracking of and reference 
to visual objects cannot be done through representations of location (Section 5.C.II). 
Finally, in Section 5.D, I present Clark’s view of sentience and point out how my 






5.B. Pylyshyn’s account and representations of particulars: 
 
 
In this section I present Pylyshyn’s account (Section 5.B.I) and then examine 
his claim that FINSTs refer through an information link with their referents (Section 
5.B.II). I point out that if this information link is read as a singular causal one, then, 
for reasons given in Chapter 1, Pylyshyn’s account runs into the “which link” 
problem, which makes it questionable. In Section 5.B.III I argue that if the 
information link between FINSTs and their referents is read as a nomic one, then, 
then only one of the following options is the case: a) it is implausible to think that 
FINSTs refer to particular objects; or b) FINSTs refer to particular objects via definite 
descriptions. If the latter option is the case, and if definite descriptions presuppose 
concepts, then FINSTs are conceptual representations referring via conceptual 
representations of spatio-temporal relations. I finish Section 5.B.III by criticizing 
Pylyshyn’s theoretical arguments for FINSTs being unmediated by concepts. 
 
5.B.I. Pylyshyn’s account: 
 
Pylyshyn postulates his visual indexes (FINSTs) to account for his Multiple 
Object Tracking (MOT) experiments133. In these experiments the test subjects are 
presented with some number (usually more than five) of what looks like objects on a 
                                                 




computer screen. Following a cue that draws the subjects’ attention to four or five of 
them, the test subjects are tasked to track them for a short period of time. The objects 
move randomly but, nevertheless, people are extremely good in tracking four to five 
objects. Here is an illustration of what the MOT experiment looks like134: 
  
 
Figure 5.1.: Eight of what looks like identical objects are shown (at t = 1). A proper 
subset is flashed (at t=2), after which the objects randomly move. Then the observer 
has to pick out the objects initially flashed at t=4. 
 
According to Pylyshyn’s FINST model135 the data can be explained by 
supposing that about 4-5 objects are preattentively indexed in parallel by FINSTs. 
The primary function of FINSTs is “to individuate a small number of objects so that 
they may be directly accessed and subjected to focused attentional processing.” A 
FINSTed object need not be found by attentional scanning. According to the FINST 
                                                 
134 Cf. Pylyshyn (2001b, p. 142). 




model, FINSTs are tokened in a bottom-up manner. FINSTs are “object-centered” 
and refer to objects despite changes in the location of the latter: in other words, 
FINSTs not only refer, but track objects.  
 
Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) did an experiment where the participants had to 
track a flashed proper subset of identical, randomly moving objects. Since the objects 
had identical properties (apart from location) the only way the participants could track 
them was via their historical continuity. Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) found when up to 
5 objects were tracked the success rate was about 90%. Using a computer simulation 
of tracking, where focal attention moved serially among the tracked objects and 
updated a record of their locations, a success rate of only 50% was produced. The 
speed of the focal attention was as high as it has been recorded in the psychological 
literature and it was even assumed that participants stored “the predicted locations 
based on the direction and speed of the targets’ motion, and that they used a guessing 
strategy when they were uncertain”136. Pylyshyn concludes on the basis of these 
results that tracking is done in parallel without the use of focal attention and without 
encoding the locations of the tracked objects. 
 
In further experiments Pylyshyn has tested whether the subjects are tracking 
the objects by using representations of their properties137. Pylyshyn takes the results 
                                                 
136 Cf. Pylyshyn (2000, p. 3). 





to suggest that our visual system employs four to five representations that refer to and 
track, not properties, but what typically turn out to be particular objects, and do so 
without using concepts to encode the object’s properties:  
 
[FINSTs] provide a reference to some sensory individual…without thereby encoding any 
property of the individual that is indexed. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 67))  
 
These supposed representations of objects Pylyshyn calls “FINSTs” and he takes 
them to explain how the visual system binds properties together, tracks objects, and 
allocates attention.  
 
What FINSTs refer to, Pylyshyn calls “FINGs”. FINGs are not to be identified 
as objects in the ontological sense. Instead, they are intentional objects (what 
Pylyshyn calls “sensory individuals” and “visual objects”)—things we perceive as 
objects.138 Another way to think of FINGs is as instantiations of a complex property 
that nomically co-varies with FINSTs. The complex property could be something like 
the property of being bounded, unified, and persisting through time (the property of 
being a Spelke object). A token FINSTs would refer, according to Pylyshyn, to a 
particular instantiation of that property—a FING. 
 
                                                 
138 Cf. Pylyshyn (2007, p. v): FINTSs “attach to what in our sort of world typically turn out to be 




While Pylyshyn does not believe that any concepts play a role in explaining 
how FINSTs refer, he believes that the FING’s properties (e.g. having a location, 
being bounded, being unified, etc.) are causally responsible for the tokening of 
FINSTs—it is just that they need not be encoded as concepts139 for the FINST to 
refer: 
                                                 
139 A brief clarification: Pylyshyn says below that the properties are “not encoded”, not that they are 
“not encoded as concepts”. I take him to mean the latter, though, given that prior to the tokening of 
FINSTs there are states that carry information about the FING’s properties. On some accounts of 
reference this is sufficient to treat those states as representations. Pylyshyn can grant that, but deny that 
they are conceptual ones. Cf. Pylyshyn (2007, p. 73): “My concern at this point is primarily with the 
question of whether certain spatial properties such as location and distance are encoded (represented) 
early in vision and whether they can serve as the basis for primitive selection. For this purpose we 
should recall that there is a substantial difference between the claim that certain properties, such as the 
locations and distances between objects in the world, play a causal role in a visual process, and the 
claim that these properties play a role by virtue of being represented. Objects are always at some 
location or other, and the effect they have on a perceiver may depend on where they are, but the 
locations they are at (even their locations relative to one another) may or may not be represented. The 
same is true of the location of objects on the proximal stimulus (e.g., on the retina) or further up in the 
nervous system, such as patterns of activity on the retinotopically-organized fibers leading from the 
eye, or in primary visual cortex, which is largely retinotopically mapped. Since these locations are past 
the sensors, are they necessarily representations? If so what is the essential difference between the way 
that distance in the world affects perception and the way that the corresponding distance on a 
neighborhood-preserving (i.e., homeomorphic) anatomical mapping affects perception (for ease of 
reference I will refer to the result of such mappings as “neural layouts” or NLs)? We can say that such 
neural layouts register (rather than represent) spatial properties. Such neural layouts help to illustrate 





[there] are specific properties that cause a FINST index to be assigned and that enable it 
to keep track of the indexed individuals – but those properties just are not encoded and a 
representation of those properties is not used in carrying out those functions. (Cf. 
Pylyshyn (2007, p. 139, emphasis mine)) 
 
According to Pylyshyn, FINSTs represent FINGs the way demonstratives 
do—simply as “that”: 
 
what is selected is merely indexed or demonstrated and not conceptualized in any way. 
(Pylyshyn (2007, p. 62)) 
 
Note that FINSTs being demonstratives does not necessitate that conceptual 
representations do not play a role in how FINSTs refer. If one treats FINSTs as a 
Kaplanian ‘dthat’, then one can treat FINSTs as demonstratives that refer via 
conceptual representations in the definite description that defines the content of a 
FINST—one will only deny that the definite description (and the concepts within) is 
constitutive of the content of a FINST. However, as evidenced by the previous quote, 
Pylyshyn holds that conceptual representations of a FING’s properties are not used in 
the case of referring and tracking. In what follows I will attack this position. If 
Pylyshyn adopts a Kaplanian position, however, then there is no disagreement 
between us.  
                                                                                                                                           
subpersonal to informational states that are better referred to as registrations of spatial information 





Since Pylyshyn’s experiments purportedly show that conceptual 
representations of properties play no role in MOT, Pylyshyn concludes that FINGs  
 
are not represented [by FINSTs] as objects or as Xs for any possible category X. They are 
just picked out transparently by a causal or informational process without being 
conceptualized as something or other. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 56)) 
 
The notion of information appealed to here is a Dretskian one: 
 
The minimum function needed for an object to have the right kind of causal or 
informational link with a [FINST] token is that there be some causal or nomologically-
supported dependency between the object and its associated symbol token (this is similar 
to the informational view of reference, as developed by Dretske, 1981). What kind of 
dependency? Any simple causal connection will do. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 56-57)) 
 
A symbol is taken to carry Dretskian information about another if there is a nomic 
relation between the two. But, given the discussion in Chapter 1, I will explore both 
options with respect to FINSTs—that they get their reference in virtue of singular 
causal relations to FINGs (Section 5.B.II) and that they get their reference in virtue of 
nomic relations to FINGs (Section 5.B.III):  
 





Given the discussion in Chapter 1, we have reasons to be dubious that FINSTs 
get their reference in virtue of singular causal relations with FINGs: we have the 
“which link” problem—the problem of distinguishing which of the links in the causal 
chain leading to a FINST is its referent. I argued that Fodor’s attempt at a solution—
his triangulation account does not work. Pylyshyn in fact is sympathetic to this 
approach:  
 
Another possibility [for solving the “which link” problem (recently suggested by Fodor 
[2008, Chapter 9] is that counterfactuals may rule out all but the correct link in the causal 
chain. This proposal works because the reference for which we are trying to give an 
account is a visual reference, so only currently visible things are relevant and only links 
in a causal chain to the FINST from some initial but currently visible cause have to be 
considered (which excludes the big bang, and the switching on of a light earlier, among 
other things; but it allows the light source if it is visible). Such a chain must pass through 
some property of the referent. Which property? The answer cannot be determined solely 
from that one chain—it needs another parameter. According to Fodor’s proposal (which 
he calls a triangulation), if we consider counterfactual causal chains that end with the 
same FINST but have a slightly different perspective (a slightly different viewer location) 
then if the chains intersect they will intersect at the link that is the referent of that FINST. 
(Pylyshyn (2007, p. 97, ff. 14)) 
 . 
However, as I argued in Chapter 1, there are problems with Fodor’s triangulation 







The first problem for Fodor’s triangulation account is that the first intersection 
need not be the one we would intuitively label as the “right” one. We get such cases 
when the causal chains are instantiated by light beams. The reason we get them is 
because of a fundamental property of light—it interferes with itself. The upshot, as I 
explain below, is that the first intersection of the actual and the counterfactual causal 
chains is the link where the interference happens and that is not the intuitively “right” 
referent. In more detail: 
 
Suppose that a laser is directed at a transducer and that all the photons from 
the laser end up at the transducer. Suppose that there is no other light present and 
finally suppose that the laser is instantiating a causal chain that via the transducer 








Figure 5.2.: Schemata of a source emitting a laser, photons of which pass (one per 
day) through one of the slits in a barrier. Since a second slit is open, there are 
interferences, which explain the interference pattern. The striped lines denote the 
counterfactual paths of photons. L0 denotes the actual location of a transducer, while 
L1 and L2 denote two counterfactual locations of the transducer.       
 
Suppose that a transducer is placed at L0—in the path of a photon that has 
been interfered with. Let’s apply the triangulation account here: if the transducer were 




an actual and a counterfactual causal chains (they would be bent a little, but that 
matters not) that intersect at Source, which is the answer that we intuitively want. 
However, suppose the transducer were to be moved in location L1. Suppose that in 
this counterfactual scenario the photon that moved along Path1 now moves along 
Path3. Then, the two causal chains would intersect at the point of interference 
(Interference1) and so Interference1 would be the referent of ‘x’. First of all this 
seems wrong. Furthermore, another problem is that depending on where we choose to 
place the transducer, we get two different intersections of the causal and the 
counterfactual chains: Source and Interference1. This means that the triangulation 




A second problem with the triangulation account can be seen once we 
consider single-slit diffraction. When light passes through a single slit it can be 





   
 
Figure 5.3.: Schemata of a source emitting a laser, photons of which pass through a 
slit in a barrier. The striped line denotes a counterfactual path of a photon. L1 is the 
location of the actual observer. L2 is the counterfactual location of the observer. 
 
Now, consider an observer at L1 and let’s apply the triangulation account: 
were she to move, say to L2, then she would be in the path of a fraying light beam 
that intersects the actual light beam at the location of the slit. The actual and the 
counterfactual light beams intersect and converge at Slit. By the triangulation account 
then, it is the photons at the location of Slit which are the referent of a token symbol 
‘x’. However, as Cole points out140, “we can refer to things further back on the causal 
                                                 
140 Cf. Cole (2009, p. 442). In his thought experiment he uses sound waves passing through a key hole, 




chain than any perceptual intersection”. That is, if I am standing at L1 and observing 
the light beam, I am tokening ‘x’ and using it to refer not to the location of Slit, but to 
a point behind it. Thus, the triangulation account gives the wrong result. 
 
Objects, tropes, and states of affairs: 
 
The triangulation account is an account of how particular objects get 
represented. It takes for granted that only objects enter in singular causal relations. As 
a result, when it individuates a singular causal link, the link can only be an object. 
Now, objects enter in singular causal relations in virtue of the properties they have. 
That is the same as saying that nomic relations between properties “cover” the 
singular causal relations that objects enter in. Yet another way to put the point is that 
properties play a causal role in singular causal relations between objects. So when we 
are individuating via triangulation a causal link in a singular causal chain, why are we 
specifying only an object and not also the properties that the object has? One answer 
is that we are individuating a particular at a space-time location. Objects can have 
space-time locations. Properties don’t. But now, it seems that a lot hinges on what 
metaphysical view we are committed to: 
 
Suppose that one denies that properties are universals and appeals instead to 
tropes—super-determinate properties instantiated at space-time locations. On this 
                                                                                                                                           
intersection. Suppose e.g. you and I listen to a conversation through a keyhole. We can be thinking 




view, instead of a property being causally relevant to a singular causal relation that an 
object enters in, we have a trope, instantiated at the space-time location of the object, 
being causally relevant. Triangulation, then, triangulates two particular entities at the 
same space-time location—an object and a trope at the space-time location of the 
object. Both play a causal role in the causal chain leading to a token symbol ‘x’. So, 
which one is the referent of ‘x’? One can argue that since both are playing a causal 
role in the singular causal chain, both, together, should be the referent of ‘x’. This is 
treating them as an event or, alternatively, a state of affairs (a particular object 
instantiating a property at a space-time location). But if one goes this way, then one 
has given an account of how states of affairs (or events) are represented, not how 
objects are. Note that the two are different, since objects, unlike states of affairs (and 
events), can move through space-time, while the latter can’t. This means that if one 
makes the metaphysical moves above, then triangulation ceases to be the account of 
representation of particular objects that we are looking for. Granted, the metaphysical 
moves may be deemed “sketchy” due to the appeal to tropes. But such moves are 
defended in the literature by nominalists and, in any case, the point is merely that if 
the triangulation account is an account of how objects are represented, then it needs to 
be elaborated to prevent “sketchy” moves like the ones above being made.  
 
Beyond pointing to Fodor’s triangulation account, Pylyshyn does not address 
the issues above. With respect to the “which link” problem he says that 
 
[i]t is one of the “big questions” about how reference is naturalized and is beyond the 





But addressing the “big questions” is essential if Pylyshyn’s claims—that FINSTs 
represent without appeal to concepts—are to be held as plausible. If one tries to 
account for the content of FINSTs through singular causal relations, then one runs 
into the “which link” problem. But if one abandons singular causal strategies for 
nomic ones, due to the difficulties with the “which link” problem, then, as I argued in 
Chapter 3, there are good reasons to believe that representations of particulars get 
their content via concepts, contrary to Pylyshyn:  
 
5.B.III. FINSTs referring through nomic relations:  
 
Suppose that the relation between a FINST and a FING is a nomic one. As I 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, nomic relations, by themselves, cannot explain how 
representations of particulars get their content: Adams & Aizawa (1997, p. 274-5) 
point that ADA cannot account for how representations of particulars get their 
content. ADA is based on nomic relations and Fodor himself assumes that there are 
no nomic relations between particular objects. Nomic relations are assumed to be 
between properties. This leaves ADA as incapable of addressing the question of how 
representations of particular objects get their content. One way to help ADA here is to 
appeal to properties such as the property of [being an instance of Aristotle] and to 
nomic relations between the property of being an instance of Aristotle and the 
property of being a token of ‘Aristotle’.141 But, as Adams (2003, p. 156) objects, this 
                                                 




makes ‘Aristotle’ mean a property that can be shared by clones of Aristotle—entities 
that are numerically different from (the original) Aristotle, but share with (the 
original) Aristotle the property of being an instance of Aristotle. What makes it the 
case that ‘Aristotle’ means the original, as opposed to the clones? Fodor could insist 
on treating the property [being an instance of Aristotle] as unique for an individual. 
But this is dubious: as Adams (2003, p. 156) points out, “why would anyone ever 
have thought that individuals do not feature in laws?” Allowing such properties and 
laws between such properties entails a vast profligacy of laws—surely not the result 
we want if we are after a lean ontology. 
 
If nomic relations, by themselves, cannot explain how representations of 
particulars get their content, then one could appeal to my account of how 
representations of particulars get their content. I briefly recapitulate it below: 
 
In Chapter 3 I argued that ADA, when supplemented with conceptual role 
semantics, can account for how representations of particular objects refer. The idea is 
to use conceptual role semantics to account for the logical and non-logical roles of 
representations of particular objects in the visual system. The relations of particular 
interest are those between the representations of particular objects and representations 
of spatio-temporal relations. The representations of super-determinate spatio-temporal 
relations that I appeal to—C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)—co-vary, in the 
way Fodor suggests, with the property of being a spatio-temporal relation at time t 




length drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, and dnx; and b) r, l, and n form the base of the pyramid and r 
and l are my eyes, while n is my nose: 
 
 
Figure 5.4.: This is an instance of a configuration involving four objects x, l, n, and r 
forming a pyramid with sides of length drx, dlx, and dnx and a base of a triangle with 
sides drl, drn, and dln. The configuration instance is instantiated so that l, r, and n are 
the left, right eye, and the nose of “Pinocchio” here. 
 
From now on, for brevity, I will use “‘Cj” for the predicate “‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, 
drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’”. 
 
Importantly, the content of the predicate ‘Cj’ is not defined entirely á la ADA, 
but  is inferentially and functionally related to a first-person reflexive term (‘I’) and 
an indexical for time (‘t’). It is this characteristic that complements and helps ADA 
here: in virtue of the predicate being related to ‘I’ and ‘t’ it doesn’t pick out just any 
pyramidal super-determinate configuration of type C, instead it picks out a particular 
instance of it: the one that is set on me at t. This makes the referent of the predicate 
‘Cj’ a trope. ‘Cj’ is nomically related to the property of being a pyramidal super-




picked out in virtue of the ‘Cj’’s nomic relations with the property of being the super-
determinate spatial configuration Cj and in virtue of its inferential and functional 
relations with ‘I’ and ‘t’. The picking out of a trope is cashed out as the satisfaction 
relation that obtains between Fregean definite descriptions and their referents. In 
short: when ‘I’ and ‘t’ in the predicate ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, O)’ are 
saturated, then the referent of this predicate is a trope. 
 
I suggest that we use the predicate ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, O)’ in 
the following definite description in virtue of which the symbol ‘x’ gets to refer to a 
particular object: 
 
(Ex)((y)(C(y, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, dry, dly, dny, t, O) ↔ (x = y))) 
 
Put crudely, this reads: right now x is the one and only particular that has the 
relational spatial property of being at the specified distances with respect to my nose 
and eyes.  
 
This approach makes use of conceptual role semantics for more than the 
logical apparatus needed for the definite description. Conceptual role semantics is 
also used to define the content of ‘I’ (the first-person reflexive term) and is perhaps 





According to this view representations of particular objects get their content 
via definite descriptions without the definite descriptions being constitutive of the 
content of the representations of particular objects. If the capacity to express definite 
descriptions presupposes concepts, then my view implies that FINSTs are conceptual 
representations and that they get their content via conceptual representations of 
spatio-temporal representations. Now, if the capacity to express definite descriptions 
presupposes concepts, then my account is barred for Pylyshyn. He claims that 
FINSTs are non-conceptual and that they refer and track independently of conceptual 
representations of properties.142  
 
Now, the debate on what exactly concepts are and whether there are such 
things as non-conceptual representations is messy and there is no consensus as to 
what concepts are and whether there are such things as non-conceptual 
representations. Some, like Fodor (2008), would grant that if one appeals to definite 
descriptions with predicates, argument variables, and quantifier operators, then one is 
appealing to conceptual representations.143 My claim is that if being able to compose 
                                                 
142 Cf. Pylyshyn (2007, p. x): “I have proposed that the capacity to individuate and track several 
independently-moving things is accomplished by a mechanism in the early vision module that I have 
called FINSTs…. This primitive nonconceptual mechanism functions to identify, reidentify and track 
distal objects.” 
143 Fodor would agree that being able to compose definite descriptions is a sufficient condition for 
being a concept. Fodor (2008) argues that being a predicate entails having the property of being a 
conceptual, as opposed to non-conceptual representation. Fodor (2008, Ch. 6) assumes that conceptual 




definite descriptions is a sufficient condition for being a concept, then, obviously, my 
account of how particular objects get represented appeals to concepts and the 
representation of an object itself is conceptual. However, one can deny that being able 
to compose definite descriptions is a sufficient condition for being a concept. For 
example, as Rey (p. c.) has pointed out, one may argue that what distinguishes 
conceptual from non-conceptual representations is that the former can enter into 
indefinitely many novel combinations, while the latter, being produced by modules 
that are encapsulated from and inaccessible to the rest of cognition, enter in severely 
restricted number of combinations. Thus, it is possible for one to argue that non-
conceptual representations can compose definite descriptions. Or alternatively, one 
can insist, as Fodor and Pylyshyn do, that that a) conceptual representations are those 
that represent an entity as being X; and b) conceptual representations are to be 
contrasted with non-conceptual representations that represent an entity without 
conceptualizing it as being X. For both Fodor and Pylyshyn non-conceptual 
                                                                                                                                           
properties are determined by the syntactic and semantic properties of their parts. One of the 
distinctions between the two types of representations is that they compose differently. Conceptual 
representations have canonical decompositions: they have a constituent structure (logical form) in 
virtue of which they have canonical parts that have semantic and syntactic properties. Their non-
canonical parts (obtained by decomposing the conceptual representations in a manner different from 
that defined by their constituent structure) have no semantic and syntactic properties. Non-conceptual 
representations don’t have canonical decompositions as a result of which all of their parts have 
semantic and syntactic properties (p. 173). Because non-conceptual representations don’t have 
canonical decompositions, all of their parts are “homogeneous” (p. 174-175)—they are of the same 
type, as opposed to of different types as are the parts in conceptual representations: predicates, 




representations carry Dretskian information about X without representing it as X, or 
as anything else. Now, as long as a definite description only picks out the content of a 
symbol without also constituting the content of the symbol144, it seems possible that 
definite description can be built from logical constants and symbols that do not 
represent as.  
  
Defining what concepts and non-conceptual representations are is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. As a result I am prepared to grant that the mere ability to 
compose definite descriptions is not a sufficient condition for conceptual 
representations and either the ability to enter into indefinitely many novel 
combinations or the ability to represent as145, or both, or some other condition is such 
                                                 
144 If the definite description were to constitute the content of a symbol, then it would count as a mode 
of presentation and modes of presentation are standardly taken to be a mark of representations that 
represent as. 
145 I think, however, that there is a sense in which non-conceptual representations can also represent as. 
The argument is as follows: Information-carrying non-conceptual representations come in two types: 
demonstrative and non-demonstrative (robust). The content of demonstrative representations depends 
on the particular circumstances of their tokening. That is to say that in the case of demonstrative 
representations we are concerned with a particular cause causing a token symbol. However, as I have 
argued in Chapter 1, if such demonstrative representations are unmediated, then we get the “which 
link” problem. This suggests that we need demonstrative representations to be mediated by robust 
ones. However, we have the disjunction problem for robust representations and to avoid it, one has to 
appeal to ADA. In appealing to ADA one commits to treating a representation as having veridicality 
conditions: the nomic relations on which all the other nomic relations depend, but not vice versa, pick 




a condition. In that case, the argument in this dissertation would have to be scaled 
back to just establishing that to represent particular objects, we need logical form rich 
enough to express definite descriptions. This does not permit me to criticize 
Pylyshyn’s position that FINSTs are non-conceptual and that they are not mediated 
through conceptual representations. However, the more important point that I am 
making in this dissertation is about the logical structure needed to represent particular 
objects. If this structure turns out to be sufficient for concepts, then I can also point 
out that, contrary to Pylyshyn, representations of objects are conceptual and are 
mediated through conceptual spatio-temporal representations.  
 
Obviously, Pylyshyn can deny that definite descriptions are needed to 
determine the content of a FINST. If he is right, then it wouldn’t matter if the capacity 
to form definite descriptions presupposes concepts. I would no longer be able to argue 
that, since FINSTs get their content via definite descriptions and such descriptions 
presuppose concepts, FINSTs are conceptual and conceptually mediated. Below I 
discuss this objection in light of what has been said in the previous chapters: 
 
5.B.III.1. Logical form: 
 
                                                                                                                                           
referent and as such are non-veridical. This means that there are two modes of presentation of an 
entity—a veridical (via representation ‘P’) and a non-veridical one (via representation ‘Q’). Modes of 
presentation are standardly taken to be a mark of representations that represent as. Since robust non-




I am now going to argue that abandoning the logical form of definite 
descriptions would make one unable to represent particular objects.  
   
Suppose that Pylyshyn goes with Fodor (2008) and claims that heterogenous 
syntactic role is a sufficient condition for being a concept. Essentially, the idea is that 
if representations have at least two types of syntactic roles (e.g. of predicates and of 
arguments), then they count as concepts.146 Defending the view that FINSTs are non-
conceptual would then mean that in giving an account of FINSTs, Pylyshyn cannot 
appeal to predicates and arguments. This entails that appealing to definite descriptions 
is out of the question.  
 
Despite this, Pylyshyn can argue that he can make use of my account by 
substituting my conceptual representations (predicates and arguments) with registers 
that carry information (non-conceptual representations).147 Thus, just like tokens of 
the predicates in my definite descriptions enter in singular causal relations with the 
visual system tokening them and in virtue of this they specify it implicitly, so would 
the registers. Also, just like the temporal indexical in my account, Pylyshyn’s 
registers would carry information about the time they are tokened in virtue of causal 
relations with a register and a pacemaker. If this is on the right track, then my account 
is impotent in trying to show that a) the logical form of definite descriptions is needed 
to represent particular objects; and b) FINSTs are conceptually mediated 
                                                 
146 Cf. Fodor (2008, p. 171-175). 




representations of particular objects. In essence, Pylyshyn can argue that I haven’t 
provided a reason why predicates (conceptual representations) are needed, as opposed 
to registers (non-conceptual representations). 
 
Let’s suppose that my account is modified in the way proposed above. One of 
the results of the above modification is that the registers are not going to be 
concatenated with FINSTs as predicates. If they were, then they would be predicates 
and the FINST would be an argument. That would make both be conceptual 
representations—contrary to what Pylyshyn wants—if we go with Fodor’s way of 
defining the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction (which for the moment we are 
assuming). So, instead of logical concatenation, the registers are merely going to be 
functionally related to FINSTs. Of course, one cannot argue that a definite description 
specifies the content of a FINST, because that would be appealing to the predicates 
and arguments that form the definite description. Instead, one must give a causal story 
where a FINST gets its content through representationally unmediated or mediated 
relations with its referent. If a FINST were to get its content unmediated by registers 
(something that Pylyshyn does not believe is the case148) then the “which link” 
problem would obviously arise. This suggests that a FINST gets its content 
mediatedly through registers: the content of a FINST would be the information 
provided by the registers. However, this information would not be specific enough to 
specify a particular object because of the “which link” problem. It can only specify a 
                                                 
148 Cf. Pylyshyn (2001b, p. 145): “In assigning indexes, some cluster of visual features must first be 




property. However, then the FINST would end up being a representation of a 
property, not of a particular object, and what we are after is representations of 
particular objects.  
 
Pylyshyn can try to argue that ‘x’ (a token FINST) a) carries information 
about the system tokening it and the time of its tokening in virtue of being related to a 
system via singular causal relations; and b) carries information (via its causal relation 
with a register) about the property of being at the tip of a spatio-temporal 
configuration such that: i) it involves the objects x, l, n, and r forming a pyramid with 
sides of length drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, and dnx; and ii) r, l, and n form the base of the 
pyramid and r and l are a system’s eyes, while n is a system’s nose. While we are at 
it, let’s also suppose that the FINST carries information (via registers) about shapes, 
surface reflectances, and Spelke properties (being bounded, unified, and persisting in 
time). Haven’t we, in virtue of having the FINST carry so much diverse information, 
specified a particular already? The answer is that we haven’t. Nothing guarantees that 
all of these properties are about the same particular object—‘x’ could just as well 
carry information about independent particular objects. That is to say that the system 
cannot use ‘x’ to individuate a particular object.  
 
Also, note that what is not explained is how representations of the properties 
of object p get bound with each other and not with the representations of the 
properties of object q (this is known as the “binding problem”). Clark (2004) argues, 




different syntactic roles—arguments and predicates. Since we are currently assuming 
Fodor’s account of concepts, we can now argue that such binding requires conceptual 
representations. Since such binding is required for the FINST to get its content, then it 
follows that FINSTs are conceptually mediated.  
 
Let us move away from Fodor’s account of the conceptual/non-conceptual 
distinction. So, suppose now that predicates and arguments can count as non-
conceptual. This means that the above objections can be discarded: now Pylyshyn can 
argue that in virtue of being predicates of the same argument variable (at the same 
time), the same entity is represented as having different properties. The idea is that we 
have the following concatenations conjoined with each other: ‘Lix ^ Ux ^ Skx’. Here 
‘Lj’ refers to the property of being at a particular space-time location with respect to 
me, ‘U’ refers to the property of being unified, and ‘Sj’ refers to the property of being 
of a particular shape. ‘Lix ^ Ux ^ Skx’ reads as “x has the property of being the 
unified entity with a certain shape at Li”. In virtue of ‘x’ being concatenated with all 
of these predicates at the same time, ‘x’ refers to an entity that has all of these 
properties. Furthermore, suppose that we can store ‘Li’, ‘U’, and ‘Sk’. When 
observing an object in our visual field through time, we have a succession of these 
predicates being stored in memory. Let ‘x’ be concatenated with the predicates stored 
in memory, as well. For example, let ‘Lix ^ Lix ^ Lkx’. In virtue of being 
concatenated with all of them, ‘x’ represents an entity that has different temporal 




space-time places at once, ‘x’ cannot refer to a trope or a space-time point. So, isn’t 
that enough to treat ‘x’ as a representation of a particular object? 
 
The answer is, “No”. I am willing to grant that the referent of ‘x’ is a 
particular (after all, I argued that ‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’ refers to a 
particular—a trope—merely in virtue of ‘Cj’ being related to ‘t’ and ‘I’)149. Also, I am 
willing to grant that ‘x’ does not refer to a trope or a space-time point. However, what 
I am not willing to grant is that a particular object has been represented. To see this 
note that one reason why I appeal to definite descriptions in my proposal is so that I 
can say that ‘x’’s referent is the one and only entity that has a certain set of properties. 
Without definite descriptions (and we are currently assuming that they are 
unavailable to Pylyshyn), one has to allow that more than one object can be at a 
certain space-time location (which is possible in some ontologies). This would mean 
that no particular object has been individuated. The upshot is that if Pylyshyn adopts 
the current proposal, then he would not be able to account how particular objects get 
represented.   
 
The point above, however, can be objected to, due to the implausibility of 
there being two objects (wholly) located at the same space-time location. So here is a 
second argument for the point that without definite descriptions we cannot determine 
if the referent of ‘x’ is a particular object: First, notice that points (being 
infinitesimal) can be problematic as the locations of properties—one wonders 
                                                 




whether something square can be at an infinitely small point. Instead, let’s treat 
properties as being instantiated at regions. Similarly, instead of treating tropes as 
properties at space-time points, we can treat them as properties at space-time regions. 
Second, note that when observing an object in my visual field through time, there is a 
space-time region occupied by the object. At this space-time region we have 
instantiated the properties of being of a certain shape (Sk) and of being unified (U). 
We also have instantiated at different spatio-temporal parts of this space-time region 
the properties of being at a certain location with respect to me (Lj, Li, and Lk)—since 
the region is partially at these locations. So, when we have ‘Lix ^ Lix ^ Lkx’, we can 
treat this as representing the fact that a region is partially at Lj, Li, and Lk (and wholly 
at all of them). Alternatively, we can treat this as representing the fact that Lj, Li, and 
Lk are instantiated at the region. So, if ‘Lix ^ Lix ^ Lkx’ can be treated as representing 
the fact that a region is partially at Lj, Li, and Lk, then the space-time region in 
question is an available candidate for the referent of ‘x’. The upshot is that the current 
proposal cannot determine whether ‘x’ refers to a region or an object.  
 
One can object here that the concatenation ‘Px’ means that x has P. Thus, 
‘Ljx’ cannot mean that Lj is instantiated at x. Instead, it must mean that x has the 
property of being at Lj. But, the objection continues, a region that is composed of the 
sub-regions specified by Lj, Li, and Lk cannot wholly be at any one of them. 
Alternatively, if ‘Px’ means that x has P, then one can object that a region cannot 
have the property of being unified, for example. Only objects can have such 




ontological assumptions about regions having properties. It makes assumptions only 
about there being particulars, properties, and properties being related to particulars. 
Whether the relation is one of having, being instantiated at, or whatever, is left open. 
As a result, ‘Px’ need not mean that x has P. It can mean that P is instantiated at x.  
 
In my account, the problem of determining whether ‘x’ refers to a region or an 
object is avoided because a) a definite description like (Ex)((y)(Ljy ↔ (x = y))) 
specifies the content of ‘x’ as wholly present at a space-time region; and b) there are 
multiple definite description like this one stored in memory (e.g. (Ex)((y)(Lky ↔ (x = 
y))). This means that the content of ‘x’ at tj and tk must be an object since a space-
time region cannot be wholly present at two different space-time locations. 
 
The upshot from the points above is that unless the ability to form definite 
descriptions is present, a sensory system would not be able to represent particular 
objects. If this ability is sufficient for being a concept, then the further conclusion can 
be derived that representations of objects are a) conceptual; and b) mediated through 
conceptual spatial representations. But Pylyshyn gives three theoretical arguments as 
to why FINSTs cannot be mediated through conceptual spatial representations.150 I 
criticize them below: 
 
5.B.III.2. The circularity argument: 
                                                 






Pylyshyn’s circularity argument seems to be based on Kripke’s requirement 
that a successful theory of reference must not include in the conditions of reference 
the notion of reference itself for fear of being circular.151 Likewise, one would be 
right to argue against theories that include in the conditions for conceptualizing, the 
notion of conceptualization. Pylyshyn seems to suggest that a similar circularity is 
committed by a theory where the reference of an argument is explained by predicates:  
 
there is no such thing as a purely top-down process, or rather, a process cannot be top-
down all the way out to the world. If representations are to have a content that is about 
the world, then the world must impose itself upon the perceptual system – which is to say 
it must act bottom up at some stage. What I am proposing here is that what is bottom up 
is what will be needed to produce the predicate-argument pairs that constitute a 
conceptual encoding of the world (encoding that something has the property P). In order 
to prevent circularity the arguments of such predicates must be identified (or as I say 
“picked out”) by a process which itself is not conceptual (does not use other predicates or 
properties in order to identify the referents of the arguments). This desideratum also 
entails that things that are bearers of properties must be selected and referred to in a 
bottom-up or data-driven manner. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 12)) 
 
I don’t see why a theory where the reference of arguments is provided by 
predicates needs to be circular. As long as the reference of predicates is explained in a 
way that does not appeal to the notion of predicate reference, there is nothing circular 
                                                 




with using predicates to determine the reference of an argument. That is, circularity is 
avoided if one appeals, for example, to ADA to explain the reference of predicates. 
Then, using descriptions with predicates and indexicals would be enough to provide 
the reference of the predicated arguments, as I have argued in Chapter 3. 
 
5.B.III.3. The infinite regress argument: 
 
Pylyshyn argues that if the reference of a term is explained through the 
reference of another term, whose reference is explained through another term, and so 
on ad infinitum, then we have an infinite regress and we never explain how a term 
actually gets to be about something in the external world. From this Pylyshyn infers 
that a) the reference of terms must eventually be explained through an unmediated 
(direct reference) relation between a term and an entity in the world; and b) it is visual 
indexes that provide the grounding: 
 
[w]hile it is clear that you cannot individuate objects in the full-blooded sense without a 
conceptual apparatus, it is also clear that you cannot individuate them with only a 
conceptual apparatus. Sooner or later concepts must be grounded in a primitive causal 
connection between thoughts and things. The project of grounding concepts … in 
perception remains an essential requirement if we are to avoid an infinite regress. Visual 
indexes provide a putative grounding for basic objects – the individuals to which 
perceptual predicates apply, and hence about which cognitive judgments and plans of 
action are made…Without such a preconceptual grounding, our percepts and our thoughts 




indexes we can think about things…without having any concepts of them: one might say 
that we can have demonstrative thoughts. (Pylyshyn (2001b, p. 154)) 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation I agree with (a): the reference152 of terms 
is eventually grounded in representationally unmediated directly referential relations 
with external entities. ADA is an example of a theory where i) predicates are 
unmediated in the sense that the content of other predicates is not constitutive of their 
content; and ii) some predicates are unmediated in the sense that no other 
representations are needed for their tokening. In either case, according to ADA, 
predicates directly refer to properties. However, I disagree with (b): the infinite 
regress argument does not show that predicates cannot also provide the grounding. 
ADA, for example, shows how this can be the case. Then, we could have predicates 
and visual indexes that provide the grounding.153 
 
5.B.III.4. The evaluated predicates argument: 
 
Pylyshyn seems to argue that since only those predicates which are predicated 
of arguments can play a role in the sentences of the language of thought, then it must 
be the case that predicates can play a role in the language of thought only after an 
                                                 
152 Reference is, of course, to be distinguished from content. The content of indexicals, logical 
operators, and numbers is not their referent (well, in the case of indexicals, not only their referent). 
153 I, as evidenced by Chapter 3, also believe that visual indexicals are causally mediated by 
representations (but still directly referential). That is, their content is not mediated via the content of 




argument is available for them to be predicated of. This makes FINSTs—the 
arguments—logically prior to the predicates: 
 
some properties do get encoded in the form of predicates, since predicates are properties 
of indexed things, so FINSTs are logically antecedent to predicates…I will argue that it is 
a general property of conceptualizations of the perceptual world that only indexed objects 
can serve as arguments of predicates and consequently only properties of selected objects 
are conceptually encoded. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 43)) 
 
However, we can agree with Pylyshyn that for predicates to play a role in the 
language of thought they must be concatenated with an argument, without agreeing 
that the argument must be a FINST—a visual index that already refers to a visual 
object in the external world. As I have argued in Chapter 3, the argument may get its 
content via its concatenation with predicates (which, of course, does not entail that 
the content of the predicates is constitutive of the content of the argument). Thus, 
even if one grants that the tokening of an argument is logically prior to (i.e. 
independent of) the tokening of a predicate154, one can still hold that the reference of 
the argument is logically posterior to (i.e. dependent on) that of the predicate. And it 
is the latter point that is of interest here. 
 
  
5.C. FINSTs, FINGs, and the tracking problem:  
                                                 
154 I don’t see why one should grant that, though—the arguments and predicates can be tokened 






If the above is on the right track, then Pylyshyn’s theoretical arguments do not 
show that concepts cannot play a role in grounding thought. But Pylyshyn’s most 
powerful argument for his claim that conceptual representations of properties play no 
role in MOT is an empirical one: a simulation by Pylyshyn purportedly shows that 
tracking by conceptual location representations is unviable. The simulation and the 
solution to the tracking problem that I presented in Chapter 3—a solution based on 
conceptual representations of locations—are practically identical. In what follows I 
will first present and criticize Pylyshyn’s FINST based solution to the tracking 
problem (Section 5.C.I) and then I will present and rebuff his empirical argument 
(Section 5.C.II). 
 
5.C.I. Pylyshyn’s solution to the tracking problem: 
 
According to Pylyshyn, the tracking problem—the problem of associating an 
object at time t1 with an object at time t2155—is solved by the FINST mechanism in 
virtue of the fact that FINSTs normally (i.e. barring mistakes) keep being connected 
to the same FING through time through a causal chain linking the two. Pylyshyn 
hypothesizes two possible mechanisms that play a role in that: 
 
                                                 





Any early vision system will contain sensors and a way of clustering features (e.g. Marr, 
1982). In order to maintain the identity of moving clusters (i.e. to implement a ‘sticky’ 
binding) all one needs is a mechanism that treats time-slices of clusters that move 
continuously over the retina as the same cluster. It could do so, for example, by following 
the rule that if the majority of the elements in a cluster (represented, for example, in a 
‘list of contributing points’) continue to be present in a succeeding cluster then consider 
both clusters to be the same. Or alternatively, one could simply spread the activation 
arising from a cluster of elements to neighboring elements, thereby favoring the 
activation of nearby regions and so favoring continuously moving clusters. This is 
essentially the technique suggested by Koch and Ullman (1985) in their proposal for a 
neural implementation of attentional scanning. (Pylyshyn (2001b, p. 147, ff. 7))  
 
The neural implementation in question is a winner-take-all network: 
 
The network I have in mind uses a slightly modified version of what is known as a fully 
connected Winner-Take-All (WTA) network. Such a network has the property that when 
provided with an array of inputs that vary in their activation level (i.e., that have different 
magnitudes of inputs) the network settles into a state in which the unit with the most 
highly active input retains its value while the activity level of all the others is reduced to 
zero. This is, in fact, a maximum-finding circuit. (Pylyshyn (2006, p. 167))  
 
Pylyshyn’s account of tracking is (more or less) as follows: a FING causes a 
token of a FINST. The direction (in retinal coordinates) in which the FING is lying is 
registered, but not conceptually represented, via sensors on the retina. The distance 




through sensors that register convergence of the eyes156. The causal chain leading 
from the FING to the token FINST passes through a neural array where neurons 
(buffer units) are registering information about the object. These neurons are 
connected with other neurons so that they have neighboring receptive fields. The 
neurons currently being active stimulate the neurons they are connected with. As a 
result the latter neurons will get even more active, once they are stimulated by a 
FING, than a neuron that is stimulated by a FING without being already “primed”. 
This would make the token FINST be more likely to be activated by the neurons close 
by the neurons that had been activated. In this way a causal chain between the FING 
and the token FINST is maintained and tracking is performed. Note how for 
Pylyshyn, the tracking of FINGs, just as referring to FINGs, is accomplished without 
the help of conceptual representations of properties. While the object’s properties 
may play a role in causing the FINST, they are not (conceptually) represented. 
 
This is an intuitive proposal that seems to work: since the same token FINST 
is continuously caused by the same FING, in virtue of a causal chain linking the two, 
                                                 
156 Also, the distance is registered through sensors that register accommodation: cf. Palmer (1999, p. 
203-4): “Accommodation is the process through which the ciliary muscles in the eye control the 
optical focus of the lens by temporarily changing its shape. It is a monocular depth cue because it is 
available from a single eye, even though it is also present when both eyes are used…[T]he lens of the 
human eye has a variable focusing capability, becoming thin to focus light from faraway objects on the 
retina and thick to focus light from nearby ones…. If the visual system has information about the 





the token FINST tracks the FING. No appeal is made to any conceptual 
representations but only to registrations. Despite its intuitive appeal, this proposal is 
problematic. First, it cannot explain visual tracking through occlusion (a case where 
the visually tracked object is briefly occluded by an intervening obstacle). The reason 
is that while the visually tracked object is occluded, there is no causal chain 
connecting tokens of FINSTs with a FING.157 Furthermore, the proposal suffers from 
the “which link” problem just as much as Pylyshyn’s account of how FINSTs refer to 
FINGs. Namely, it is not clear why the FINST should be tracking a distal object, as 
opposed to a proximal one, e.g. a locus of activation on the retina or on the neural 
array. In fact, it is not clear why there should be any tracking at all—the notion of 
tracking implies that the same object is being tracked. However, because of the 
“which link” problem, it is indeterminate what a FINST refers to at a moment and 
therefore from one moment to the next. At time t1 it could refer to object x (a link in a 
causal chain leading to the token FINST). At time t2 it could refer to object y (also a 
link in a causal chain leading to the token FINST). However, if x ≠ y, then, since the 
FINST does not represent the same object at different times, it does not track. Lastly, 
if Pylyshyn has a hard time explaining why a FINST refers to a particular object, as 
opposed to a property or a space-time region, as argued above, then it is not clear why 
a FINST should track at all. Instead it can be treated as merely representing that a 
                                                 
157 To avoid this problem Pylyshyn allows that during occlusion tracking is performed via conceptual 
representations of location: cf. Pylyshyn (2007, p. 40): “[it] seems at least that when tracked targets 
disappear there is a record of where they were when they disappeared” and cf. Pylyshyn (2007, p. 80): 





property is present. Alternatively, it can be treated as merely individuating a space-
time region.  
 
The point is that there are theoretical problems for Pylyshyn’s account of 
tracking by FINSTs. But Pylyshyn thinks that the problems for alternative accounts 
for tracking, like the one I presented in Chapter 3, are much worse:  
 
5.C.II. Pylyshyn’s empirical argument against conceptual location 
representations: 
 
Pylyshyn takes his experiments158 to show that conceptual representations of 
non-spatial properties are not used in tracking. Let’s grant this for the moment. 
Pylyshyn also takes his experiments to show that conceptual representations of 
spatial properties are not used in referring and tracking. If he is right, then my 
account of how particular objects get represented—according to which particular 
objects are represented through conceptual spatio-temporal representations—and the 
solution to the tracking problem presented in Chapter 3—a solution based on 
conceptual spatio-temporal representations—are mistaken. What I will now argue for 
is that Pylyshyn’s argument is not conclusive.  
 
                                                 





Pylyshyn considers a mechanism for tracking through conceptual location 
representations159: the locations of four targets are represented (encoded) and 
recorded (perhaps in something like Treisman’s object files160). Then, these 
conceptual representations of location are updated continuously by moving focal 
attention to each target in turn: if target x has moved, the representation of location in 
the object file corresponding to x is updated with a representation of the location of 
the nearest object to x’s previously represented location.161 However, Pylyshyn 
dismisses this solution because the simulation of this strategy when using data about 
the movements of the dots from an actual MOT experiment yielded  
 
a predicted performance of only about 30 percent under the most conservative 
conditions—that is, using the highest estimates of attentional speed reported in the 
literature and even considering the possibility that not just location but also speed and 
direction of each target are also encoded to enable some degree of prediction of the 
targets’ location. This is far from the 87 percent performance we actually observed with 
our volunteer subjects. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 36-37)) 
 
                                                 
159 Cf. Pylyshyn (2007, p. 36-37). 
160 Cf. Kahneman, D., Treisman, A. and Gibbs, B. J. (1992). 
161 More specifically the process is something like the following: 1) Create object file α with a location 
representation at time t1. 2) For any object file β such that it is a) created after t1 but within time t; and 
b) its location representation specifies a location whose distance to the location specified by α’s 
location representation is the shortest, but also shorter that x, then delete the location representation in 




Hill (2008), however, points out that this argument does not work against all 
accounts where representations of location are used in MOT. The accounts immune to 
Pylyshyn’s argument are those where FINSTs are object files (á la Treisman) and 
where each FINST tracks in virtue of a location representation in the object file, 
which gets continuously and automatically (i.e. in parallel and without the use of 
focal attention) updated: 
 
[Pylyshyn’s] only truly decisive argument against [the hypothesis that MOT requires 
representations of location], stated on p. 37, does not rule out all versions of it. In 
particular it has no force against the version which claims (i) that subjects track moving 
objects by deploying object files, (ii) that object files contain representations of locations, 
and (iii) that these representations are continuously and automatically updated. (Hill 
(2008))  
 
The accounts which Pylyshyn dismisses are ones where the locations of the 
targets are represented and recorded and where these representations of location are 
updated by moving focal attention to each target in turn. Focal attention is a serial 
process and it is because of that that Pylyshyn gets the abysmal predicted 
performance of only 30 percent (compared to the 87 percent performance observed 
with actual subjects)—it takes time for focal attention to move from one object to 
another and the longer that time is, the greater the chance is that a non-tracked object 
can be the one closest to the previous location of a tracked one (and so be mistaken 
for the tracked object). However, accounts where representations of locations are 





Pylyshyn accepts that one cannot show with a great degree of certainty that 
such alternative explanations are wrong:  
 
one can’t exclude all logically possible alternative processes for achieving these results. 
For example, we cannot exclude the possibility that location encoding occurs in parallel 
at each tracked object and then serially allocated focal attention is used for tracking, or 
that four parallel “beams of attention” independently track the four targets. (Pylyshyn 
(2001b, p. 143, ff. 3)) 
 
But what then are Pylyshyn’s grounds for preferring his own view? Hill conjectures 
that Pylyshyn insists on his hypothesis on methodological grounds: it is simpler since 
it doesn’t require representing locations. But Hill argues that Pylyshyn’s proposal is 
not in fact simpler, as Pylyshyn intends: Pylyshyn allows for representations of 
locations to play a role in tracking:  
 
[it] seems at least that when tracked targets disappear there is a record of where they were 
when they disappeared. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 40))  
 
Pylyshyn’s idea seems to be that normally tracking does not need to involve 
representations of locations, but in some cases—occlusion—they are involved. 






our assumption is that the disappearance itself causes locations to be conceptualized and 
stored in memory. (Pylyshyn (2007, p. 80))  
 
Hill agrees that this is a possible interpretation of the results, but he points out that 
since the FINST mechanism also appeals in some cases to representations of location, 
then it may not be simpler than mechanisms that use representations of locations to 
track in all cases:  
 
Pylyshyn seems not to realize that a mechanism that detects disappearances and then 
creates representations of last known locations (perhaps by drawing on iconic memories 
of the locations) may not be simpler than a mechanism that creates representations of 
locations at the outset of a tracking venture and then automatically updates them. In other 
words, his interpretation of tracking across disappearances adds significantly to the 
complexity of his initial FINST-based hypothesis about tracking, and may thereby 
undercut the methodological argument for its correctness. (Hill (2008)) 
 
The upshot is that Pylyshyn’s argument on methodological grounds is not 
persuasive since it at most shows that representations of locations need not play a key 
role in tracking. Furthermore, the argument based on Pylyshyn’s empirical findings 
does not exclude all variants of accounts where spatial representations are used for 
tracking. Thus, what Hill (2008) calls Pylyshyn’s “only truly decisive argument” 
against the use of representations of location in tracking leaves open the possibility 





If the above is on the right track, then Pylyshyn has not presented a conclusive 
argument against my account of how particulars get represented and the tracking 
mechanism proposed in Chapter 3.  
 
 
5.D. Connections with Clark’s theory of sentience: 
 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have appealed to representations of spatio-
temporal relations to account for how particular objects are represented. Before I 
conclude, I will present Clark’s argument as to why such representations are needed 
for representing objects. The gist is that to represent objects we first need to segregate 
some cluster of visual features from the background. To do so, however, requires 
solving the binding problem, which in turn requires concatenating predicates to 
arguments, where the arguments refer to regions. I give an account of how regions get 
represented and this account appeals to representations of spatio-temporal relations. 
The upshot is that Clark’s argument can be read to fit with and support my account of 
how particular objects get represented.  
  
According to Clark, our visual system must solve the binding problem if it is 
to distinguish between a glossy red object next to a matte green one and a matte red 
object next to a glossy green one. Clark argues that to solve the binding problem a 




system had only one type—predicates. The problem is that simply conjoining 
predicates together would not work: ‘glossy’ and ‘red’ and ‘matte’ and ‘green’ does 
not settle which representations are bound together—do we have (‘glossy’ and ‘red’) 
and (‘matte’ and ‘green’), or (‘glossy’ and ‘green’) and (‘matte’ and ‘red’)?162  
 
One can attempt to appeal only to predicates by appealing to primitive 
representations of properties like ‘glossy-red’, ‘matte-green’, ‘glossy-green’, and 
‘matte-red’. In other words, one can try to solve the binding problem not by figuring 
out conditions for conjoining ‘glossy’ and ‘red’ but by appealing to non-complex 
representations that refer to complexes of properties like glossy redness. However, 
this would entail that for any combination of properties we would need to have a 
distinct representation. This would lead to an indefinite number of representations, 
which is problematic. What makes this implausible is not only the profundity of 
symbols, but the fact that minds are assumed to be instantiated in computational 
systems with finite alphabets of primitive symbols. Having a mind with an indefinite 
number of primitive symbols threatens this presumption.163 
 
                                                 
162 Cf. Clark (2000, p. 72): “we need two different kinds of place-holders in any schema describing the 
contents of sensory experience. It cannot be collapsed to a univariate form. We cannot capture those 
contents by substituting different qualities Q in a schema of the form ‘appearance of qualities Q.’ 
Instead we need two place-holders: ‘appearance of qualities Q at region R.’ 
163 I say “threatens” and not “disproves” because the fact that a set has indefinite number of members 
does not entail that the set is infinite. Thus, the problem of indefinite number of demonstratives is a 




One can also attempt to appeal only to predicates by appealing to Quine’s 
(1960). In Chapter 2 I mentioned Quine’s (1960, p. 343-347) argument that we can 
transform a sentence with singular terms/arguments/variables into a sentence without 
one via six combinators. However, as Robin Clark (p. 3-4) points out, what Quine 
actually shows is that we can eliminate only the syntactic contribution of variables. 
The semantic contribution remains intact. That is to say that symbols corresponding 
to variables in a language do not need to be explicitly tokened/written. Whatever their 
syntactic contribution to a sentence is, it can be substituted via the use of Quine’s 
combinators. But this does not entail that we can eliminate the semantic contribution 
of variables. The semantic contribution is needed by Quine’s own admission to define 
the arity of predicates. So we still need variables.  
 
Clark argues that what is needed to solve the binding problem is to identify the 
thing that is glossy with the thing that is red. To do so, we need the identity operator 
and a term that is syntactically and semantically distinct from representations of 
properties—a singular term: 
 
[t]o get to identity statements we need to add a new kind of term, with a distinct function. 
These are singular terms, names or terms like names, that are used to identify. (Clark 
(2004, p. 8)) 
 
The singular term that Clark introduces to solve the binding problem is a term that 





Terms for features and terms for places must play fundamentally distinct and non-
interchangeable roles, because otherwise one could not solve the binding problem. (Clark 
(2004, p. 6)) 
 
The reason Clark appeals to singular terms that refer to places is to account for 
the processing that goes on in early vision. Essentially, different properties are 
registered in different “feature maps”. Such maps register a given property and its 
spatial relation to the observer. We can think of their outputs as composed of a 
representation of a property concatenated with a singular term—a representation of a 
place. Treisman and Gelade (1980) suggest that there is also a “master map”—a map 
that detects when two feature-maps token singular terms that refer to the same region. 
It is via the “master map” that two singular terms are identified with each other. 
 
Clark (2004, p. 13) points out that the binding problem must be solved prior to 
FINSTs being tokened, according to Pylyshyn’s own admission: 
 
In assigning indexes, some cluster of visual features must first be segregated from the 
background or picked out as a unit. (Pylyshyn (2001b, p. 145)) 
 
As a result Clark (2004, p. 13) takes himself to be giving an account of an “earlier 





Proto-objects will be the values of variables in one layer of visual representation. That 
layer is above feature-placing but below the apparatus of individuation and sortal 
concepts found in a natural language. (Clark (2004, p. 1))  
 
Given my account of how particulars are represented, I am sympathetic to 
Clark’s account. I agree that we need representations prior to FINSTs and more 
specifically that the representations needed must include spatial ones. I also agree 
with his argument that we need both predicates and arguments in order to solve the 
binding problem and that the arguments refer to regions. Now I will point out how his 
view can be read to fit with and support mine:  
 
In my account of how particular objects get represented I appealed to 
representations of super-determinate pyramidal configurations—‘C(x, l, n, r, drl, drn, 
dln, drx, dlx, dnx, t, I)’ (I will use ‘Cj’ for brevity). The configuration is such that: a) it 
involves the objects x, l, n, and r forming a pyramid with sides of length drl, drn, dln, 
drx, dlx, and dnx; and b) r, l, and n form the base of the pyramid and r and l are a 
system’s eyes, while n is a system’s nose. Now, the concatenation ‘Cjx’ represents 
that x is at the tip of the pyramid. This means that in virtue of being concatenated 
with ‘Cj’, ‘x’ can be used a representation of a space-time location—the one at the tip 
of the pyramidal configuration Cj set on me, now. ‘x’ can also represent a region 
when it is concatenated with a multitude of such predicates: ‘Cjx’, ‘Cix’, and ‘Ckx’. 
Suppose that ‘x’ is also concatenated with a non-spatio-temporal property, as in ‘Rx’, 
where ‘R’ refers to redness. Then, ‘Rx’ will denote a feature at a region. Finally, note 




doesn’t enter into definite descriptions that are stored in memory, ‘x’ would not count 
as a representation of an object. Thus, it is the fact that ‘x’ doesn’t enter into definite 
descriptions that are stored in memory that makes ‘x’ refer to a region, as opposed to 
an object. 
 
This shows that my account can provide an explanation of how 
representations of features at regions get their content and it does so in virtue of two 
syntactically different types of symbols—much as on Clark’s account. Also, given 
that there are no definite descriptions needed for representing features at regions, I 
can hold, as Clark does, that the level of representation of features at regions is below 
that required for representing objects. More importantly, however, above I have given 
an account of how representations of regions get their content—something which 
Clark does not do. According to this account, representations of regions get their 
content via representations of spatio-temporal relations (‘Cj’). Thus, Clark’s view can 
be developed to appeal to such spatio-temporal representations to explain how 
regions are represented and, via the terms that represent regions, to explain how the 
binding problem is solved. Since solving the binding problem is a necessary 
requirement for representing objects in the sensory systems, Clark’s view can be read 
as supporting my position that representations of spatio-temporal relations are 









In this chapter I have argued that if Pylyshyn’s view is read as an account 
where FINSTs get their content via singular causal relations with FINGs, then 
Pylyshyn’s view runs into the “which link” problem. If Pylyshyn’s view is read as an 
account where FINSTs get their content via registers that enter into nomic relations 
with properties of FINGs, then, unless it appeals also to definite descriptions, it has 
difficulty explaining why a FINST is a representation of a particular object, as 
opposed to a representation of a region. If one appeals to definite descriptions, 
however, then on some views of the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction, one has 
appealed to concepts. This means that if to represent particular objects requires 
definite descriptions, and if an appeal to the latter entails an appeal to concepts, then 
FINSTs are conceptual representations and are conceptually mediated (in the sense 
that their content is specified through other concepts, but without the content of these 
concepts being constitutive of the content of FINSTs). Pylyshyn’s empirical 
argument—the argument that tracking by conceptual representations of location is 
unviable—is also shown to be lacking because it does not apply against accounts that 
appeal to the use of conceptual representations of location in parallel. Pylyshyn’s own 
solution of how tracking takes place is shown to suffer from the “which link” problem 
as much as his solution of how FINSTs represent FINGs. The overarching conclusion 
is that Pylyshyn’s view that FINSTs are not conceptual and are not mediated by 









6.A. Main claims: 
 
I have argued that singular causal strategies of content face a significant 
problem in the “which link” problem. The latter cannot be resolved by an appeal to 
triangulation (whether actual or counterfactual). The troubles of singular causal 
strategies with the “which link” problem constitute a reason to pursue other strategies, 
which is what I have done in this dissertation.  
  
I have pointed out that ADA faces the problem of representing individuals. I 
have argued that to explain how particular objects are represented a) the logico-
syntactic roles of representations of particular objects need to be taken into account, 
and for this ADA needs to be complemented by conceptual role semantics; and b) an 
appeal to the temporal and first-person indexicals must be made, and for this ADA 
must be supplemented with singular causal relations. In particular, I have argued that 
a representation of an object ‘x’ gets its content via a definite description that denotes 
‘x’’s referent without constituting ‘x’’s content. This view makes use of conceptual 
role semantics for more than the logical apparatus needed for the definite description. 




particulars are tracked in virtue of an updating and storing of the definite descriptions 
that determine the content of representations of particular objects.  
 
In my proposal for accounting for the content of representations of particular 
objects I have appealed to conceptual role semantics to account for predicate logic, 
representations of numbers, ‘I’, and ‘t’. But conceptual role semantics has been held 
by many to be deeply problematic because of the holism and the circularity problems. 
I have argued that by looking at the roles of symbols that are explanatorily basic, the 
holism problem can be solved. I have also argued that conceptual role semantics need 
not be circular if one doesn’t use it as the sole account of content. 
 
Finally, I have argued that if Pylyshyn’s view is read as an account where 
FINSTs get their content via singular causal relations with FINGs, then Pylyshyn’s 
view runs into the “which link” problem. If Pylyshyn’s view is read as an account 
where FINSTs get their content via registers that enter into nomic relations with 
properties of FINGs, then, unless it appeals also to definite descriptions, it has 
difficulty explaining why a FINST is a representation of a particular object, as 
opposed to a representation of a region. If one appeals to definite descriptions, 
however, then on some views of the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction, one has 
appealed to concepts. This means that if to represent particular objects requires 
definite descriptions, and if an appeal to the latter entails an appeal to concepts, then 




overarching conclusion is that Pylyshyn’s view that FINSTs are not conceptual and 
are not mediated by conceptual representations of spatial properties is questionable.  
 
 
6.B. Directions for future research: 
 
 
I have suggested how spatio-temporal relations such as configurations can be 
represented. But this leaves open the issue whether these spatio-temporal relations are 
organized within a space (e.g. Euclidean or Hyperbolic) or whether the mechanisms 
for spatial perception are fragmented in a way that does not allow one to pick a 
specific or any geometry. In examining this issue I plan to start with Wagner (2006) 
and Masrour (2010). So, one direction for future research is to see how space-time is 
represented. 
 
In this dissertation I have assumed Fodor’s metaphysical assumptions. I want 
to explore how alternate metaphysical assumptions would change the conclusions of 
this dissertation. Obviously, if one were to adopt a nominalist proposal, then the 
singular causal theories of content would become much more plausible and this 
would boost Pylyshyn’s case. But adopting regularity theories of nomic relations 
might also have effects on the conclusion I have drawn—for example, the assumption 
on which ADA relies is that nomic relations cover causal relations (i.e. they are 





In my proposal of how particulars are represented in nomic accounts I 
appealed to temporal representations. I would like to explore further this issue 
beginning with the work of Roberts (1998) and Gallistel (2009). 
 
Some of the implications of my account—as to whether FINSTs are 
conceptual or not—obviously depend on what “concept” means and whether there are 
non-conceptual representations. Thus, one of the future research projects would be to 
relate the views on the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction to my project in a much 
more specific manner than I have done in this dissertation. 
 
Finally, I have appealed to memory in giving an account of how 
representations of particular objects get their content. My hunch is that Treisman-
style object files can serve as memory files that encode types of features through time 
(e.g. shape Si at ti, Sj at tj…). I plan to examine this hypothesis starting with the work 
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